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Abstract 
The effects of a technology disaster on an organization can include a prolonged 
disruption, loss of reputation, monetary damages, and the inability to remain in business. 
Although much is known about disaster recovery and business continuance, not much 
research has been produced on how businesses can leverage other technology 
frameworks to assist information technology disaster recovery. The problem was the lack 
of organizational knowledge to recover from computer crime interruptions given the 
maturity level of existing disaster recovery programs. The purpose of this Delphi study 
was to understand how disaster recovery controls and processes can be modified to 
improve response to a computer crime caused business interruption. The overarching 
research question in this study was to understand what factors emerge relative to the 
ability of disaster recovery programs to respond to disasters caused by computer crimes. 
The conceptual framework included a maturity model to look at how programs might be 
improved to respond to the computer crimes threat. Research data were collected from a 
3 round Delphi study of 22 disaster recovery experts in the fields of disaster recovery and 
information security. Results from the Delphi encompass a consensus by the panel. Key 
findings included the need for planning for cyber security, aligning disaster recovery with 
cyber security, providing cyber security training for managers and staff, and applying 
lessons learned from experience. Implications for positive social change include the 
ability for organizations to return to an acceptable level of operation and continue their 
service benefiting employees, customers, and other stakeholders. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Businesses must be able to recover from an unexpected interruption if they are to 
continue to service their customers and maintain an advantage over their competition. 
The management of disaster recovery activities is a critical role in restoring the business 
after it has experienced an interruption. An interruption can include anything from natural 
disasters to terrorism (Guidry, Vaughn, Anderson, & Flores, 2015). The goal of 
information technology disaster recovery, a subset of the larger known emergency 
management theory, includes planning and the resumption of applications, data, 
hardware, digital communications, and other technology infrastructure. Technology-
caused disasters require a response by technology resources to triage and resume the 
business’s technology infrastructure. Information technology disaster recovery is 
primarily concerned with the minimizing of the interruption of operations, ensuring 
security, and producing a reliable data. Technology disasters can manifest from hard 
drive failures, erroneous backup, or loss of a network segment, but computer crimes are 
an emerging threat that organizations need to consider as an equal threat as a traditional 
disaster.  
In this chapter, I provide information about the importance of understanding the 
impact of computer crimes on information technology disaster recovery. The disaster 
recovery problem, purpose of the study, and theoretical framework are discussed. The 
chapter concludes with the description of the research method, assumptions of the study, 
delimitations, and significance of the study. 
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Background of the Study 
Interruptions resulting from computer crimes create damages to businesses in the 
form of financial loss, reputation, data destruction, and privacy issues (Marinescu, 2015; 
Mossburg, 2015; Mulla & Ademi, 2015; Tran, Campos-Nanez, Fomin, & Wasek, 2016). 
Computer crimes are often executed against technology infrastructures through the acts 
of hacking, denial of service, malware, ransomware, or phishing. The 2014 hacking of 
Sony Pictures Entertainment caused the company to operate for several days without 
computing resources while the technology infrastructure was being resumed from the 
attack (Bidgoli, 2016; Solberg Søilen, 2016). In January of 2016, a milestone was 
reached when a hacking group was successful in attacking regional power authorities in 
Ukraine that led to the loss of power to over 225,000 customers (Lee, Assante, & 
Conway, 2016). In February 2016, the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center 
emergency room was disrupted by computer crimes that resulted in the transfer of 
patients to alternate hospitals (Kandel & Kovacik, 2016; Sittig & Singh, 2016). On June 
27, 2017, the Heritage Valley Health System, based in Beaver, Pennsylvania, was forced 
to suspend operations from a targeted cryptolocker attack that disabled computer systems 
in two hospitals (Schwartz, 2017a). Computer crimes should be considered as significant 
risks to an organization’s standard operating procedures. Business is being affected by 
computer crimes that are causing significant interruptions. Computer crime interruptions 
are becoming a bigger issue, as a business must position itself against a growing range of 
risks (Allianz, 2015; Jang-Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). Morgan (2016) claimed the damages 
from computer crimes and their interruptions are expected to reach 6 trillion dollars by 
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2021. Businesses that are reliant on technology are experiencing significant interruptions 
due to computer crimes, which lead to monetary losses, customer turnover, reputational 
losses, and diminished goodwill (Brown, 2016; Ferdinand, 2015). Computer crimes can 
initiate from multiple vectors and may leverage a risk that was not previously identified 
by cybersecurity team or emergency planners. Computer crimes will continue to increase 
as the number of technology devices is being leveraged in businesses. 
Problem Statement 
Although much is known about disaster recovery and business continuance, not 
much research has been produced on how businesses can leverage other technology 
frameworks to assist information technology disaster recovery (Bird, 2015; Brown, 2016; 
Dines, 2012; Ignatius, 2015; Marinescu, 2015). The general problem, as Ferdinand 
(2015) noted, was that the ability to resume a business has now become not just a 
management goal, but a goal for critical technology infrastructures. The specific problem 
was the lack of organizational knowledge to recover from computer crimes interruptions 
given the maturity level of existing disaster recovery programs. Guidry et al. (2015) and 
Ferdinand discussed the lack of a set of control procedures to allow understanding of how 
business’s management can bolster disaster recovery programs to account for this type of 
interruption.  
Traditional information technology disaster recovery focuses on fire, flood, loss 
of power, and technology hardware failures, but research conducted in the 2016 Cyber 
Security Intelligence Index by IBM noted 60% of small to medium size businesses fail 
following a cyber-attack (IBM, 2016). McCreight and Leece (2016) wrote that disaster 
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planners might not respond to security events where they have no knowledge. Increasing 
the understanding of the disaster planners, responders, and management teams improves 
the ability to execute the recovery plan. This research may help close the gap by 
increasing the understanding of how business may leverage cybersecurity frameworks to 
modify information technology disaster recovery programs. The information from this 
study might produce a framework for businesses to find additional capabilities in 
responding to a computer crimes interruption. 
Businesses that are unable to serve their customers do not tend to remain in 
business for long. The ability to recover from an unexpected interruption is vital if the 
business is to continue to service their customers and maintain an advantage over the 
competition. Information technology disaster recovery (ITDR) emerged from the field of 
emergency management and sought to resume the organization from a technology outage 
quickly. Traditionally, businesses have needed to prepare for outages from fire, flood, 
loss of power, and terrorism. With the increase in reliance on technology infrastructures, 
businesses also need to prepare for computer crimes such as hacking, denial of service, 
and malicious insiders in interrupting the business by causing a technology interruption. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this qualitative Delphi study was to understand how information 
technology disaster recovery controls and processes can be modified to improve response 
to a computer crime caused business interruption. This qualitative approach included a 
focus on information technology disaster recovery participants to develop a new 
framework of response. Twenty-two participants with at least 5 years’ experience in 
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disaster recovery were interviewed until patterns or themes were detected. The inquiry 
included a focus on the existing information technology disaster recovery frameworks as 
they are executed by organizations in resuming the business into a state where normal 
operations can be conducted. The new model was developed as an understanding of how 
the information technology disaster recovery processes might be influenced by other 
frameworks tailored to cybersecurity or computer incident response. A Delphi approach 
was chosen over other qualitative research approaches, such as a case study, because I 
aimed to learn what factors affect certain responses and how to improve the disaster 
response process. 
Research Questions 
The research may help to build knowledge on several qualitative questions about 
the current state of information technology disaster recovery and where integration of 
cybersecurity methodologies would be advantageous. A qualitative inquiry was chosen to 
allow for rich data analysis from a specific, expert population of participants and theory 
generation to improve disaster response. The overarching research question in this study 
is: What factors emerge relative to the ability of disaster recovery programs to respond to 
disasters caused by computer crimes? Subsequent questions asked in the Delphi rounds 
sought to understand how successful are disaster responders when following approved 
information technology disaster recovery plans to recover from computer crimes caused 
business interruption. What steps do the experts believe can be an improvement for 
resumption from this type of threat? What interruptions caused by computer crimes cause 
the response team to recover differently than a traditionally planned? What differences 
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can be found from a business that prepared for interruptions caused computer crimes as 
compared to those that do not? What common themes exist where the cause of the 
technology interruption might have been significantly reduced by modification of the 
information technology disaster recovery framework to align with a cybersecurity 
framework?  
Conceptual Framework 
This study used a disaster recovery maturity model as the conceptual framework. 
A disaster recovery maturity model depicts multiple levels representing an organization’s 
ability to resume the business within the desired recovery time objective (Randeree, 
Mahal, & Narwani, 2012; Stewart, Allen, Dorofee, Valdez, & Young, 2015). Based on a 
capability maturity model, the maturity level speaks to the state of readiness to recover 
from a business interruption. An organization at the lowest level of ad hoc has minimal 
planning and will scramble to recover the organization. The highest level of resilience 
will exist where the organization has a detailed recovery plan, administrative oversight, 
and established preventive measure. Assessing the organization’s disaster recovery 
program against key factors such as documentation, recovery time objectives, 
architecture, and scope provides an understanding of a state of readiness and what 
processes need to be re-engineered for improvement. The disaster recovery maturity 
model provided the ability to assign recommendations to improve maturity in action-
oriented goals.  
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Nature of the Study 
A qualitative researcher aims to gather an in-depth understanding of a 
phenomenon and the data surrounding that phenomenon. Woods, Macklin, and Lewis 
(2016) described qualitative research as the combining of knowledge, experience, and 
understanding to allow the researcher to make judgments about a phenomenon or 
circumstance. A qualitative inquiry was chosen because it is the most appropriate design 
for gaining an understanding of the problem computer crimes interruptions causes to 
disaster recovery programs. A qualitative inquiry was selected over a quantitative study 
because of the little knowledge on the subject of computer crimes affecting information 
technology disaster recovery processes, and the difficulty of soliciting participants 
willing to discuss their organization's failure. Although empirical survey data might be 
collected on experienced disasters and a hypothesis designed about what impacts would 
exist, the nature of a qualitative study allows for a rich data collection on the 
phenomenon.  
A Delphi design was selected over other qualitative approaches, such as case 
study or phenomenology, because of the goal of the study was for prediction and theory 
building. In a qualitative case study of an organization's disaster response, the data 
collected from the small number of organizations may not fully develop a theory of how 
other organization may leverage a different set of controls for resuming the business. The 
Delphi design allows for the identification of controls or alternative frameworks that may 
be used to improve the process by analyzing feedback from experts in the field of disaster 
recovery. The findings from the data collection activity are triangulated from the 
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responses of the participants and research during the literature review. The study was 
exploratory because of the small number of studies on the topic of computer crimes as 
they affect information technology disaster recovery.  
 While Delphi is a flexible approach for data collection and consensus generation, 
the researcher must consider different designs to implement the method correctly. 
Skulmoski, Hartman, and Krahn (2007) wrote that the initial Delphi questions are 
typically broad, open-ended questions. Extra care must be made by the researcher to 
ensure the initial set of qualitative questions set the proper path for the research. The 
researcher may see limitations in the research by not executing Delphi with a proper set 
of initial questions, not populating the panel with the correct expertise, and not correctly 
communicate the requirements of the participants. To address these limitations, I worked 
with the committee to refine the initial round of questions, conducted a pilot round to 
solidify the questions and instructions, diligently sought the proper panel members, and 
carefully crafted communications to each participant. The number of participants chosen 
was a number large enough to allow for the loss of multiple panelists as well as to obtain 
data saturation.  
 The topic of information technology disaster recovery activity resulting from 
computer crimes does not raise an ethical concern. Delphi is used in an anonymous 
fashion that allows for participants to provide their expertise on how the traditional 
disaster recovery methods can be positively altered. The panelists are not affiliated with a 
business so that there can be no negative perceptions of an entity or employer. Disaster 
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responders and technology management are not considered a traditional protected class in 
scientific research. 
Definitions 
Business continuity planning: Business continuity planning is the methodology 
that ensures certain critical business functions will continue to operate regardless of the 
disasters that may be encountered by the organization. Business continuance is mainly 
business facing and will focus on planning (Thejendra, 2008). 
Computer crimes: An act performed by a person, sometimes referred to as a 
hacker that illegally uses, steals or destroys information. This individual or group of 
individuals may destroy or corrupt the computer data (Schultz & Shumway, 2001). 
Computer exploits: A technology exploit is a mechanism for executing an 
unintended, potentially damaging process afforded by a technology vulnerability that 
offers an advantage to an attacker (Sen & Heim, 2016). 
Contingency: A contingency is something that has occurred out of the ordinary. A 
contingency could range from a fire to a malicious insider deleting data (Togio, 1989). 
Crisis management: Crisis management is defined as the process by which a 
group of senior management will control conversing with the media, dialog with the 
customers, and act as a panic prevention team (Tucker, 2014). 
Cybersecurity incident responders: An incident responder specifically trained and 
charged with resuming the organization in the event of an information security incident 
(Schultz & Shumway, 2001). 
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Disaster recovery: Disaster recovery is the planning and execution needed to 
quickly recover from a disaster that is usually caused by technology (Tucker, 2014).  
Disaster recovery site: A disaster recovery site is usually an alternative computing 
site that can be used to run the technology the business needs if the primary site fails or 
becomes unstable (Togio, 1989).  
Emergency management: The managerial function of creating the framework by 
which communities reduce vulnerabilities to disasters and how to cope with the disaster 
when encountered (Hiatt, 2000). 
Failover: Failover is the mechanism used to migrate the production system to a 
redundant server upon the previous active backup (Grigonis, 2002). 
First responders: Someone designated or trained to be the first to respond to an 
emergency (Bishoff et al., 2015). 
Recovery time objectives: The designated duration of time and a service level 
within which a business process must be restored after a disaster to avoid unacceptable 
consequences to the organization (Thejendra, 2008). 
Resumption: The act of returning an organization into the state it was in before a 
disaster or interruption (Thejendra, 2008). 
Security: Security is defined as that state where an organization is free of 
unacceptable risk (Mihut, 2014). 
Assumptions 
Several assumptions are considered in this research. First, there is an assumption 
that the Delphi participants are experts in their fields of disaster recovery or cybersecurity 
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and have sufficient knowledge about disaster response to propose solutions for the 
problem. Each participant was selected based on interviews, recommendations, or their 
visibility as a researcher in this subject matter. There is an assumption that the 
participants would answer the questions from the Delphi design truthfully and provide 
clear communication on answers that were deemed outliers from the Delphi round. I 
assumed that participants who stayed for all three rounds of the study and, when asked to 
provide additional data about an outlier, I gave the participant the proper amount of time 
to give an answer. This study was a qualitative study to obtain rich, descriptive data. 
Participants were guided through each round of the Delphi design and allowed a window 
of time to provide their responses to keep the rounds allocated to a reasonable timeframe 
to complete the study. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The participants of this study were selected from disaster recovery programs for 
businesses that are large enough to plan regularly, conduct testing and have experienced 
an interruption from computer crimes. Organizations including Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association (ISACA), Information Security Certification (ISC2), 
Information Systems Security Association (ISSA), Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), and 
the InfraGard were contacted for applicable participants in the United States. Experts 
from the disciplines of emergency management, information technology disaster 
recovery, and cyber resiliency were asked to rate qualitative indicators using the Delphi 
design. I targeted experts from medium to large business in the United States. To reach a 
quality panel of experts across the United States, I collected data via electronic mail. The 
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ability to leverage the Internet allowed for the panel to have flexibility when they 
provided data and the ability to reflect on their answers. When interviews were identified 
as necessary, Internet-based video or a conference call was used.  
The role of the researcher in the data collection process is to facilitate the multiple 
rounds of the Delphi design and conduct interviews for outlier concepts after the Delphi 
rounds are complete. Researchers have the unique ability to increase an understanding of 
how participants experience the phenomenon being studied, which provides valuable data 
for the research. I narrowed and filtered data as it was collected, without altering the data, 
to be analyzed into patterns or themes theories, as recommended by Maxwell (2013). To 
reduce the threat of bias in this research I performed triangulation with data collected 
from participants and data found in the literature. Special attention was paid to collect 
participant data in each round of the Delphi and conducted interviews.  
For each round of the Delphi, the consensus was sought, and answers to the 
questions were provided to the panelists for review and adjustment when requested. As 
the data collection process from the Delphi study is electronic, presentation, importing, 
and archiving were simplified. Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) highlighted a significant 
value of the Delphi design is in the ability to produce theoretical research. Zahidy, 
Azizan, and Sorooshian (2016) wrote about the Delphi design being suited for a study 
where there is incomplete knowledge about a problem where there are no correct answers 
or incomplete knowledge.  
I chose the Delphi design to provide for greater access to disaster responders 
across multiple businesses and service offerings, anonymous responses, and the ability to 
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produce theoretical data for an improved information technology disaster recovery 
response. Interviews were conducted with certain participants for interesting disparities to 
understand the deviation from consensus. Like disaster recovery planning, a Delphi study 
by Pieko (2005) was successfully used to improve the quality of information technology 
security audits. The panel of experts was asked to rate indicators on a Likert scale from 1 
to 6 which were divided up into several categories such as data destruction, resiliency, 
and disaster planning issues. 
Limitations 
The research was limited to the disaster recovery and cybersecurity participants’ 
understanding of information technology disaster recovery and cybersecurity incident 
response. The research included how disaster recovery teams and cybersecurity teams 
could better plan for and resume the organization from a computer crimes interruption. 
My focus for the research study did not include the motive behind the cyber attackers, 
describe the type of individuals or groups that comprise cyber hackers, or developed a 
method for preventing the attacks. The findings from this research may not apply to all 
organizations. I assumed that applicable organizations would have information 
technology disaster recovery programs in place and the findings may not apply to very 
small enterprises without dedicated incident responders or cybersecurity staff.  
Significance of the Study 
The research presented by the study is unique in that it is focusing on an under-
researched area of information technology disaster recovery. The existing literature on 
disaster recovery has yet to collaborate cybersecurity response to the traditional 
14 
 
emergency response. The ability to recover quickly from a technology interruption is 
crucial, and the need to prepare for computer crimes may not be as adequately addressed 
as possible. The results of the study may provide insights into what areas of information 
technology disaster recovery are weak as it pertains to computer crimes and what areas 
can be supplemented. The findings may have a significant influence on how disaster 
planning is conducted for organizations that have a strong reliance on technology 
infrastructure. The study could have a significant influence on a business that experiences 
significant computer crimes related interruption and could recover in a manner as to limit 
the impact of the business offering and minimizing financial loss. 
Building a new understanding of an information technology disaster recovery 
framework that focuses on traditional business interruptions and security responses that 
assist in resuming computer crimes would be beneficial to disaster recovery planners, 
disaster recovery responders, and business owners. Organizations that rely on a 
significant foundation of technology infrastructure may be able to apply or assess the gap 
between their existing traditional disaster recovery methods and the new knowledge 
being created in this study. The research presented in this study should be read by disaster 
recovery managers, technology first responders, and business continuance planners for 
the knowledge being created to improve the response to an emerging threat. 
Significance to Practice 
The ability to recover an organization’s data processing is directly related to the 
prosperity of the organization (Marinescu, 2015; Mossburg, 2015). The improvement of 
disaster recovery practices to respond to computer crimes offers an advantage to disaster 
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recovery programs. Providing better planning and procedures to incident responders 
should allow for reduced resumption times.  
Significance to Theory 
 Information technology disaster recovery has been historically based on methods 
borrowed from medical first response and military emergency management from the 
battlefield. Guidry et al. (2015) and Ferdinand (2015) discussed the lack of organizational 
understanding of how a disaster management program could modify measures to account 
for computer crimes interruptions. Using the Randeree et al. (2012) and Stewart et al. 
(2015) disaster recovery maturity model conceptual framework can allow for the 
measurement of the effects of this study to improve organizational response to a 
technology disaster. Supplementing the existing disaster recovery frameworks with new 
controls to mitigate emerging technology risks provides an opportunity to modernize the 
practice of information technology disaster recovery.  
Significance to Social Change 
The experience of information technology disaster recovery experts and 
cybersecurity experts represents a section of information, which could facilitate a change 
in the response and recovery from technology disasters. Technology disasters are a risk 
that is increasingly affecting organizational survivability. Keeping a viable business 
following a technology interruption, assists in the profitability of the organization and the 
employees remain on the payroll. By improving the disaster recovery response to an 
event, a community that is relying on vital services from the affected entity will 
experience a reduced interruption as opposed to a prolonged disturbance. Hospitals, 
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emergency response, local law enforcement, and transportation are examples of vital 
services that can leverage an improved information technology disaster recovery response 
to service the local community. Responses to disasters such as an earthquake can reveal 
parallels for organizations recovering from technology disruptions. This study of 
computer crimes as it pertains to disaster recovery is a relatively new topic and this 
research places organization in a better position to respond to an emerging threat. 
Summary and Transition 
The purpose of this qualitative study was to understand how information 
technology disaster recovery controls and processes can be modified to improve response 
to a computer crime caused business interruption. The risks to organizations continue to 
rise as new technology threats emerge and more business processes rely on data 
processing. Information technology disaster recovery must improve and cybersecurity 
incident response may provide new methods that can be collaborated to reach a more 
mature disaster recovery program. A better understanding of cybersecurity in the context 
of disaster recovery may allow disaster recovery planners to improve their organizational 
resumption processes. In the next chapter, I present a literature review I conducted on the 
theories and practices for disaster recovery practitioners, review of the applicable law and 
regulations for disaster recovery, information security frameworks, and the common 
threats to organizations. The literature review describes where the information 
technology disaster recovery concept has evolved and where the current research is being 
conducted in response to computer crimes. Chapter 3 includes the research methodology 
and the use of the Delphi design.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Businesses unable to quickly recover from a technology-caused interruption will 
find significant barriers to servicing their customers and maintaining an advantage over 
their competition. Critical technology infrastructure must be resumed to an acceptable 
operating state that allows the service to the client. As technology becomes more 
embedded in the core of business processes, the vulnerability to organizational 
interruptions as technology fails to operate as expected becomes greater. Traditional 
disaster recovery placed a high priority in recovering from the loss of power, fire, and 
flooding. As the expertise of the underground criminal increases, the ability to cause a 
technology interruption upon a business becomes a greater risk. Information technology 
disaster recovery is primarily concerned with the minimizing of the interruption of 
business operations, the risk of delays, ensuring security, producing a reliable data 
backup, and restoration promptly. The management of the recovery activities plays an 
important role in restoring the business after it has experienced an interruption. Chapter 2 
includes a literature review of emergency management, information technology disaster 
recovery, business continuance planning, cyber-attack interruptions, information security 
practices, technology frameworks, and laws about disaster recovery. The literature 
examined in this chapter was collected from disaster management books, online 
repositories, disaster recovery journals, research studies, and disaster conferences. The 
purpose of this literature review was to gain insight into the process, people, and threat 
vectors that are considered when building and maintain an information technology 
disaster recovery program.  
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Literature Search Strategy 
The search strategy for this review collected the primary sources from seminal 
books, peer-reviewed journals, standards body websites, and federal government 
websites. The Journal of Information Systems & Operations Management, Journal of 
Business Continuity & Emergency Planning, Centre for Disaster Management and 
Hazards Research, Disaster Recovery Journal, Disaster Prevention and Management, 
and Computers & Security Journals are focused on for the relevant research in the last 
several years. Additional journals were obtained from ProQuest, Business Source 
Complete, InfoSCI, and ABI/Inform Global. The keywords used in the search were 
business continuity planning, crisis management, cyber resilience, cyber terrorism, data 
breach, disaster preparedness plans, disaster resilience, emergency response 
management, and enterprise risk management. The range used in the search was limited 
to 5 years and less from the anticipated time of this dissertation completion. I used this 
strategy to identify the risk of cyber-attacks on organizations ability to recover systems 
and the need to incorporate information security practices into the management disaster 
recovery programs. The relevant articles were reviewed for application to the topic, 
credibility, dependability, and transferability. I created Figure 1 to show the order and 
method of the topics researched.  
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Figure 1. The literature review method to understand the impacts of computer crimes. 
 
 Conceptual Framework 
Recent headlines describe the increasing damages and disclosures caused by 
cyber criminals and yet organizations are still lacking the necessary controls and 
methodology needed to prepare for technology disasters (Rittinghouse & Ransome, 
2011). A capability maturity model (CMM) has been a popular tool for the development 
of an improvement program to transform an organization into a better operational state. 
The purpose of a maturity model is to provide understanding for improving processes for 
development and maintenance of products and services. The six common capabilities are 
incomplete, performed, managed, defined, quantitatively managed, and optimized 
(Barclay, 2014). Maturity model focus can include technology, a business initiative, or a 
financial process (Latif, Arshad & Janom, 2016). A process of dependability can be 
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determined using a maturity model, which assumes the positive movement towards a goal 
in stages (Dorfman & Thayer, 1997). A popular way to evaluate the levels of a maturity 
model is a five-point Likert scale as first seen in the Carnegie Mellon Capability Maturity 
Model Integration (Latif et al., 2016). Leveraging a maturity model may provide a greater 
understanding for improving processes that respond to computer crimes caused disasters.  
One method to improve the standing of an organization’s disaster management is 
the use of a disaster recovery maturity model (DRMM). Allen et al. (2015) encouraged 
organizations to use defined maturity model, such as the CERT-RRM, to measure 
progress and to assess their programs. Stewart, Allen, Dorofee, Valdez, and Young 
(2015) claimed that a disaster recovery program’s effectiveness comes from direction and 
approval from the executive levels of the organization. The DRMM is used as a tool for 
assessing the capability of the disaster recovery program (Al Hamed & Alenezi, 2016; 
Lindström, Samuelsson, & Hägerfors, 2010; Randeree et al., 2012; Stewart et al., 2015). 
The DRMM provides the ability to communicate outcomes with ease based on the data 
ranking in the model, allows organizations to recognize shortfalls, and the identification 
of improvements over time. The ability of the DRMM to provide dashboards and metrics 
that can be reviewed by executives provides a mechanism to justify the DR investment 
and the organizational readiness for implementing a business continuance program. A 
DRMM should eliminate subjectivity, reduce disaster planner bias, and provide a clear 
picture of an organization's stance towards readiness. Lindström et al. (2010) explained 
the need for a less abstract way for senior management to understand disaster recovery 
and to use a concept that would be familiar with a common decision-making tool. 
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Randeree et al. (2012) claimed a maturity model proposes a life cycle that is explicitly 
defined, managed, and measurable. By using a disaster recovery maturity model, an 
organization may identify strategic areas where improvement could be made to amend 
the recovery from computer crimes.  
The process of the maturity concept implies growth in the process, capability, and 
consistency of the program. Al Hamed and Alenezi (2016) proposed a model based on 
their research that consisted of an evaluation of a process quality dimension versus a 
scope capability dimension. The vertical axis represented the maturity stages from 
initiated, planned, implemented, controlled, integrated and optimized. The horizontal axis 
represented maturity stages where each stage builds on the previous level. The Carnegie 
Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute developed the CERT Resilience 
Management Model (CERT-RRM), which focuses on enterprise management of 
operational resilience (CMMI, 2007; Lindström et al., 2010). The CERT-RMM defined 
processes for 26 functional areas that are organized into enterprise management, 
engineering, operations and process management. Stewart et al.’s (2015) research used 
the CERT Resilience Management Model to define a more granular maturity scale for 
organizations that need a greater depth of detail than the original CERT-RMM. The Allen 
(Dorofee et al., 2015) model defined four maturity levels of incomplete, performed, 
managed, and defined with an additional component of Maturity Indicator Levels (MIL) 
for describing upward progression. The MIL was described as incomplete, performed, 
planned, managed, measured, defined, and shared. Lindström et al. (2010) research 
intended to improve the process of explaining BCM to senior management by increasing 
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the organizational understanding of the current disaster recovery maturity level it belongs 
to and what is required to improve the standing of the current level. The staircase 
methodology presented by Lindstrom was applied at the organizational and department 
level to highlight risks that are deemed necessary to mitigate known disaster events. 
Randeree et al. (2012) proposed a disaster recovery maturity model developed using 
focus groups with 10 United Arab Emirates banks and their BCM experts. Randeree, et 
al. argued that the BS25999 BCM standard missed necessary components of a framework 
for organizations to benchmark themselves as a maturity model is necessary for 
measurement. The U.S. Department of Energy Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model 
(C2M2) is a public-private effort established to improve the energy sector’s cybersecurity 
capabilities (Department of Energy, n.d.). The C2M2 is comprised of three cybersecurity 
capability maturity models. With the capability maturity model being a popular tool for 
the improvement of a program, organizations should consider the use of a disaster 
recovery maturity models to improve the disaster response to computer crimes.  
The topic of the effects of computer crimes on disaster recovery was examined, 
through the lens of a DRMM, throughout the literature review. The multiple levels of the 
DRMM represented the ability to recover the organization, which allowed for the 
analysis of methods that could improve the disaster response to a technology caused 
service interruption. 
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Literature Review 
History of Disaster Recovery 
Disaster planners, first responders, and organization management teams should 
understand how information technology disasters came to be an important aspect of 
organizational risk management and how disasters have affected organizations over time. 
A disaster can be experienced in many degrees of severity and, according to Lord (1981), 
should be approached through a lens of contingency planning. An up to date, well-
rehearsed disaster recovery plan can be the difference between restoring to a state of 
normalcy in a matter of hours or restoring the system in months or years (Hiatt, 2000). 
Emergency management. Emergency management seeks to control the activities 
of evacuation, recovery, and relocation of people and resources. Development of an 
emergency management plan requires a role of a recovery coordinator to designate teams 
and responsibilities to various recovery tasks. Without an emergency management plan 
for coordination of activities, inefficiencies will lengthen the time to resume the entity. 
Emergency management has been identified as an aspect of disaster recovery that is often 
difficult for disaster responders (Togio, 1989). Existing research on emergency 
management tries to understand organizational interactions, the analyzation of key 
indicators, and the critical structures within the event (Kapucu & Hu, 2016).  
To assist the public sector in the United States, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) was placed into existence by President Carter’s 1979 
executive order 12127 to provide disaster-related responsibilities into a formal 
government agency. The creation of FEMA consolidated the Federal Insurance 
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Administration, National Fire Prevention Administration, National Weather Service 
Preparedness Program, Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, and components of 
the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (Cutter et al., 2016; FEMA, 2017). The FEMA 
mission statement is to provide the support, tools, and resources to ensure that the agency 
can build, sustain, and improve the capability to prepare, protect, respond and recover 
from all hazards. Cutter et al. (2016) explained that FEMA, in the beginning, was focused 
on attacks from abroad and then evolved to a focus on natural disasters under President 
Clinton, and back to security and counter-terrorism planning under President Bush. 
Kapucu and Hu (2016) claimed intergovernmental and cross-sector collaboration had 
become the norm in emergency response due to the necessity of sharing resources. With 
the development and maturity of emergency management in the government, efficiencies 
from a dedicated budget, staff and education should shorten the time to resume the 
impacted target.  
Recent studies (Kapucu & Hu, 2016; Lachlan et al., 2016) have shown greater 
success in disaster response due to the building of collaborative networks between public, 
private, and nonprofit entities. Emergency planning teams for private organizations are 
often grouped into concentrations such as a software applications team, network 
recovery, communications, administrative support, offsite storage, and security (Togio, 
1989). Corporate emergency management would plan the evacuation, recovery, and 
relocation of employees and readiness of alternative locations for conducting businesses. 
The use of planned, coordinated emergency management will place an organization in a 
better position to respond to the disaster. 
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Crisis communications. Latif et al. (2016) noted it is crucial in disaster 
management to communicate the right information to the right people in the right place at 
the right time. Effective communication is the key to successful recovery (Bartock et al., 
2016; Bishoff et al., 2015). Houston et al. (2015) wrote that disaster communication is 
focused on strategies that can protect the organization’s image during a crisis. A 
comprehensive communication plan will describe the phone calling decision tree of 
contacts, location of the continuance plan, basic communication script, who receives 
press releases, plan for providing updated information, and inform third parties. Bartock 
et al. (2016) claimed the most successful recovery teams would develop a clear and 
concise communications plan. Key stakeholders will need to be provided sufficient data 
about the disaster to understand responsibilities and decision-making steps. Key 
stakeholders are often defined as organizational management teams, external partners, 
technology teams, legal counsel, and customers (Bishoff et al., 2015). Failed 
communication channels must be considered during planning and document alternative 
solutions for use (Bishoff et al., 2015; Grigonis, 2002). Cloud communications solutions 
such as SIP trunking, fax services, text messaging, virtual contact centers, and interactive 
voice response are optimal alternatives for failed primary, on-premises solutions. 
Organizations that dedicate resources to identifying effective communication may find 
the key to successful recovery came from the communications plan.  
A review of the crisis communication literature highlighted two common 
frameworks. The Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) model and the 
Disaster Communications Intervention Framework were designed to protect an entities’ 
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image and to improve an understanding of how leaders should respond to a disaster 
(Houston et al., 2015; Lachlan, Spence, Lin, Najarian, & Del Greco, 2016). Both models 
use disaster communications to prevent injury, promote calm, and direct the entities 
operational response. Research by Lachlan et al. (2016) and Matar, Matar, Balachandran, 
and Hunaiti (2016) indicated that organizations have new avenues via social media 
technologies that are likely to be utilized by affected audiences under disaster scenarios.  
Technologies such as Facebook, YouTube, Reddit, or Twitter can quickly educate 
and inform audiences that otherwise could be harder to reach through traditional means 
of radio or analog phone calls. Research by Takahashi, Tandoc, and Carmichael (2015) 
found that Twitter is a popular communication tool for the public with the intent of 
assisting in the response and recovery efforts to the disaster. David, Ong, and Legara 
(2016) wrote that Twitter has shown to be a valuable channel of information for 
government and private sectors through the affected users posting updates, text, and 
photos. David et al. highlighted the emerging advantages of social media for crisis 
communications due to the features of information transmission, activity reporting, media 
content sharing, back-channel capability, rapid dissemination, and the sharing of 
experiences. 
Traditional disaster recovery. Disaster recovery is often described as a response 
to natural disasters such as fire, floods, and earthquakes (Alexander, 2015; Tucker, 2014). 
Alternate descriptions include responses to human-made disasters such as hazardous 
spills, terrorism, and technology failures. The disaster recovery literature lists the four 
phases of disaster recovery as preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery (Berke, 
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Kartez, & Wenger, 1993; Elliot, Swartz, & Herbane, 2010; Mojtahedi & Oo, 2017; 
University of Oregon, 2007). Disaster recovery often includes discussions on historic site 
preservation, transportation plans, capital improvements, economic stimulus, Red Cross 
Outreach, Health and Human Services programs, emergency operations, and natural 
hazard mitigation plans (University of Oregon, 2007). Disasters are more than common 
emergencies that are exhibited in car crashes or injuries to humans (Phillips, 2015). In a 
disaster, local resources are reduced, eliminated, or exhausted and will directly affect the 
community. Disasters can exist at a magnitude where state or federal agencies are needed 
for assistance. Emergency services, public works, city planners, elected officials, local 
business leaders, school districts, the local chamber of commerce, and department of 
transportation are frequently listed as stakeholders (University of Oregon, 2007). A 
disaster requires complex efforts for communities to recover (Philips, 2015). 
Commitment to recovery planning is essential if the organization implements a disaster 
recovery program (Bishoff et al., 2015). Research by the University of Oregon (2007) 
indicated that for every dollar spent on disaster planning, communities could save four 
dollars in response and recovery costs. In 1995, global disasters cost the insurance section 
over $180 billion (Hiatt, 2000) and in 2013, $3.6 billion of damage was attributed to 
tornadoes (Kantamaneni, Alrashed, & Phillips, 2015). Mojtahedi and Oo (2017) claimed 
the annual spend on disaster recovery activities has increased to $200 billion since the 
1980s.  
Mojtahedi and Oo (2017) believed that certain disasters could not be completely 
averted, even with proper planning and mitigating controls. Disaster insurance has 
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traditionally been utilized for limiting loss and as a transfer mechanism to allow 
organizations to be protected in the event of a disaster. Butler (1998); Rittinghouse and 
Ransome (2011) wrote that disaster insurance has historically focused on buildings and 
property and not designed to address technology needs. Modern technology risk has 
created new vulnerabilities and new management objectives requiring an updated 
insurance strategy from one a decade ago. Modern disaster insurance offers many plans 
for organizations recovering from a disaster that has affected their technology 
infrastructure (Siegel, Sagalow, & Serritella, 2002). A technology-focused insurance 
policy will provide superior loss prevention which dovetails with an enterprise risk 
assessment program. Determining the potential disaster and business impact allows 
organizations to choose the right policy for the specific needs of the industry. 
Business continuance planning (BCP). In 1969, a small airplane crash created a 
disaster that crippled the Applied Data Research data center housing an IBM System 360 
(David, 1969; Herbane, 2010). The Applied Data disaster is considered the first major 
incident that caused organizations to consider hardware alternative sites for data 
processing. Other researchers believed business continuance planning was developed 
with the changing landscape of technology at the core of business processes in the 1970’s 
(Jedynak, 2013). Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) believed business continuance 
planning was not about technology but a new way of managing a business functionality 
in all circumstances. In the late 1970s, Comdisco and SunGard housed more computing 
resources than was needed for their data processing needs and the companies decided to 
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lease out computing resources. Butler (1998) noted the Comdisco and SunGard concept 
was considered the launch of the modern backup, alternate data center.  
Business continuance planning is not a new concept but has gained momentum in 
the last few decades. The initial interest in business continuance planning appeared in the 
1950s and 1960s when organizations began to understand the criticality of certain 
business data and the risk of availability if a disaster was encountered (Randeree et al., 
2012). In 1978 a seminal study at the University of Minnesota examined the maximum 
amount of downtime that can be tolerated by specific industries before the recovery 
would be impossible (Aasgaard, Cheung, Hulbert, & Simpson, 1978). The 1978 
University of Minnesota study indicated that financial industries have the lowest 
tolerance for downtime and insurance and manufacturing could tolerate up to five days of 
interruption. Butler (1998) highlighted that in the 1990s the credit card and financial 
sectors would lose between $5.6 million to $7 million per hour in downtime. Hiatt (2000) 
claimed the business continuance planning process has evolved into an extensive set of 
tasks that is filled with various pitfalls where the best-intentioned, seasoned planners will 
unintentionally overlook critical processes. Planning is essential for organizations 
charged with reducing risk to a business interruption. Hiatt (2000) claimed a well-
planned and rehearsed disaster recovery plan could mean the difference between an 
immediate recovery or a set of devastating repercussions that can bankrupt a business.  
Alexander (2015), Grigonis (2002), Iqbal, Widyawan, and Mustika (2016), Lam 
(2002), and Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) defined the business continuance life cycle 
as including the phases of enterprise risk analysis, business impact analysis, definition of 
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requirements for continuance, design of a continuance strategy, implementation of the 
strategy across the organization, development of plans for technology, people and 
premises, reoccurring testing activities, and continuous process improvement actions. I 
created Figure 2 to capture the major components of business continuance planning. 
 
Figure 2. A typical business continuance life cycle. 
The risk analysis activity or business impact analysis being conducted for BCP 
works to ensure that controls and expenditures are deployed in a way that reduces risk to 
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the organization following a disaster. Bartock et al. (2016) wrote that most activities of 
the BCP process come from the planning and documentation of the system before any 
event occurs. Lam (2002) wrote that organizations should consider technology threats, 
information threats, and people threats. When a risk analysis is conducted the 
organizations assesses the likelihood and impact of the threat occurrence (Bartock, 2016; 
Fallara, 2003; Grigonis, 2002; Lam, 2002).  
The risk management process categorizes and prioritizes the threats according to 
risk levels and ascertains levels of risk that are acceptable to the organization. 
Organizations will need to consider which threats to ignore due to a significantly low 
likelihood or inconsequential interruption. Yang, Ku, and Liu (2016) claimed most 
organizations would use software tools to perform risk-based compliance analysis. 
Organizations have options when dealing with risk. Risk response is a component of the 
business continuance risk analysis. Organizations have options for a risk response in 
avoidance, transference, mitigation, and acceptance (Bhoola, Hiremath, & Mallik, 2014). 
Bhoola et al. claimed the identification of risks alone would not ensure the success of the 
project, but an implementation of a risk response plan offers greater protection when the 
risk is needed to be mitigated. Avoidance is often leveraged in a manner that has the 
project being implemented in a way that the identified risk will not be encountered 
because of changes to the plan eliminate the probability of the risk (Bhoola et al., 2014; 
Lam, 2014). Risk transference will place the responsibility of the risk component with a 
vendor or alternative stakeholder (Lam,2014). Risk mitigation reduces the risk by 
applying a solution to reduce the vulnerability or threat (Bhoola et al., 2014). 
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Organizations looking to mitigate the risk of a loss of power incident will deploy 
uninterrupted power supplies to supplement the loss from the utility provider. Risk 
acceptance recognizes the risk that remains after controls have been applied. McManus 
(2003) pointed to the documentation of an evaluated risk as an advantage in the planning 
process. Organizations that have a good understanding of how different risks will be 
controlled have an advantage when it comes time to recover from an interruption. 
Al Hamed and Alenezi (2016), Butler (1998), Fallara (2003), Grigonis (2002), 
and Torabi, Soufi, and Sahebjamnia (2014) defined the business impact analysis (BIA) as 
the activity that identifies critical functions and determines supporting resources for 
critical business processes. Identification of business threats provides an understanding of 
how resources can be affected by a disaster and the BIA should be used in decision-
making when formulating resumption plans. The BIA is a key part of a business 
continuity management system (BCMS) because the activity collects key processes and 
critical functions to calculate the minimum business continuity objective (MBCO) and 
the maximum tolerable period of disruption (MTPD) according to Al Hamed and Alenezi 
(2016). Torabi et al. (2014) research revealed that the data gathering and data analysis 
phases are the two most time-consuming steps of the BIA. The main advantage of the 
BIA is the early identification the risks and the data provided on requirements for a 
continuance. Data from the BIA feeds into the subsequent phases of business continuance 
planning. The risk analysis process is significant because most of the remaining planning 
components will leverage what was indicated in the risk analysis phase. 
33 
 
Testing is a major consideration in BCP as the activity will directly improve the 
accuracy of the execution of the plan. Lam (2002) wrote that there are four main reasons 
to test the business continuance plan, which included the validation of the effectiveness 
of the stated service levels, identification of any shortcomings, assessment of the service 
levels being achievable and realistic given the time constraints, and to provide confidence 
in the plan. BCP testing should address as many applicable, conceivable disasters as 
possible but still assume that the actual disaster will be a scenario that was not 
specifically tested. Stanton (2005) argued that having a technology disaster recovery 
processes is not the equivalent of having a complete business continuance plan in place. 
Butler (1998) and Hiatt (2000) claimed business continuance testing of a resilience plan 
would not completely align with what a real disaster will exhibit, and organizations 
should consider that. Alexander (2015), Bartock et al. (2016), Fallara, (2003), 
Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011), and Wold (2002) wrote that testing activities should 
be implemented at a frequency that applies to the organization, has realistic objectives, 
and assigned responsibilities to test the hypothetical disaster adequately. Organizations 
that plan and execute on recovery testing will have a more accurate and practiced 
resumption plan than an organization that does not. 
Lessons learned is a major component of BCP. Bartock et al. (2016) and Hiatt 
(2000) claimed periodic testing and disaster recovery exercises should be continually 
scheduled to identify improvements from the lessons learned during the testing. The 
lessons learned activity assists improvement in the recovery process and provided a 
feedback mechanism for decision-making. The timing of the activity can be a factor in 
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quality. Bartock et al. (2016) wrote the longer the period between testing and the lessons 
learned activity, the less likely the lessons learned will be accurate. Togio (1998) 
presented some guidelines for disaster planners to maximize the effort of training the 
responders: 
 Disaster planners must develop a rapport with team leaders. 
 It is important to package the information in short, digestible amounts. 
 Target the audience for the proper level of terms and language. 
 There should be an attempt to address all questions to the extent possible. 
 Give team members copies of the sections that apply to them for their 
review to return comments or suggestions. 
Testing frequently and a timely review of the outcome can improve the disaster recovery 
program. 
Alexander (2015), Bartock et al. (2016), Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011), 
Thejendra (2014), and Tucker (2014) wrote that a critical component of the recovery 
comes from having guidance, playbooks, and plans to support the stated organizational 
recovery objectives. Hiatt (2000) and Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) listed several 
common recovery plans that included contingency, business continuance, business 
recovery, continuity of operations, technology contingency, crisis communications, and 
incident response. Written guidance and plans are often necessary because of the large 
number of business processes that need to be recovered, clarity needed on what response 
teams are assigned what actions, identification of the critical systems that must be 
addressed according to the business, and the proper order of resumption. Clearly written 
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playbooks that can be immediately accessed during a disaster offer a large advantage to 
an organization as opposed to resuming business processes from management's 
experience managing the procedures. 
The use of a continuance strategy improves the chances of proper resumption. 
The business continuity planning body of knowledge has provided multiple frameworks 
and strategies described later in this chapter. Bajgoric (2014), Grigonis (2002), and 
Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) concluded that a BCM strategy, when organized and 
managed properly, would improve the performance of the recovery. The ISO17799 is an 
international standard for business continuance planning and covers ten domains that can 
be modified to accommodate most any business planning requirements (Aronis & 
Stratopoulos, 2016; Choudhary, 2016; Junttila, 2014). Organizations looking to improve 
the response to a disaster should consider the adoption of a BCP framework. 
Information technology disaster recovery. Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) 
noted that leading up to the middle 1970s, most companies had no form of technology-
focused disaster recovery but instead relied upon traditional business insurance to 
mitigate the losses to property. By the mid-1980s organizations had started planning for 
alternate datacenters and by the 1990s recovery plans encompassed resilient networks 
(Butler, 1998). Butler pointed to a new urgency of recovering from a disaster because of 
the expanding role of technology found in critical business processes. The loss of 
technology resources, reliability, or integrity of data can interrupt the normal processing 
of business data. The Business Continuity Institute (2013) Horizon Survey reported in 
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2013 40% of a sample of 730 international organizations was significantly disrupted by a 
technology-induced outage.  
Bajgoric (2014) argued that disaster recovery is typically part of a larger business 
continuance program, which includes services outside of the technology department. 
disaster recovery has become more relevant because of the growing need for computers 
in business. Alexander (2015) and Neaga, Winters, and Laufman (1997) defined an 
information technology disaster recovery disaster as an extended service interruption for 
an organization where data processing could not be conducted and correction not 
available within an acceptable time frame. Butler (1998), Hiatt (2000), and Togio (1989) 
defined the technology disaster as an event that interrupts the business because of the loss 
of critical information needed in data processing. Bishoff et al. (2015) claimed disasters 
are not limited to physical phenomena but events that inflict the whole business 
ecosystem. A generalized workflow for information technology disaster recovery is 
defined in Figure 3. Although disaster recovery can be conducted outside BCP, disaster 
recovery can leverage requirements gathering, data collection, risk assessment, 
stakeholders, and planning from a larger business continuance planning program. Figure 
3, which I created, describes the components of information technology disaster recovery. 
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Figure 3. Typical disaster recovery cycle for interruption planning. 
 
Traditional disaster events such as fire, floods, loss of power, earthquakes, and 
hardware failures can represent a significant risk of an interruption of a business’s data 
processing. Neaga et al. (1997) predicted that as organizations become more dependent 
on data processing, the availability aspects of technology become increasingly critical. In 
the mid-1970s, operating a computer mainframe such as the IBM 370 system placed the 
main computing hardware in a datacenter far away from the end users who were using 
dumb terminals. With the mainframe system in a single location, securing and preparing 
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the mainframe for disasters was an easier solution than the inexpensive, distributed 
computing now available. Information technology disaster recovery for the 1970s-era 
mainframe had the disaster planners seeking hardened data centers, daily backups, and 
alternate locations for migrating the mainframe (Grigonis, 2002). The 1980s introduced 
the workstation and the client-server model of distributed computing. These added 
complications to the disaster planner because now computing was being conducted at 
multiple locations and within reach of the user. Disaster planners in the 1980s needed to 
understand how to best provide recovery for not just the mainframe and data center, but 
the workstations and the unstructured data that was being created outside the datacenter. 
Present day disaster recovery planners focusing on information technology disaster 
recovery may consider many technologies such as resilient networking, data in the cloud, 
data in a private datacenter, server hardware, storage area networks, electronic data 
interchange (EDI), personal computers in an office, mass media devices, where critical 
data may reside, enterprise printing, and information and communications technology 
(ICT). 
The alternate data center can be an important component of an organization’s 
recovery effort. Lord (1981), Neaga et al. (1997), and Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) 
noted the decision to operate an alternate data center site was vital for organizations to 
consider when a fast recovery was required. Several things must be considered when 
operating an alternate data center. The alternate site is often defined as a cold standby, a 
warm site with no staff, or a hot site with full-time staff (Fallara, 2003). A cold site can 
be minimalist building with environmental controls ready to take equipment to a site with 
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some equipment but ready to be quickly built into a production environment. Thejandra 
(2014) argued the cold site could be a non-IT facility that can be used for an extended 
period. A warm site will have the technology equipment, but disaster recovery efforts 
will need to be completed in major tasks to resume the system. A host site will normally 
operate in an active-active state where data processing can be computed in the primary 
data center or the alternate data center with only minor configuration changes (Jones, 
2007; Thejandra, 2014). Hot sites will have near real-time backup data from 
synchronization processes to ensure the data is available if there is a loss of a data center. 
Distance is often discussed as a factor in determining where the alternate data center can 
reside. Neaga et al. (1997) claimed you could have alternate sites in the same building 
with fire being the only major risk. Jones (2007) argued that distance between data 
centers was critical to avoid disasters from power grid failures, hurricanes, flooding, and 
supply chain and distribution disruptions. The choice of a recovery site is an important 
decision-making action. Organizations must choose the applicable strategy that can 
maximize the use of the monetary investment in the data center. Recovery capacity and 
availability of resources, during the interruption, must be considered for operating the 
critical data processing and business processes. 
The return on investment (ROI) is often discussed when disaster recovery is being 
budgeted. Cybulski (2016), Hiatt (2000), Million (1997), Sarmiento, Hoberman, Jerath, 
and Ferreira Jordao (2016), and Stanton (2005) argued the return on investment for 
disaster recovery makes good business sense, and when a single event triggered the 
response activity, the investment has been realized. The initial cost to an organization to 
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start the planning process is a small investment in employee time to start the planning the 
risk assessment phases of an disaster recovery framework. Sarmiento et al. (2016) wrote 
the benefits from the BCM understanding how intangible components of the business 
impact tangible decision-making can reap relevant ROI results. Stanton (2005) argued 
that standard ROI calculations may not apply. Similar to the purchasing of insurance, 
until the organization experiences the need to recover the business the ROI will not be 
obvious. Once the disaster event is experienced, and the BCP program is leveraged, the 
investment is justified (Sarmiento et al., 2016). The better argument for ROI may come 
from the focus being placed on interruption risks to assure customers and partners that the 
organization has placed priority on reducing risks to an acceptable level. 
Traditionally the information technology risk assessment for disaster recovery has 
been identified as a responsibility of the technical staff because they would have the best 
understanding of what technologies comprise the infrastructure. Moreover, technology 
risk assessments have typically been performed within the technology department with 
little input from other departments. Schmitting and Munns (2010) claimed that a 
traditional business risk assessment method had reached a limitation as technology 
systems have become more complex and integrated into all aspects of the business. Hiatt 
(2000) claimed that a technology risk assessment assists in planning, can improve the 
business, reduce recovery problems, and produce better-managed disaster recovery 
controls. The technology risk assessment may differ from traditional risk assessment 
depending on the business sector. A technology risk assessment includes identifying a 
large sample of technology threats, which include hacking, malicious administrative 
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insider, computer fraud, the value of various types of data, and disasters affecting 
technology infrastructure that would not normally be evaluated under a traditional risk 
assessment (Schmitting & Munns, 2010). An information technology risk assessment can 
be aided by recognized guidance from existing works such as the ISACAs IT risk 
practitioners guide, CERT Guide to Threats, Council on Cybersecurity critical security 
controls, NIST cybersecurity framework, and the OWASP top ten. The ISACA defined 
the objective of the technology risk assessment is to understand the security 
requirements, connected network architectures, information available, physical assets 
available, the location of data repositories, applications in use, security components, 
authentication mechanisms, regulation the organization must adhere to, and what 
documented policies are used. Lanz (2015) argued that information technology risk is 
like traditional audit risk and managers should consider the combination of detective risk 
strategies and technology controls to reduce risk to an acceptable level. Lanz recognized 
that firms might need to bring in a technology resource to address the cyber-risks and 
complexities that may not be present from traditional audit staff. Each organization will 
be different. Thus the decision of how to conduct the information technology risk 
assessment, what to include, and how the risks will be prioritized will be dependent on 
how that organization has their technology deployed. 
The basic information technology disaster recovery planning contains recovery 
scoping, processes and procedures for specific technologies, business impact assessment 
actions, rules for invocation, identification of team’s responsibilities, backup strategies, 
restoration procedures, stakeholders, plan maintenance, and required testing (Lam, 2002; 
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Lord, 1981; Neaga et al., 1997; Rittinghouse & Ransome, 2011; Wold, 2002). Butler 
(1998) claimed that most companies perform the least amount of disaster recovery 
planning as possible and ignore the potential for disasters. Instead, many organizations 
rely on redundant networks and computers to keep the data processing functioning. In 
designing the plan, organizations will identify critical business services, establish 
recovery time objectives, affirm key constraints, identification of possible strategies, and 
the drafting of plans to meet senior management’s goals. Disaster plan scoping is an 
important concept in the planning process.  
The purpose of scoping is to gain a clear understanding of what systems the 
information technology disaster recovery program will recover. Butler (1998) argued that 
the recovering of computers and data following a disaster was no longer sufficient for 
modern businesses as disaster recovery plans must now take into consideration all critical 
business operations that use the same technology. Organizations must have a clear 
understanding of the scope of the technology being resumed, or there will be a gap in the 
disaster response.  
Whether the disaster is sudden or an emanate event is on the horizon, human 
judgment is needed to decide when to act on the disaster planning. The purpose of 
planning for invocation is for the disaster recovery teams to understand when to stand 
down and when to put the plan into action. A routine problem or maintenance downtime 
should not be eligible to be a disaster and have the plan invoked. A data center power 
anomaly may not invoke the plan, but a prolonged power outage that cannot be restored 
before the uninterrupted power supply (UPS) fails may deem acceptable to invoke the 
43 
 
plan. Hiatt (2000) and Thejendra (2014) wrote the decision of an emergency management 
team or assigned figurehead, using the best available information, should be the authority 
to invoke all or part of the plan. Hiatt (2000) and Toigo (1989) listed principles that can 
be used contribute to the decision-making process to invoke the plan: 
 Can the organization maintain routine operations? 
 Can the damage be contained without affecting normal operations? 
 Are facts about the disaster being taken at face value and without bias? 
 Can the organization coordinate activities ahead of time to mitigate the risk? 
 Is this solely a technology problem? 
Defining the point at which the organization will failover will differ depending on the 
organization and the disaster. An advantage is leveraged when the organization has a 
defined set of disaster scenarios metrics where the plan will be invoked when 
experienced. Many organizations will have comprehensive, traditional disaster recovery 
program but will be likely to invoke the plan only for very significant outages lasting 
greater than a day. For those organizations in this state, invoking disaster recovery is seen 
as a significant task and in dealing with the disaster plan is considered the lesser of two 
evils.  
Testing is a significant component in the quality of the information technology 
disaster recovery program. Butler (1998) claimed the purpose of conducting disaster 
recovery testing is to determine if the plan is working as expected by the stakeholders. 
Lam (2002) highlighted the need for technology testing to rehearse the schedule of 
events, assess the plan, identify the weaknesses for improvement, and to ensure the 
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distribution of the plan is at the correct levels. Neaga et al. (1997) pointed to research 
indicating that during an actual disaster event the plan is rarely executed as planned. The 
purpose of testing is to provide revisions to the plan that will mirror the changes being 
conducted in the infrastructure and applications over time. No disaster plan is foolproof, 
and there are limitations to disaster recovery strategies. Testing should include 
unannounced drills, conducted during various times, targeted destruction, documentation 
of test results, and a corrective action plan written (Butler, 1998). Hiatt (2000) wrote that 
the only way to get reasonable assurance that the plan will produce the expected results is 
to test the plan. Plans can be tested by conceptual group activities such tabletops or field-
based simulations that will walk through the documentation and plans to understand how 
the response will be conducted on paper. Alternatively, plans can be tested with an 
activity to failover the organization’s primary to the designated alternative business 
processes and locations for a period (Hiatt, 2000; Togio, 1989). Testing is important 
because of the living nature of disaster recovery planning. As Togio (1989) pointed out, 
plans must be maintained and tested to keep up with the ever-expanding technology 
embedded in business processes. 
The development of written disaster recovery policies and procedures should be 
conducted for managing all major applications, technology infrastructure, data centers 
and critical processes that rely on technology. Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) and 
Wold (2002), wrote the disaster recovery plan should document the before, during and 
after the activity of the affected system, application or datacenter. Rittinghouse and 
Ransome commented that the documentation would normally overlap with other 
45 
 
components of the business continuance plan and redundancy should be removed. Butler 
(1998), Fallara, (2003), and Wold (2002) highlighted the importance of executive 
management understanding and agreeing to use the written policy. The act of writing the 
policy solidifies the work that has been conducted in the phases of the disaster recovery 
lifecycle. Wold (2002) claimed that it is advantageous to an organization to develop pre-
formatted policy templates to facilitate the writing process and provides consistency to 
the teams using the plan. The written disaster recovery plan organizes the detailed 
procedure, identifies chronological steps, and provides a roadmap for the maintenance or 
creation of policies. A thoroughly developed information technology disaster recovery 
plan will consider the team approach and have assignments for functional components of 
the resumption. 
Laws and regulations influencing disaster recovery.  
In the U.S., presidents, federal, and state legislators have written several laws, 
regulations, and executive orders influencing the disaster recovery field over several 
decades. The regulations span from protecting public confidence to assisting 
communities to recover from natural disasters. In some cases, the regulation applies to 
government agencies while another regulation is assigned to the private business. This 
literature research reviewed several applicable statutes but what is discussed is not 
intended to be a comprehensive list. Organizations should consider the regulations that 
may be applicable and if the intent of the regulation is being met by the controls in place. 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 instituted an internal control mechanism for 
corporations that placed responsibility on executive management for maintaining 
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adequate controls over financial procedures and reporting (Law & Robson, 2014; SEC, 
n.d.). The Exchange of 1934 act was passed to provide the public with confidence in the 
financial data being presented and overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). Benston (1973) wrote that the financial legislation is believed to have forced 
organizations to pay closer attention to how financial data is generated, and more 
importantly retained to mitigate loss from a disaster. The mid-1970s to the 1980s marked 
the appearance of several regulations that were created which included disaster 
management concepts for public organizations. These regulations would lead to the 
business continuance movement known today. Dietel (2015) described the Flood Disaster 
Act (1973) as the major introduction of disaster recovery plans to organizations that 
would directly impact the communities where they existed. The Flood Disaster Act 
allowed the government to offer subsidies to owners that accepted the requirements of the 
program. The Flood Disaster Act intended to reduce flood damage throughout a 
community by introducing an insurance mechanism (Dietel, 2015). The United States 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) (1977) was a separate implementation of disaster 
recovery planning for organizations. Elliot, Swartz, and Herbane (2010) claimed the 
FCPA required public organizations to have internal mitigating controls to safeguard 
assets from a disaster. Schreider (1996) wrote that the disaster recovery aspects of the 
FCPA come in the Standard of Care wording that evaluated organizations on 
mismanagement of data. The Office of Comptroller of Currency’s Banking Circular BC-
177 (1983) regulated financial institutions to implement disaster recovery plans. Hall 
(1989) and Schreider (1996) described the BC-177 as a control that made banks prove to 
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an examiner that a disaster recovery program was in place, had been tested, and it was 
likely to succeed. The BC-177 was important because it made bankers aware of the 
importance of a disaster recovery program. The United States Expedited Funds 
Availability Act (1989) added to the need for disaster recovery and business continuity 
plans in U.S. federal chartered financial institutions (Dahlberg & Guay, 2015). The 
Federal Reserve (2016) defined the requirements for next-day availability and the need 
for the institution to make transactions available by the next business day. The 
Comprehensive Environment Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) 
from 1980 were written to address the cleanup efforts following a human-made or natural 
disaster (Revesz & Stewart, 2016). Davis, Strell, and Wallace (2005) wrote that CERLA 
is well suited for responding to natural disasters because it was written to apply to a wide 
array of substances including water, soil, and air. A critical component of Section 104(a) 
of the CERLA defined the government authority to act when the substantial danger to the 
public is determined (Davis, Strell, & Wallace, 2005).  
New regulations emerged in the 1990s that forced organizations to build a set of 
stronger mitigation steps to protect critical assets and customer data. Organizational 
incident response strategies and resilience planning were targeted by legislators to be 
mandatorily improved. A significant upgrade of disaster recovery legislation was written, 
and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) developed a DR standard 
(Herbane, 2010). The ISO lead the disaster recovery movement into a more mature state 
with roadmaps for organizations to gain improvements in their DR programs and 
provided the ability to certify to the standard. The 1993 Office of Management and 
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Budget (OMB) Circular A-130 sought to place attention to government records, 
specifically strategic planning, to ensure record preservation is conducted (OMB, 2000). 
Bartock, et al. (2016) noted the A-130 circular forced a redesign of organization’s DR 
programs to leverage the use technology systems to preserve records in the event of a 
disaster. The circular highlighted that information technology is not the sole solution to 
the problem but one set of resources to meet the objective of recovery of critical records. 
An important aspect of the A-130 was that the circular specifically called for federal 
information systems administrators to be trained to manage the technology resumption 
effectively. Aligning with business continuity planning, the A-130 circular specifically 
pointed to risk assessment activities to understand the magnitude of the harm that would 
exist from the loss or modification of federal information. The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 is widely known as the privacy and 
technology regulation that applied to the healthcare industry. Cervone and Cervone 
(2016) claimed HIPAA’s primary purpose was not technology security but more 
importantly designed to improve the resiliency of the data used for patients. The HIPAA 
Security Rule Standard 164.308(a)(7) Contingency Plan was specifically written for 
governing the use of the protected health information (PHI) and how the safeguards will 
keep the data safe by the recovery strategies (Cervone & Cervone, 2016; Rittinghouse & 
Ransome, 2011). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 was similar to HIPAA 
in that the regulation intended to enhance the financial services sector by providing a 
clear framework for regulation that included disaster recovery components (Rittinghouse 
& Ransome, 2011). Executive management team members that are proven to have fallen 
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short of compliance may be subject up to a $250,000 fine and a prison term for each 
violation (Cervone & Cervone, 2016; Rittinghouse & Ransome, 2011). In 2002, the U.S. 
Congress set into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 in response to a wave of 
high-profile reporting scandals (Cervone & Cervone, 2016; Elliot et al., 2010; Garner, 
Hutchison, & Conover, 2016). Although Sarbanes-Oxley does not specifically create 
controls for BCP or DR, Cervone and Cervone (2016) and Elliot, Swartz, and Herbane 
(2010) argued the requirements of the act invoke BCM concepts through a risk 
management requirement that applies to public organizations. Sections 302 and 404 of 
SOX require publicly traded companies to evaluate the effectiveness of the internal 
controls protecting financial data. The GLBA and HIPAA regulations are unique in the 
disaster recovery space due to the penalties that can be levied when an entity is found to 
be out of compliance. Iguer, Medromi, Sayouti, and Tallal (2016), Samanta and Dugal 
(2016), and Srinivasan (2016) claimed that providing disaster recovery controls is 
commonly used as audit control evidence to show compliance by the organization. 
The President of the United States has implemented controls over the years 
through the issuing of presidential directives. In 2003, the Department of Homeland 
Security published the Presidential Policy Directive 7 (PPD-7) that reinforced the need 
for a risk assessment of critical infrastructure and key resources to terrorist attacks. The 
PPD-7 pointed to an important fact that it is not possible to protect all critical 
infrastructure but focusing on strategic improvements can lessen the impact of attacks 
that may occur (Department of Homeland Security, 2003). Niglia (2015) wrote that 
Section 7(d) of the directive is important in that it enhances protections that will assist in 
50 
 
the capability to ensure the orderly functioning of the delivery of private sectors essential 
services such as the energy sector, transportation sector, and nuclear sector. In 2011, the 
Department of Homeland Security published the Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) 
that sought to strengthen the resilience of the United States via risk assessments focused 
on terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and natural disasters (U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2011). The goal of the PPD-8 was to account for concrete, 
measurable, and prioritized objectives that could be used to mitigate risk. PPD-8 assigned 
responsibility to the assistant to the President for Homeland to periodically review the 
progress of the government's risk plan and to produce reporting metrics from meetings 
with federal, community-based, and private organizations. The presidential directives 
offer an advantage to disaster recovery teams in that the directives offer requirements and 
raise awareness of the need to focus on disaster recovery practices.  
Some disaster recovery guidance has come from national emergency management 
agencies. Karter (2003) claimed that $12.4 billion in property damage was recorded in 
2012 and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) develops publishes and 
disseminates standards to minimize the effects of fire and other risks. The National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 (2010) recommended improved practices for 
disaster management involving the fire code, life safety, and vehicle safety. The NFPA 
1600 standard defined several elements for disaster recovery and emergency management 
that included emergency response, responsibilities, actions to take to save lives, and 
communication channels (Kellman, 2016; McLaughlin, 2005).  
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Disaster Recovery Standards, Certifications, and Guidelines 
 One of the major challenges of disaster recovery and the need for management 
involvement comes from the inability to recover all resources immediately following an 
interruption. During the interruption, every application must wait in a priority queue to be 
restored. The priority and procedures for determining how the organization will resume 
the technology systems are at the core of the DR management practice. The body of 
knowledge in information technology disaster recovery provided several models by 
which an organization can choose to build and manage the information technology 
disaster recovery program. The beginning of business continuance planning was a simple 
component of technology and financial standards and over time evolved into an important 
role for organizations to consider (Pasquini & Galie, 2013). Several models, guidance, 
and frameworks have been presented by researchers and standards bodies such as the 
International Organization of Standards. 
 The IT Governance Institute and ISACA collaborated to present the COBIT 
framework. The COBIT framework’s main objective was to link business goals with IT 
goals. One major advantage of the COBIT in DR came from the guidance of top-level 
decision making within the organization as it pertained to disaster planning. The DSS04 
objective of COBIT detailed the necessity to ensure continued services (Iqbal et al., 2016; 
Pasquini & Galie, 2013). Butler (1998) described a general, six-step disaster recovery 
model that has been widely adopted. Butler’s plan started with demonstrating the 
business value of disaster recovery. Butler claimed the model’s strength came when 
Management commitment is obtained, the current configuration is documented, DR 
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planners compose how the business uses the technology, the disaster recovery budget is 
funded, and the DR planners develop disaster recovery plans. Bishoff et al. (2015) 
described a model by Miram Kahn detailing a four-phase disaster response that can apply 
to any disaster. The Miram Kahn model included notification response, assessment of 
damages, rescue and recovery, and resumption of services. Gibb and Buchannan (2006) 
proposed a disaster recovery framework where the recovery process was compared to 
phases of a project. The Gibb and Buchannan framework provided inputs and outputs for 
nine project activities necessary to reach the organization’s resilience goals. Neaga et al. 
(1997) presented a model where data categories were used to define the backup and 
recovery, application, database, infrastructure and system to assist in finding the critical 
systems needing to be recovered. Kadar (2015) provided a BCM risk index that allowed 
disaster planners to conduct metrics and status of the BCM program. Kadar’s goal was to 
allow organizations to align the risk index to the culture or the organization. The Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) addressed knowledge issues in the 
organization and highlighted the critical role of knowledge in disaster risk reduction 
(Weichselgartner & Pigeon, 2015). The SFDRR assisted in understanding disaster risk, 
strengthening governance to manage risk, investing in risk reduction, and enhancing 
preparedness for an effective response. The British standard BS25999 was published in 
2006 and provided an agnostic approach that organizations could follow for their BCM 
planning (Herbane, 2010). The ISO 17799 is an international security standard that 
covers ten different sections. The ISO 17799 sections are defined as business continuity 
planning, system access control, system development and maintenance, physical and 
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environmental security, compliance, personnel security, security organization, computer 
and network management, asset classification and control, and security policy (Grigonis, 
2002). The ISO 22301 outlined the requirements to implement a disaster recovery 
program. Al Hamed and Alenezi (2016) and Bajgoric (2014) noted the ISO 22301 was 
specifically written to be applicable to all industries and is the most influential standard in 
the disaster recovery literature. The Department of Homeland Security published the 
Ready.gov site to provide information to build an information technology disaster 
recovery plan for businesses to leverage. The National Disaster Recovery Framework 
(NDRF) provided an evolving framework for disaster planners to address disaster 
recovery (Chand & Loosemore, 2016; Smith, 2017). NIST Special Publications (SP) 800-
34 series defined the contingency planning for information technology systems. Elliot et 
al. (2010) wrote that the 800-34 publication had a clear focus on technology and the 
planning methodology offered a similar approach to BCM planning. dPlan, an online 
disaster planning tool for civic institutions, was released by the National Center for 
Preservation Technology and Training (NCPTT) to allow for easy creation of a disaster 
plan (Yeh, McMullen, & Kane, 2010). The dPlan program collects data through a 
simplified questionnaire process to create a customized plan that can be maintained by an 
organization. Yeh, McMullen, and Kane (2010) argued that although the dPlan could 
develop a comprehensive plan, many found the plan lacked vital, necessary sections and 
was considered time-consuming. 
Bartock, Cichonski, Souppaya, Smith, Witte, and Scarfone (2016) wrote that 
existing federal policies, standards, and guidelines exist for cyber event handling but 
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none focus on improving cybersecurity recovery capabilities. Bartock et al. (2016) 
claimed the fundamental information is not found in a single document but spread out in 
security, contingency, disaster recovery and BCP plans. Although there are many models, 
frameworks, and guidance, there is a gap when it comes to specifically preparing an 
disaster recovery program for computer crimes induced interruptions. The generalities of 
these models can assist an entity in preparing for a general response and recovery, but the 
models found in the literature do not provide clear guidance on additional steps that 
would address the emerging risk from computer crimes. 
First Responders 
A first responder is often associated with the personnel that is first to perform the 
medical response at the scene of trauma. Bobko and Kamin (2015) defined the first 
responder as fire, police, medical personnel, and in some cases civilians. Bobko and 
Kamin claimed that in most of the cases following a disaster the first responder is not a 
formally trained person. Bystanders are often thrust into situations where they can take 
actions to stabilize the situation until trained first responders can arrive. Similarly, 
organizational employees can often be pulled into disaster response without having any 
formal knowledge of how to successfully recover the business during the interruption. 
Butler (1998) wrote that once a disaster is experienced, the first responders must know 
their roles if the organization plans to maximize the success of the recovery. Bishoff 
(2015) and Lam (2002) claimed the organization should consider who is assigned to the 
response team as the members of the team should be able to perform when placed under a 
significant amount pressure from the disaster recovery. Rabjohn (2013) explained that 
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first responders could experience trauma through the exposure to a human suffering from 
the effects of the disaster. A law enforcement officer may work a murder one day, a fatal 
car accident the next day, and witness a human drowning the next. The psychological 
stress can compound according to Rabjohn (2013) and reduce the capacity of the 
response. After the incident has been experienced, the first responders initially gather and 
triage the casualties (Butler, 1998; Kamali, Bish, & Glick, 2017). The triage process will 
categorize the known casualties based on the severity. Kamali et al. (2017) and Tucker 
(2014) claimed the purpose of the first responders conducting the triage process is to use 
the available resources most efficiently.  
There are several methods used by first responders when conducting the triage. 
The Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment Method (SMART), Homebush, Triage Sieve, 
Sacco Triage Method (STM) and CESIRA are the more popular found in the literature 
(Jain, Ragazzoni, Stryhn, Stratton, & Della Corte, 2015; Kamali et al., 2017; Lea & 
Tippett, 2017). The Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (C-TECC) took 
experience from military events learned from the battlefield and applied the knowledge to 
improving the civilian first responder activities. C-TECC is overseen by a broad range of 
leaders focused on high-threat medicine, fire, rescue, emergency medicine, emergency 
medical services, police, and the special military operations community. Pennardt et al. 
(2016) wrote that the TECC had become a professionalized, national, standard core of 
competencies that created a common language for incident response capabilities 
regardless of the situation. Pennardt et al. (2016) pointed out that despite major efforts by 
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government agencies, there are still no nationally agreed-upon standards for first 
responder certification or training. 
Rodriguez (2016) wrote about the differences between an information technology 
disaster recovery incident responder versus the traditional medical responder. Rodriguez 
claimed the technology-focused first responders operate with ROI as the primary 
consideration and would assess and prioritize technology tasks based on the urgency or 
recovery time objectives. Rodriguez (2016) stated the triage process that is utilized by 
medical first responders is transferable to technology management. Technology first 
responders can take concepts from mature incident response models and use them when 
recovering technology systems. Ning, Wong, and Shi (2015) wrote that the technology 
incident response at the core is simply an approach for commanding, controlling, and 
coordinating the recovery team’s effort. Rittinghouse and Ransome (2011) claimed the 
technology first responder must focus on the business effect of the disaster as opposed to 
a damage assessment.  
Entities that do not focus on obtaining the correct talent for the initial response 
risk the responders failing to execute the plan as expected. Organizations looking to 
improve the quality of disaster response will place time and effort into choosing and 
training the people that will make up the first responders. By training responders and 
running testing scenarios, organizations can keep the knowledge necessary for disaster 
recovery fresh in the minds of those responsible for the task. 
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Disaster Planners  
Alexander (2015) and Lam (2002) defined disaster planners’ activities as a 
coordinated process of preparing to match urgent needs with available resources. The 
phases include research, documentation, dissemination, testing the plan, and revising. 
The disaster plan is a living document that is continually evolving to match the changing 
business procedures needed in the emergency response. Disaster planning involves a 
combination of plans and procedures, informed by planners, to be used by the incident 
responders. Alexander (2015) wrote that disaster planning must be realistic and pragmatic 
activity but also a collaborative process. There is no use in planning to use resources that 
would not likely be available during a disaster and planners should highlight where 
resources may be a problem in the recovery. The role of planners must consider the 
scarcity of resources during the recovery. To avoid an omission or major flaw in a 
disaster plan, disaster planners should have experience and training. Alexander (2015) 
and Smith (2017) wrote that the planning profession had been described as a vehicle to 
transfer knowledge, expand alternatives, generate social change, inform citizens, foster 
sustainable improvements, and identify vulnerabilities. Disaster planners are commonly 
employed by the organization to project manage the activity of disaster recovery. 
Stakeholders, a component of the planning team, are integral to disaster planning. 
Mojtahedi and Oo (2017) defined a stakeholder as the entity involved in decision-making 
and benefits from the resumption of the organization. The main goal of the stakeholder is 
to improve the performance of the disaster recovery project. Mojtahedi and Oo’s (2017) 
research found where stakeholders exhibited legitimacy and urgency in the planning 
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process were where a reduced the effect of disasters was experienced. Alexander (2015) 
and Smith (2017) claimed that disaster planners should not be frightened of a black swan 
or unanticipated events because the black swan has been replaced by the red herring. 
Alexander claimed very little in the future that had not occurred in some form from the 
past. Disaster planners hold a significant role in the success of the resumption of the 
organization. Planning, testing, pre-coordination with the teams and education are all 
major components found in the literature. Organizations that can dedicate resources to 
proper planning improve the ability to resume from a technology disaster quickly. 
Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is a large component of disaster recovery programs. Butler 
(1998) defined risk as the product of impact and probability. Al Hamed and Alenezi 
(2016) and Grigonis (2002) described a risk management plan as a systematic and 
analytical tool which establishes the likelihood and a known threat where harm would fall 
on the organization. To decrease risk to the organization, a disaster recovery management 
team should plan to minimize the effect of a disaster by understanding the specific 
exposures to their organization. Al Hamed and Alenezi (2016), Bishoff et al. (2015), and 
Neaga et al. (1997) pointed to the need to conduct a risk assessment before any disaster 
recovery solution could be constructed. The purpose of conducting the risk assessment 
activity was to quantify where potential problems the organization may be exposed. The 
risk assessment is an avenue for selecting the applicable mitigating controls. Lord (1981), 
Toigo (1989), and Tucker (2014) claimed risk assessment is a commonly misunderstood 
aspect of disaster recovery planning and poorly written or missing risk assessments will 
59 
 
lead to failure to recover. Grigonis (2002) described where a simple matrix of events 
could be used to document how resources can be affected by disaster events. Lord (1981) 
wrote the tough part of risk assessment is found in accepting that there is an unknown 
quantity, in the future, where an estimated loss must be made. The ability to recover all 
technology components of the organization during an interruption is extremely difficult 
and may be costly depending on the type of disaster. Neaga et al. (1997) wrote the risk 
assessment activity allows business processes to be evaluated for their negative impact on 
the organization when they are unavailable. A successful risk assessment should result in 
the required preventative measures, the type of recovery required, and acceptance of risks 
not being addressed.  
There are multiple risk assessment frameworks leveraged by organizations across 
the globe. Yang et al. (2016) wrote that the NIST SP 800-30 Risk Management Guide for 
Information Technology Systems provided a common baseline for all levels of personnel 
and the 800-30 framework can be used to support the risk management process in disaster 
recovery. The CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Methodology (CRAMM) was 
developed by a British government organization to calculate risks from vulnerabilities 
and assets. Yang, Ku, and Liu (2016) claimed the CRAMM provided organizations with 
the ability to pick the risk appetite for important versus unimportant assets. The 
Information Security Risk Assessment Model and the InfoSec Assessment Methodology 
(IAM) are leveraged by multiple U.S. Federal agencies to assist federal managers to 
implement an enterprise information security risk assessment process. Clark, Dawkins, 
and Hale (2005) argued the InfoSec Assessment Methodology provides a means to gain 
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an understanding of critical systems but does not adequately draw relationships between 
the assets and the objectives of the assessment such as recovering from a disaster. The 
Vendor Risk Assessment and Threat Evaluation (V-RATE), Security Attribute 
Evaluation Method (SEAM), Risk Filtering, Ranking and Management Model (RFRM), 
Survivable Systems Analysis (SSA), Control Objectives for Information and related 
Technology (COBIT), and Operationally Critical Threat Asset and Vulnerability 
Evaluation (OCTAVE) are all well known risk assessment frameworks that can be used 
to streamline and optimize the assessment of technology risks for organizations (Allen, & 
Sledge, 2002; Axelrod, 2016; Haimes, Kaplan, & Lambert, 2002; Snyder, 2014; Yang et 
al., 2016).  
Organizations must understand how critical processes will be impacted by an 
interruption and which will need to be resumed first. Regardless of the risk model or 
framework that is used, any form of risk analysis done properly will establish likelihoods 
and threat to the organization. By building an understanding of the risks that can impact 
the organization, management teams can spend money and resources to mitigate the 
threats and document the recovery plans needed to resume the process. 
Dangers of Disasters to Organizations 
Organizations have multiple threat vectors that can affect standard operating 
procedures. Some threats have been a risk since the beginning of civilization while other 
threats have evolved. Lord (1981) recorded that it was estimated in 1985 that there would 
be $30 billion dollars of loss due to computer fraud. Liao, Balasinorwala, and Rao (2017) 
claimed that in 2017 the estimation of computer fraud reached $100 billion and is 
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estimated to be two trillion by the year 2019. To better understand the risks to an 
organization, planners must look at traditional threats and the emerging cybersecurity 
threats. 
Traditional threats. Natural disasters negatively affect homes, businesses, 
infrastructure, and communications which ultimately affect people. Not all disasters are 
equal events, and not all people are affected in the same way. Flooding from 
thunderstorms, tornadoes, dam breaks, snow melts, or storm surges was the most 
common type of disaster to affect communities in the United States (Philips, 2015). 
Flooding brings damage to electronics, furniture, buildings, roads, and in some cases 
wastewater treatment needed for clean water. In the 1990s, flood damages to people and 
businesses in the United States neared $50 billion (Koenig, 2016). Storms as a natural 
hazard can vary in damage and impact. Hurricane Andrew in 1992 claimed 23 lives, cost 
the state of Florida and Louisiana over $26.5 billion, and displaced entire communities 
(Logan, Issar, & Xu, 2016; Philips, 2015). Texas, Kanas, and Oklahoma hold a high risk 
of tornados which can reach wind speeds of 200 miles per hour. Winds at this speed can 
level entire commercial buildings and residential homes. Research by Kantamaneni et al. 
(2015) revealed that tornado research in 2013 recorded 54 fatalities with damages of $3.6 
billion. Lord (1981) and Wold (2002) alleged the fire had been the highest probability of 
being the disaster as compared with other general threats such as flooding or ice storms. 
In some cases, as in a 1997 North Dakota flood, fire is a result of an initial, separate 
disaster which will do more damage than the initial event (Kweit, & Kweit, 2004). 
Fallara (2003) noted the threat of fire is the primary reason organizations backup systems 
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to offsite locations. Earthquakes are determined by magnitude, motion, and duration. 
Depending on the earthquake and the construction standards of the buildings, 
considerable damage can be experienced. The Kobe Japan earthquake of 1995 was 
considered the costliest earthquake to have occurred with losses of a $132 billion. In 
2010, a magnitude-seven earthquake was experienced in Haiti, which led to over 32,000 
deaths (Miura, Midorikawa, & Matsuoka, 2016; Philips, 2015). The high death toll of the 
Haiti earthquake was linked to substandard building codes and may serve as a warning to 
disaster planners choosing data center locations for organizations. Modern technology 
and communications systems run on stable, waveform electricity. Blackouts, dropouts, 
brownouts, surges, and phase shifts can damage and create anomalies in technology 
infrastructure. Electrical anomaly problems and complete outages exist as a threat to 
organizations in the number of millions of dollars each year and thousands of hours of 
downtime (Grigonis, 2002). Organizations will deploy uninterrupted power supplies 
(UPS) and diesel generators to supply clean power to the data center in the event of 
anomalies or service interruptions and to mitigate the risk of electrical issues. Sizing of 
the UPS should be considered. Small office home office (SOHO) or mid-sized UPS may 
not handle the power needs of a larger organization when a complete power failure is 
experienced. The right choice of a UPS can prevent a disaster (Butler, 1998; Grigonis, 
2002).  
Hazardous materials are another threat that must be considered. Toxic spills, 
chemical explosions, train derailment, or debris from severe storms can become 
expensive problems for affected organizations. Philips (2015) wrote that 4.5 million 
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facilities in the United States work with some form of hazardous materials and could 
cause a disruption in a business process of production, use, transportation, or disposal. 
The United States has installed a super fund from the Comprehensive Environment 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) from 1980 that was allocated to 
repair the damages from a hazardous materials disaster (Revesz & Stewart, 2016). 
Regulations from the state and federal level will need to be considered when dealing with 
a hazardous materials disaster. Disaster planners should consider what chemicals are in 
use in the organization and understand how they could create a disaster scenario.  
Terrorism can be a difficult hazard due to the nature of the deliberate and 
unexpected attack on innocent people and organizations (Philips, 2015). Terrorism’s goal 
is to cause physical and psychological harm to people, infrastructure, communities, and 
nations. Terrorism can be domestic or international and negatively affects governments, 
organizations, and individuals. Brooks (2011) wrote the terrorist attack on September 
2001 that leveled World Trade Center buildings created a disaster that took the lives of 
many Americans and due to the destruction, ended the ability for some organizations to 
stay in business. Grigonis (2002) wrote about the actions of a nefarious individual or 
group could spell disaster for an organization. When an individual has internal access to 
the technology infrastructure with malicious intent, the organization could be disrupted 
by undetermined means. Hiatt (2000) and Lord (1981) wrote that people must be 
considered when listing hazards and studies have shown that the greatest risk involving 
computer-related disasters come from people. Patterson et al. (2002) claimed human 
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operators will always make errors, even when they have a clear understanding of what to 
do. 
Natural and human-made disasters are a common and reoccurring threat to 
organizations. Although the threats are wide-ranging, organizations should be able to 
identify and craft controls that can mitigate the risks of these disasters. The body of 
knowledge on natural disasters is large, and the responses that were taken to recover the 
technology infrastructure is available. Organizational planners should look closely at 
what natural disasters the organization may be vulnerable to and apply the necessary 
mitigating controls to the disaster plan. 
Current cyber-attack threats. Devastating losses can emerge from an 
interruption of technology infrastructure. Butler (1998) and Schultz and Shumway (2001) 
noted when an organization is conducting any aspect of business on the internet, risks are 
introduced that must be considered. In the 2015 state of cybercrime survey (PWC, 2015), 
76% of the respondents claimed they were more concerned about cybercrimes than in 
previous years. Vaidya (2015) claimed that cyber-attacks not only cause billions of 
dollars in damage but have lasting psychological effects on the victims. Raiyn (2014) and 
Schultz and Shumway (2001) listed the common cybersecurity related threats as 
reconnaissance, access, reputation, harassment, denial of service, eavesdropping, 
extortion, pornography trafficking, subversion, and hoaxes. Rittinghouse and Ransome 
(2011) listed categories of internet fraud as financial, gaming, communications, utility, 
insurance, government, investment, business, and confidence. The 2016 ISACA State of 
Cybersecurity RSA conference survey revealed the threat from computer crimes, and 
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other information security breaches continue unchecked, and the financial impact of those 
losses increases every year (ISACA, 2016). According to the survey, 28% of the ISACA 
respondents reported a loss of intellectual property to cyber incidents at least quarterly, 
25% indicated intentional damage to computer systems at least quarterly, 42% indicated 
they would be able to detect only simple cybersecurity issues, and 31% recorded 
cybercriminals had exploited their organization within the last year. While attacks have 
become more sophisticated and the motivations behind them seem to evolve each year. 
Barber (2001), Butler (1998), and Gagneja and Gagneja (2015) claimed the primary focus 
of company breaches led to financial gain, extortion, intellectual property theft, and 
disruption of service. 
The emerging cyber threat continues to flourish because the computer crimes 
vector is cheaper, more convenient, and less risky than other vectors of attack (Jang-
Jaccard, & Nepal, 2014). Stalans and Finn (2016) wrote that the Internet invites deviance 
and crime by providing a mechanism for alternative justifications and viewpoints into a 
form of cybercrime. The exponential growth of the business conducted on the internet 
and by the technology used in core business processes has led to significant growth in 
cybercrime. As of 2016, 96% of data breaches involved external actors with financial 
motivation (Verizon, 2017). The literature on cybersecurity attacks contains a significant 
number of high-profile events that were directed towards critical infrastructure, 
companies, government agencies and the public. Several of these events were first-time 
scenarios and pointed to the capability of future attacks. In 1988, Burleson was convicted 
of a third-degree felony in the United States’ first computer virus trial. Burleson planted 
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malicious routines into data processing software being utilized in a securities and 
insurance firm (Marion, 1988). The malicious software destroyed data and erased volatile 
memory thirty days after Burleson was terminated from the organization. Burleson’s 
attack caused an undisclosed amount of damages to his company in recovery and 
reputation. The 1999 Melissa virus, written by Smith, was designed to replicate 
exponentially by exploiting Microsoft Word and internal email systems (Ford, 1999; 
Simons, 1999). Melissa damages were estimated at $1.1 billion, and even though the 
virus did not have a malicious payload, it did cause a considerable denial of service to 
corporate email servers across the globe. The Code Red worm of 2001 infected over 
350,000 computers in less than half a day by exploiting the Microsoft IIS service and 
damages to organizations were estimated at $2.6 billion (Vaidya, 2015). The Blaster 
worm and Slammer worm created havoc on the internet in 2003 causing a denial of 
service attacks and affecting Microsoft SQL Server (Moore, Paxson, Savage, Shannon, 
Staniford, & Weaver, 2003). The Stuxnet virus attack of 2010 physically destroyed over 
one thousand nuclear reactors in Tehran and significantly set back the Iranian atomic 
program (Singer, 2015; Steiner, 2014). Stuxnet was a multifaceted virus, and the 
complexity of this type of attack had not been seen before the release. Stuxnet attack had 
four never-before-seen, targeted, vulnerability exploits and used digital signatures that 
were stolen from legitimate organizations. Singer (2015) claimed the Stuxnet malware 
was the first specially designed cyber weapon designed by a government agency to do 
physical harm. In 2011, over 217,000 Citibank customer records were stolen by external 
hackers, resulting in a multi-million-dollar loss to the company (Aspan & Soh, 2011; 
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Vaidya, 2015). The Citibank attack consisted of hackers using keyloggers to gain user 
access to critical servers to defraud the company (Vaidya, 2015). In 2004, the Sasser 
computer worm infected global technology systems including Delta airlines which 
resulted in disabled technology systems for transatlantic flights and several hospitals 
were unable to operate until the technology could be repaired (Schultz, 2004; Steiner, 
2014; Vaidya, 2015). The Estonia attacks of 2007, from a pro-Kremlin terrorist group, 
used ping floods and botnets to denial of service banks, newspapers, government 
systems, and communications for several days (Shackelford, 2009; Vaidya, 2015). 
Estonia was a disastrous attack in that it was the most technology-centric country in 
Europe where 90% of banking and government interfaces were delivered over the 
Internet. Shackelford (2009) pointed out that Estonia was built to operate how a future 
society would, and this is what made the attack more effective and was named the first 
information warfare event on society. The Sasser worm of 2004 spread using a buffer 
overflow in the local security authority of Windows 2000 and Windows XP operating 
systems. The Sasser worm damage attributed to organizational outages was estimated at 
over 550 million dollars (Schultz, 2004; Vaidya, 2015). Zimmerman and Restrepo (2009) 
reported the Sasser worm disrupted an oil and gas platform for several days before the 
systems could be restored and the platform usable. Bidgoli (2016), Solberg Søilen (2016), 
and Vaidya (2015) commented on the Sony PlayStation network being compromised in 
2011 by cyber hackers that caused $2 billion dollars in damages and the data exfiltration 
of 77 million users credit card numbers. Sony experienced a 24-day outage as the 
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company incident response team, which did not have a contingency plan, restored 
systems and mitigated the vulnerabilities that allowed the breach (Solberg Søilen, 2016).  
Cybersecurity experts believed that malware is the key weapon of the new cyber-
criminal (Jang-Jaccard, & Nepal, 2014). Ransomware, a form of malware that encrypts 
data until a ransom is paid, is on the rise. A recently significant change to ransomware 
has seen the attack move away from single targets and targeting vulnerable organizations 
(Cabaj & Mazurczyk, 2016; Verizon, 2017). The largest ransomware payment to date, 1 
million dollars, was recently paid by a web hosting firm after the technology department 
realized that the backup to the systems needing the restoration was also encrypted 
(Schwartz, 2017). Kharraz et al. (2015) claimed that cryptolocker ransomware has 
infected over 250,000 computers and disrupted several critical infrastructures in the last 
three years. Kharraz suggested that organizations need to invest in mitigating controls to 
counter the significant, growing risk of this type of attack. Cabaj and Mazurczyk (2016) 
argued that developers of the ransomware are constantly improving the attack and make 
any existing countermeasures ineffective. Cabaj and Mazurczyk claimed that 
organizations that can quickly find and block the communication between the infected 
machine and the command infrastructure of the attacker could prevent the encryption of 
the target. Lacking technical visibility poses a significant challenge for incident 
responders as they lack the tools or required response time to act. Organizations would 
need to provide monitoring technologies to the incident response team. The sharp rise of 
this risk has created a response by a few organizations. The nomoreransom.org coalition 
is comprised of 57 security vendors, law enforcement, and technology organizations to 
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assist victims in the recovery of the encrypted data without paying the ransom (Allman, 
2016; Mansfield-Devine, 2016; Verizon, 2017). Many organizations will need to rely on 
disaster response and backup administrators to respond to a ransomware attack by 
restoring infected systems to a known good period before the attack initiated. In the case 
of the hosting entity, backup media needs to be protected and available to responders. 
Phishing, coined on AOL in 1996, is a social engineering technique to acquire 
information such as credentials or financial information to mascaraed as the user. 
Alsharnouby, Alaca, and Chiasson (2015) claimed the assumption by the attacker is that 
they will be able to deceive users into believing the communication is legitimate. The 
2017 Verizon breach report recorded over 2400 major incidents due to social engineering 
techniques with phishing being the entry point 90% of the time. Alsharnouby, Alaca, and 
Chiasson (2015) and Khonji, Iraqi, and Jones (2013) highlighted the weakness in humans 
being able to spot the attack allows the exploit to be difficult to mitigate and have led to 
many organizations being breached. Organizations may find that they have been 
compromised by external attackers acting as internal administrators via the stolen 
credentials. In a major attack against the security company RSA, phishing was successful 
in allowing attackers to compromise the organization and subsequently allowed the 
attackers to pivot to Lockheed Martin (Khonji, Iraqi, & Jones, 2013). Researchers point 
to the first line of defense in a phishing campaign is detection by the user (Khonji, Iraqi, 
& Jones, 2013; Verizon, 2017). There are multiple lines of defense against a phishing 
campaign that can be deployed (Alsharnouby et al., 2015; Khonji, Iraqi, & Jones, 2013; 
Verizon, 2017): 
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 Organizations can work to take down the shared host by the phisher. 
 Users can be continually notified of various types of social engineering. 
 Organizations can deploy toolbars to rewrite HTTP links eliminating the 
hidden destination that the user is being sent. 
 Blacklists and whitelists are frequently used block communications to the 
Internet protocol of phishing webservers. 
 DNS-based blacklists use the DNS specification to inform on malformed 
links that may be used by phishers. 
 Programmatic toolbar helpers can detect phishing activity through data 
mining to alert users of the malicious intent of the link. 
Education and awareness may not be enough to protect an organization from a phishing 
attack. Disaster recovery responders should understand if the cause of the service 
interruption is due to compromised credentials from a phishing campaign. If the 
attacker’s intention is a disruption of the business, disaster responders may see services 
that have been restored will be taken back offline. Complete eradication of the intruder's 
stolen credentials will need to be conducted before the organization can be resumed. 
Barber (2001) called the Denial of Service (DoS) attack one of the most infamous 
attacks conducted by hackers to cause harm and had increased in size and complexity 
over the last ten years. Long and Thomas (2001), Moore, Shannon, Brown, Voelker, and 
Savage (2006), and Schuba et al. (1997) claimed a DoS attack leverages a weakness in 
the TCP/IP protocol and cannot be corrected without significant changes to the standards 
of the protocol. A DoS is initiated by an attacker by sending too many connection 
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requests to the victim that causes the victim to allocate all available resources and 
denying legitimate connections (Raiyn, 2014). DoS can be a significant nuisance to an 
organization that is conducting business over the internet; unable to process legitimate 
requests the organization will appear offline. Research by PWC (2015) indicated the DoS 
has become increasingly damaging and is one of the most frequent types of attacks. 
Schuba et al. (1997) claimed that organizations could defend against the DoS attack by 
allocating more resources, reducing timeouts, modifying routers to block flooding SYN 
packets, utilizing the firewall as a relay, and sending reset packets. The drawbacks to the 
defenses are cost, stability, delays in communication, and continual monitoring by the 
incident responders (Schuba et al., 1997). In 2015, a DoS attack affected the Microsoft 
Xbox Live service for a week causing substantial connections problems for their gaming 
customers. November 2016 a large distributed denial of service impacted half of the 
internet as attackers targeted the Dyn domain name service company serving many of the 
world’s largest organizations. In September of 2016, Krebs on Security was hit with a 
DDoS that was 20 times larger than any DoS that had been previously recorded on the 
internet and is thought to have been in retaliation to an article being published by the 
researcher (Shuler & Smith, 2017). The Verizon 2017 breach report noted the finance, 
retail, and technology sectors experienced more than one million DoS during 2016 
(Verizon, 2017). Verizon Research has shown that incidents involving a web application 
are caused by 80% denial of service, 20% malware and the remaining percentages are 
due to stolen credentials. The Internet of Things (IoT) has become a risk point for denial 
of service attacks. With more of the consumer electronics being manufactured having the 
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ability to connect to the internet, the more hackers are finding ways to leverage the 
devices maliciously. Organizations must understand what their capabilities are to 
mitigating DoS attacks and how the incident response team will react to mitigate the 
attack. Making the monitoring of the network data available, response planning to 
firewall rulesets changes, and contact numbers at the telecom provider can greatly assist 
the disaster responder in mitigating the attacks. 
A web service is commonly described as an application or service that is made 
available from an organization’s exposed internet server. Research on web services 
attacks indicated hacking against web services are on the rise (Raiyn, 2014; Razzaq et al., 
2014; Salini & Shenbagam, 2015). Razzaq et al. (2014) wrote that web services have 
greatly improved the profitability of organizations and at the same time increased the risk 
to cyber-attacks. A web application attack is an incident where the internet exposed 
application was the vector of the attack. The attack includes code-level vulnerabilities, 
data exfiltration and the circumvention of authentication schemes (Verizon, 2017). Gupta 
and Gupta’s (2017) research revealed 55% of the banking industry’s web services are 
always considered vulnerable and 21% frequently vulnerable to attack. Salini and 
Shenbagam (2015) claimed web application security is the primary concern for e-
business and their research indicated 75% of hacking is being deployed at the application 
layer. A 2013 survey by WhiteHat Security claimed the Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
vulnerability is the top weakness among web applications, has the capability to DoS, and 
contributes to a significant data leakage problem. Martin and Lam (2008) described XSS 
as a JavaScript code injection attack that allows for a malicious script to be run in the 
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victim's browser to gain access to sensitive resources on the backend server. Wang and 
Zhang (2016) described the 2013 Yahoo attack where accounts of Yahoo’s users were 
exploited by an XSS vulnerability causing a massive malware and spam campaign. Cao, 
Yegneswaran, Possas, and Chen (2012) and Gupta and Gupta (2017) described how XSS 
vulnerabilities produced the Boonana, SpaceFlash, Renren, Samy, and Yamanner worms 
that created damage to millions of users and workstations. Gupta and Gupta (2017) 
suggested that organizations should consider XSS attacks to be a serious threat and 
deploy mitigating controls to safeguard data and systems. A SQL injection attack 
(SQLIA) is a web service attack technique that can damage and exfiltrate sensitive data 
from databases. Pearson and Bethel (2016) argued the SQLIA lead the threat to web 
services instead of XSS. Sharma and Jain (2014) and Pearson and Bethel (2016) 
described the SQL-structured query language as the means for web applications to 
interact with a database. When applications are not properly hardened in the coding, the 
very popular SQL-injection attack can change the intended logic of the application to a 
malicious logic that returns data that was not authorized to the attacker (Sharma & Jain, 
2014). The malicious input from the injection causes the interpreter to execute 
involuntary commands to the database without proper authorization. Finding the design 
loophole allows the attacker unlimited access to the database. The literature on SQL 
injection describes multiple attack types including orderwise injection, blind, double-
blind, database fingerprinting, authentication bypass and remote commands against the 
database. Regardless of the attack leveraged, SQLIA can exfiltrate data, plant malware, 
and drop database tables resulting in a complete loss of data. Incident response teams 
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should understand the ramifications of SQLIA on the organization's web services and 
what would be needed to recover from modified or deleted data from the database. 
Cyber-attacks are becoming more destructive and are a threat that can strike any 
private or public organization (Solberg & Søilen, 2016). Cyber-attacks can be initiated by 
foreign entities, government intelligence apparatus, universities, organized crime, or 
competitors. The PWC (2015) study showed that 75% of cyber-attacks would spread 
from the first victim organization to the second victim organization within one day and 
40% of those attacks will hit the next organization in less than an hour. A study by the 
Ponemon Institute found that 70% of the entities responsible for critical U.S. 
infrastructure had experienced at least one annual technology interruption from a cyber-
attack (Mansfield-Devine, 2014). The Ponemon study also documented only one in six 
respondents claiming their technology security program as mature and capable of 
responding to a cyber-attack. Malicious hacking is a risk to any organization with 
systems connected to the internet. Stalans and Finn (2016) claimed the accessibility and 
availability of the Internet in supporting societal institutions cultivates cybercrime as 
there is no centralized government body to establish rules or enforce criminal laws in 
specific countries. Solberg Søilen (2016) compared the cyber army of the twenty-first 
century as what the military air force was a few decades ago. Militaries all over the globe 
are fortifying cyber-attack personnel and cyber-warfare toolset after witnessing the US 
Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear program. Iran responded by cyber-attacking Aramco that 
resulted in eight days of service interruption on critical systems (Bronk & Tikk-Ringas, 
2013; Lewis, 2013; Solberg Søilen 2016). Raiyn (2014) claimed traditional cyber-attack 
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detection has limitations in that it can only detect known attacks. Forums and chat rooms 
on the Internet allow for trustworthy underground markets for the sale of drugs, 
prostitution, sensitive data, and terrorism (Stalans & Finn, 2016). One common 
mitigating control to hacking comes from an internal white hat hacker. The white hat 
hacker is slang for an ethical computer hacker who specializes in testing and 
methodologies to protect an organization from external hackers. The white hat tests the 
technology infrastructure with the same techniques as a malicious hacker and may offer 
organizations a better understanding of how they may be vulnerable to attack. The 
increase in cyber-attacks should cause executive management to seek to understand how 
the organization can protect itself from this type of specific risk. A strong security 
program will reduce risk but cannot eliminate it. A mature organization should prepare 
disaster recovery plans for resuming from a cyber-attack risk that applies to their Internet 
offering.  
Common Information Security Frameworks 
There are many information security frameworks available in the information 
security literature for an organization to align, and no single framework would be 
applicable for all organizations. Implementing a security program by leveraging a 
framework means the entity will have defined principles, policies, means, and methods. 
Yang et al. (2016) claimed the security requirements of an organization’s framework 
could serve useful for building a program and as simple as a checklist activity for 
compliance. The common components of the security frameworks found in the literature 
consist of planning, implementation, and verification (Mihut, 2014). Planning 
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components included management processes, risk management, and security design. 
Implementation components included implementing security metrics, security toolsets, 
defensive technology, monitoring, and training. Verification components included 
monitoring, audits, testing, and evaluations. 
Yang et al. (2016) claimed the use of ISO 27001/27002 is considered the most 
prevalent practice in the domain of information security management. Cefaratti, Hui, and 
Wallace (2011) described the ISO 27000 as a framework designed to address the 
essential controls needed to safeguard an entities technology asset. Gillies (2011) claimed 
previous studies indicated the ISO 27000 framework had seen a slower adoption than 
previous ISO frameworks such as the 9001 series. An ISO 27002 based survey by 
Cefaratti et al. sought to measure the effectiveness of IT-related investments in best 
practices and found that the respondents considered the effectiveness of the controls and 
the investments by the organizations to be linked to positive results found by external 
auditors. Research by Gillies (2011) revealed that 50% of the organizations holding an 
ISO 27000 certification were from 50 or less employee, SME types of organization. 
Gillies highlighted that 80% of the respondents indicated the 27000 certifications were 
obtained for a competitive advantage in marketing the organization and not for improving 
the security program. Gillies argued the adoption problem of the ISO 27000 framework 
come from complexity and the $22,000 certification price for smaller organizations 
without a large technology audit budget.  
The NIST SP 800-184 Cybersecurity Event Recovery Framework (CSF) provides 
a high-level framework for organizations to improve their posture by following a five-
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phase approach. Souppaya, Feldman, and Witte (2017) described the 800-14 as a 
framework that is suited for improving policies and plans for recovering from evolved 
threats. Shackelford, Proia, Martell, and Craig (2015) claimed the NIST framework had 
the potential to improve international corporations that favor a voluntary approach to 
cybersecurity. Souppaya et al. (2017) claimed the planning components of the 800-184 
enables the organization to improve the risk scenarios activities by reviewing recent 
cyber events to assist in the development or recovery playbooks. The 800-14 could 
identify gaps to be addressed before the disaster is experienced. NIST released the SP 
800-184 as a guide for cybersecurity event recovery and defines five functions of 
identification, protection, detection, response, and recovery (Lindström et al., 2010; 
Souppaya et al., 2017). Metrics generation is encouraged in this framework, and the 
metrics are used to improve the quality of the response actions. 
NIST SP 800-53 was defined as the framework for the Security and Privacy 
Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations (Montesino & Fenz, 2011). 
Cardenas et al. (2009) noted the 800-53 framework consists of over 180 controls that are 
not enforceable on federal systems but were designed to provide guidance. Ericsson 
(2007) claimed the 800-53 was designed to influence a wider audience than just federal 
systems and the largest challenge for organizations is to select the appropriate security 
controls from a framework. Montesino and Fenz’s (2011) research found an advantage in 
leveraging the 800-53 framework for other organizations in that 30% of the controls 
could be automated by software solutions. The 800-53 framework provided a set of 
78 
 
baselines that would allow an organization to find a section of countermeasures needed 
for that vertical.  
Yang et al. (2016) claimed the NIST 800-26 Security Self-Assessment Guide for 
Information Technology Systems, established the foundation for standardization on 
several levels of security status. Organizations choosing to align with the 800-26 can 
leverage the framework to determine whether a described five levels are adequately 
implemented by the security program. Johansson and Johnson (2005) asserted the 800-26 
framework provided an extensive questionnaire that should be used to test security 
controls against a classified or unclassified system. 
CIS 20 Critical Controls, sometimes referred to as the Consensus Audit 
Guidelines (CAG), is a framework of 20 prioritized actions to defend an organization 
from known cyber-attacks (CIS, 2017; Montesino & Fenz, 2011). Lewis (2013) claimed 
the NSA originally defined the initial list of controls from the active compromises they 
were involved in remediating. Lewis pointed that the NIST frameworks are several 
thousand pages which can create implementation barriers, but the CAG correlated the 
most commonly used attacks along with defensive measures. 
The Operationally Critical Threat Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) 
is a methodology developed by the Carnegie Mellon University to streamline the process 
of assessing information security risks and the development of a security strategy. Yang 
et l. (2016) claimed the OCTAVE offered an alternative approach specifically designed 
to assess technology assets and the resiliency of the applied controls. Johansson and 
Johnson (2005) described the advantages of the OCTAVE come from the business unit 
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and technology staff working together to address the security needs of the organization. 
The team drew on the collected knowledge to define the current state, major risks, and a 
clear security strategy. 
Iqbal et al. (2016), Lainhart (2000), and Yang et al. (2016) wrote that the Control 
Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT) could be deployed as a 
supporting toolset to bridge the gap between information technology and top-level 
decision making about business continuance planning. Von Solms (2005) evaluated the 
COBIT framework against the ISO 17799 for security governance. Von Solms 
summarized the COBIT was lacking in the detailed installation of controls and was 
designed to guide a framework to be integrated into a wider IT governance program. 
Lainhart (2000) claimed the main objective of COBIT was the creation of superior 
policies and technical controls that would eventually lead to endorsement by auditors. 
Ridley, Young, and Carroll (2004) wrote the highest concentration of COBIT adoptions 
are found in the United States. The adoption base is understandable as the COBIT 
framework was developed in the U.S. and aligned easily with IT governance drivers 
found in industries such as the financial sector.  
Information Security Forum (ISF) includes a standard of practices in five sections. 
The ISF is broken out into 30 areas and 135 sections and offers advantages when 
measuring the information security program in an organization (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2010); 
Kruger & Kearney, 2006). Da Veiga and Eloff (2010) claimed the ISF should guide 
improve the security culture that provides an improved security behavior from 
employees. 
80 
 
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) is a framework designed to 
address IT service management and provide management guidelines for incident 
response, capacity management, problem management, and others. Kanapathy and Khan 
(2012) described the ITIL framework as a set of best practices that can increase IT 
service management and enable IT departments to demonstrate strong systematic 
execution of processes. Sharifi, Ayat, Rahman, and Sahibudin (2008) claimed the ITIL is 
the most widely used, general IT framework in the world. Sharifi et al. (2008) claimed 
organizations that have failed at implementing the ITIL framework were lacking in 
management commitment, creating complicated processes, missing process owners, and 
having a project team that was too ambitious. Kanapathy and Khan (2012) argued the 
ITIL framework does not recommend a standard for the implementation of the controls 
and their research found larger IT teams with established programs were more likely to 
be familiar with ITIL.  
The National Security Administration’s InfoSec Assessment Methodology (IAM) 
(Cross, 2003; Yang et al., 2016) proposed by the National Security Agency provides an 
analytical framework for information security. The InfoSec Assessment addresses three 
tiers of quality and 18 distinct areas by which the program would be managed. NSA 
(2002) noted the framework sought to improve vulnerability assessments and provide 
quality guidelines to security programs. Cross (2000) claimed the strengths of the IAM 
comes from the documentation, focus on awareness training, and standard operating 
procedures found in the framework. 
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The Survivable Systems Analysis (SSA) method was developed by the SEI 
CERT® Coordination Center. Yang et al. (2016) wrote the SSA is a process that provides 
an advantage in the assessment of the survivability properties of a technology system. 
The analysis is carried out at a high level and proceeds through a set of joint working 
sessions to compile findings and recommendations for upper management decision-
making.  
The frameworks summarized in this section, along with the many supplemental 
frameworks that can be found in the information security body of knowledge provided 
many options for organizations to create a security program, measure the program for 
maturity, achieve governance, provide awareness, and reduce risk to the organization 
from technology risks. An organization should carefully choose which framework will 
best fit the professional vertical and current state of the information security program. 
Failure to properly align the framework with the organization may result in significant 
vulnerabilities, a false sense of security, or a program operating in a lesser state than 
optimal. Organizations with less than optimal security posture and exposing 
vulnerabilities in the technology infrastructure increases the risk of a computer crimes 
service interruption. 
Current Research in Information Technology Disaster Recovery 
Innovative technologies have been studied to improve preparedness for disaster 
recovery planners, incident responders, and executive management. In the past, 
information technology disaster recovery planners needed only to focus on keeping the 
mainframe operating during a natural disaster, and ensure there was a good working set 
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of backups. Alexander (2015) wrote that disaster planning must now evolve to face the 
challenges of the technology age and understand the immediacy means of 
communications available. Alexander stated another challenge is to ensure that the 
increasing dependency on technology for the recovery of the organization does not create 
a vulnerability in its right. Ee (2014) wrote that new technology threats are making 
organizations more aware of the need for continuance planning but many organizations 
do not reach a state of business resilience. To approach business continuity management 
traditionally may not be enough to reduce modern risk scenarios such as computer 
crimes. Bajgoric (2014) claimed the traditional approach focuses the organization to think 
in limited aspects and leaving out different threat dimensions. Organizations failing to 
reach a mature BCP will focus on past incidents, incomplete knowledge, perform weak 
business impact analysis, and follow only portions of a framework. Ee (2014) wrote that 
inadequacies in BCP could be solved through a standard approach and a commitment to a 
BCM discipline by upper management. Al Hamed and Alenezi (2016) wrote about the 
importance of a strong connection between information security and disaster recovery. Al 
Hamed and Alenezi claimed not all information security controls are part of disaster 
recovery and not all DR measures are found in information security frameworks. Where 
information security is primarily a preventative measure, disaster recovery is more 
aligned to be preventative, repressive and corrective. 
New cloud alternatives. Cloud computing has recently transformed the thinking 
of backing up data in disaster recovery (Bisshoff et al., 2015). Alhazmi and Malaiya 
(2013) claimed cloud technologies had provided an affordable alternative to disaster 
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recovery plans for small and medium-sized organizations with no significant addition to 
office or facilities cost. Razvi Doomun (2008) believed that cloud providers that offered 
strong disaster recovery and security options could gain an organization a competitive 
advantage. The advantages of cloud solutions come from the removal of many local 
infrastructure dependencies. When the technology infrastructure is delivered from a cloud 
computing provider, many traditional tasks such as backup and maintenance are 
transferred to the solutions provider. Chang (2015) highlighted the need for contingency 
planning in the cloud because of the need for a clear understanding of data management. 
Outsourcing to a public or private cloud can move data off the local premises for cost 
savings, but the risk of data loss has just shifted to the service provider. Chang argues the 
risk of data loss applies regardless of whether the data is stored in the cloud or on 
premises. Alhazmi and Malaiya (2013) pointed to a limitation of cloud disaster recovery 
comes from the cloud provider serving as the DR component for many organizations and 
the provider may become overwhelmed if it experiences a high demand from several 
customers at once. Cloud-based disaster recovery may provide some advantages in cost, 
but the redundancy of the data must be considered. Alhazmi and Malaiya wrote that 
cloud services have a limited history to review and it is not clear how cloud providers 
will respond to a serious disaster or a cybersecurity attack. 
Disaster recovery communications. Improvements in ICT have allowed 
organizations to improve the facilitation of the recovery during crisis response. Matar et 
al. (2016) claimed the progress and fast rise of social media platforms for communication 
had found application in disaster recovery incident management. Bortree and Seltzer 
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(2009) research indicated that social media provided a positive means for two-way 
communication between its users and entities to deliver vital information. Social media 
features, in the disaster recovery context, provides the users, responders, and disaster 
team management the ability to leverage native, mobile applications for a communication 
channel. Matar et al. pointed to the success of communication via social media during 
Virginia Tech shooting in 2007 in providing vital details to first responders and other 
students. Research by Quang Tran, Kien, Borcea, and Yamada (2014) found an 
advantage in connecting disaster responder mobile devices to surviving wireless access 
points for a multi-hop wireless access network that effectively mitigated losses by 
allowing connectivity to communications systems. Providing Internet connectivity to the 
large disaster area can improve the emergency response by allowing video conferencing, 
instant messaging, access to disaster plans in a cloud provider, and electronic mail with 
disaster recovery coordination teams. Research by Suaybaguio (2016) found that Short 
Message Service (SMS) was perceived as an optimal communication channel during a 
disaster for the timely dissemination of information from disaster managers. SMS 
messages do not require the mobile device to be activated for the user, and the messages 
are transmitted with the same cell tower technology as voice calling. SMA can also be 
sent from a computer to an ordinary mobile device using software automation and 
scripting. 
The ability to have users continue to operate during the loss of a facility or campus 
can be advantageous for most entities. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks forced 
organizations to rethink how employees could operate remotely during a disaster 
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(Grigonis, 2002). Gartner used the phrase workforce resilience to describe the need for 
employees to have remote access to commodity Internet using the power of mobile 
devices and virtual private networking. Organizations that are location-specific have a 
greater risk of being disabled. Grigonis (2002) claimed enterprises that have engineered 
the ability for employees to work remotely are positioned to respond quickly in the event 
of a disaster. Mobile work schemes offer the organization to put employees back to work 
quickly. Lam (2002) wrote that traditional organizations would temporarily shore up 
people resources with contract staff, call-out arrangements, rental offices, manual 
procedures, and service forwarding agreements. Virtual Private Networking (VPN) 
technologies can place employees anywhere and still protect the confidentiality, 
availability, and integrity of the network transmission (Grigonis, 2002). One minimizing 
the impact of a disaster is distributed computing, including end-user computing. Greene 
(2006); Sprague (2015) wrote that although VPN technologies are not the only 
mechanism for flexibility, VPN technology allows for organizations to accommodate 
many displaced employees with minimal effort. Heng, Hooi, Liang, Othma, and San’s 
(2012) research found a strong agreement in the VPN technology as a solution for 
reacting to unseen events and still providing an adequate platform for normal business 
operations. Organizations that use a VPN solution that can place the user base anywhere 
that has Internet capability has an advantage when a disaster affects a location.  
Need for technology integration. The review of the cybersecurity frameworks and 
the disaster recovery frameworks highlighted commonalities but also revealed gaps in the 
disaster recovery incident response to computer crimes. Johansson and Johnson (2005), 
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Lindström et al. (2010), and Souppaya et al. (2017) wrote that although multiple 
frameworks had components for disaster recovery, there was a gap in focusing on 
recovery for cybersecurity. Figure 4 was created to describe a potential improvement to 
the disaster recovery response process. 
 
Figure 4. The improved disaster recovery response workflow. 
 
Johansson and Johnson (2005) research compared multiple security frameworks and 
found that while certain frameworks were strong in planning, others were strong in 
controlling, and others were strong in governance. Johansson and Johnson claimed that 
that depending on the framework chosen, organizations will receive different levels of 
information security controls and recovery. Bartock et al. (2016) wrote it is important to 
understand that a cybersecurity incident response plan should be developed as part of a 
larger contingency plan. Gupta, Chaturvedi, and Mehta’s (2011) research found that 
organizations should be better prepared to handle cyber-attacks if the security program is 
part of an overall, mature information technology program. A strategic focus on risk 
management strategies should help the organization to reduce the effect of materialized 
risk. Lindström et al. (2010) claimed one of the more important issues in disaster 
recovery comes from IT and cybersecurity planning. Top managers may not have the 
proper understanding of information security which can lead to decisions that do not 
improve the organization responds to a computers crimes type of interruption. The BCP 
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should include other procedures for reducing a service interruption risk to business 
functions. Iqbal et al. (2016) wrote there is a benefit to organizations that can manage and 
monitor its information technology program by better benchmarking to improve the 
service availability. Cardenas et al. (2009) argued that the current tools of information 
security not provide a sufficient defense in depth system to protect specific organizations 
such as those with control systems (SCADA). Lindström et al. (2010) wrote that 
information security management standards focus on mature processes and not the 
content of what they are securing. The ISO, GASPP, and SSE-CMM are popular in use 
and practitioners face a limitation in focus on ensuring processes exist while being less 
focused on how the processes accomplish improving the security stance of the 
organization. Barber (2001) noted the ISO 17799-1 is being explored by companies to 
provide a framework to manage cyber risk and judge the security controls in place. 
Integrating information security responders with disaster recovery first responders should 
have advantages. Loui and Finn (2016) claimed cross-training system administrators and 
first responders is essential to be sure the correct coverage will be available when disaster 
strikes. Organizations that can find opportunities to integrate the cybersecurity incident 
responders, Security Operation Center (SOC) monitoring, disaster recovery planners, and 
disaster recovery first responders should experience improved recovery over 
organizations that do not integrate.  
Summary and Conclusions 
The literature review included the concepts of emergency management, crisis 
communications, types of disaster recovery, laws affecting disaster recovery, disaster 
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risks to organizations, disaster recovery frameworks, and information security 
frameworks. Disaster recovery efforts have evolved from simple people management and 
planning for the effects of natural disasters to adhering to federal regulations and 
managing the risks of technology interruptions such as computer crimes. A common 
theme found in the disaster recovery body of knowledge was that there are risk factors 
that planners and first responders must prepare for to expect an optimal recovery. Those 
risk areas were natural, human-made accidents, terrorism, and technology. The more 
detailed information technology disaster recovery literature detailed the influence of 
computer crimes and the need to account for the risks. Although there were many 
strategies discussed for managing disaster recovery efforts, there were only a few sources 
that presented strategies to combat computer crimes interruptions. Bird (2015), Brown, 
(2016), Dines, (2012), Ferdinand (2015), Ignatius (2015), Marinescu (2015), and 
McCreight and Leece (2016) provided studies that assisted in the analyzing the gap. This 
research reinforced the necessity to understand the emerging threats that computer crimes 
have on organizations and the need for disaster recovery programs. Chapter 3 includes 
the research methodology to investigate how information technology disaster recovery 
can be modified to better respond to emerging threats. 
89 
 
Chapter 3: Research Method  
The purpose of this qualitative study was to understand how information 
technology disaster recovery controls and processes can be modified to improve response 
to a computer crime caused business interruption. The problem statement highlighted in 
Chapter 1 was the lack of knowledge organizations have to recover from some computer 
crimes interruptions given the maturity level of existing disaster recovery programs. 
Guidry et al. (2015) and Ferdinand (2015) discussed the lack of a set of control 
procedures to allow understanding of how business management can bolster disaster 
recovery programs to account for this type of interruption. The literature reflected the 
importance of planning for disasters and incident responders understanding the 
significant disaster risks to the organization. I did not find where there was a 
comprehensive framework developed to collaborate information technology disaster 
recovery and cyber security controls to combat this disaster risk. In this study, I focused 
on how organizations can better plan and build procedures to improve the recovery of an 
organization from a computer crimes disaster. This chapter includes a review of the 
research design, the role of the researcher, selection of the participants, use of the 
instrument, explanation of data collection, analysis of the data, challenges of the method, 
and any threats to the validity of the findings. 
Research Design and Rationale  
I sought to understand what factors significantly affected the ability of technology 
responders in responding to computer crimes caused disasters. Cybersecurity experts, 
disaster recovery researchers, and incident responders represent a participant pool that 
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holds an understanding of the current events affecting disaster recovery. An expert 
participant pool may create new knowledge to improve the process of responding to 
computer security interruptions. A qualitative research inquiry has exploratory and theory 
building attributes. Many of the qualitative paradigms could be used to generate a better 
understanding of how disaster recovery responders and planners should respond to a 
computer crime interruption. The rationale for this study is provided based on a review of 
the qualitative research methods that may apply to answer the stated research question. 
Choosing a phenomenological research study could provide generalizations about 
how disaster planners, disaster responders, and cybersecurity experts view the specific 
interruption caused by cyber attackers. The generalizations would provide the viewpoints 
and the shared experience of the targeted groups (Babbie, 2007) but the generalizations 
would not develop the cause and effect relation, nor the theory building needed to 
improve the process. A case study method would include how and why the service 
interruption happened, in a small sample size of one to three organizations, which had 
experienced a computer crime caused disaster (Yin, 2011). A disaster case study would 
involve extensive interviewing and observation of a disaster recovery team that had 
recovered from a computer crimes disaster. Organizations may be reluctant to approve to 
conduct a study when the team had failed to recover from the incident properly. The case 
study would allow for real-life situations to provide in-depth data collection. A researcher 
would be limited in that the qualitative data gathering would focus on the specific cases 
selected (Yin, 2011) and any conclusions may not apply to all disaster recovery 
programs. A narrative research inquiry would seek to understand the motivation and 
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experiences of disaster recovery planners and incident responders as they are recovering 
the organization from a technology-caused disaster. The narrative design would provide 
an understanding of factors that allow for successful incidence response, but narrative 
methods are usually limited to a few individuals and would not suffice for broad theory 
generation (Maxwell, 2005). Ethnographic research would focus on cultural groups 
(Babbie, 2007), which would limit the type of disaster responders and planners used in 
this study. The technology field of disaster recovery consists of multicultural workers 
(Niederman, 2004) and would severely limit the understanding that could be gained by 
narrowing to a single cultural group. The desire to have multiple perspectives, expert 
experience, and ability to conduct theory building aligns with the use of the Delphi 
design.  
A Delphi design was selected over other qualitative approaches because of the 
accuracy of forecasting (Linstone & Turoff, 1975) and goal of the study was prediction 
and theory building. Skulmoski et al. (2007) argued that the design can be used when 
there is an incomplete understanding of a problem and should be used to explore what 
does not exist. The Delphi design allows for the identification of controls or alternative 
frameworks (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004) that may be used to improve the process by 
analyzing feedback from experts in the field of disaster recovery. The Delphi design is 
based on a formal process for collecting and disseminating expert knowledge through a 
series of qualitative questions with controlled moderation (Linstone & Turoff, 1975). The 
Delphi design is a useful form of communications and anonymous consensus building to 
facilitate group judgment. The findings from the Delphi data collection activity were 
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triangulated from the responses of the participants and research conducted during the 
literature review (Linstone & Turoff, 1975; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004; Skulmoski et al., 
2007). The study was exploratory because of the small number of studies on the topic of 
computer crimes as they affect information technology disaster recovery. The use of the 
Delphi design in this study was to create new strategies for responding to computer 
crimes caused service interruptions. The Delphi technique provides quantitative data to 
quantify the participant's responses and potential for consensus (Linstone & Turoff, 1975; 
Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004).  
Role of the Researcher 
As the researcher, I held multiple roles during this study. I assembled the panel of 
experts with the experience in disaster recovery, incident response, and cybersecurity. I 
designed the questionnaire with questions relevant to the study of disaster recovery and 
grounded in the literature review from Chapter 2. The questions were designed to be 
qualitative, and I administered each of the three rounds of surveys and analyzed the 
responses. Based on the responses, the next survey allowed for the participants to revise 
their original responses and answer other questions based on the previous group feedback 
(Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). I reiterated this process until the participants reached a 
consensus in providing themes or disparities. When disparities were recorded from the 
collected judgments, interviews were conducted with the participant to gain an 
understanding of the deviation from consensus. In the case of nonresponses during any 
the three rounds of the Delphi, I communicated to the panelist to obtain assurances of 
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participation and move the process along. When participants dropped out, I filtered the 
data from the collected responses.  
To mitigate any research bias, I can disclose that I am neither affiliated with nor 
employed by any of the participants. The panel was recruited by a snowball sampling of 
suggestions from experts I consulted with about this research. While I may be known to 
some of the experts, there was no employment relationship with any of the participants.  
Methodology 
The Delphi design was developed by the Rand Corporation in the 1950s and was 
intended to be a technique for the collation of judgments on a specific subject (Skulmoski 
et al., 2007). Linstone and Turoff (1975) and Skulmoski et al. (2007) claimed the Delphi 
design is typically executed through a set of designed, sequential surveys mixed with the 
summarized feedback of earlier responses. Donohoe and Needham (2009) wrote the 
Delphi design is best used when complexity and uncertainty are present, and there is 
imperfect knowledge. The Delphi design is primarily used in cases where judgmental 
information is valuable, and the procedure uses a series of questionnaires interspersed 
with controlled opinion feedback (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). Okoli and Pawlowski 
(2004) claimed researchers could apply the Delphi design to situations as a tool for expert 
problem solving and long-range forecasting. The design does not require the expert 
panelists to be in any single location making it a viable option to be conducted by 
electronic means such as the Internet. Internet communications is an advantage in that 
participants can be from geographically disperse areas and still collaborate 
simultaneously (Skulmoski et al., 2007). Linstone and Turoff claimed three rounds are 
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sufficient to attain consensus in the expert responses. Skulmoski et al. and Okoli and 
Pawlowski wrote that additional rounds beyond three offer only small changes to the 
analysis and becomes repetitious to the panelists. Fowles (1978), Linstone and Turoff 
(1975), and Skulmoski et al. described the following steps for the Delphi design: 
 The researcher will design a team to undertake and monitor a Delphi on a given 
research subject. 
 The researcher selects panelists to participate in the exercise. Panelists are chosen 
by the expertise in the area to be researched. 
 The researcher develops the first round of questions to begin the study. 
 The questionnaire is tested for ambiguities, vagueness, and appropriateness. 
 The researcher submits the first questionnaire to the panelists, over a predefined 
communications method, to collect the qualitative data. 
 The researcher collects the data from all panelists and analyzes the first-round of 
responses. 
 Preparation is made for the second-round questionnaires based on the answers 
from the previous round. Feedback is provided in the previous rounds to allow the 
experts to provide clarity if they deemed necessary. 
 The researcher submits the next round of questionnaires to the panelists for data 
collection. 
 Analysis of the responses and developed questions based on the data is reiterated 
as long as it is necessary to achieve consensus in the results. During each round, 
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the experts are provided feedback on their responses to ensure the researcher has 
fully understood the answers that were submitted. This includes arguments. 
 A report by the researcher or team is generated to present the conclusions of the 
exercise.  
Linstone and Turoff (1975) claimed an important issue in the Delphi process is the 
understanding of the aim of the exercise by all expert panelists. When the panelists 
understand the goal, they become less frustrated and less likely to lose interest. Linstone 
and Turoff argued that technical experts must be convinced that their judgments may 
need to be made before all aspects of the problem are available which may be different 
from their standard decision-making process. The experts should be persuaded that the 
judgments are still a valuable piece of data.  
Anonymity for participants is an important factor in the Delphi process. Okoli and 
Pawlowski (2004) wrote that the participants are always anonymous to each other but not 
the researcher. Habibi, Sarafrazi, and Izadyar (2014) wrote that in groupthink exercises 
some members could dominate weaker members and pressure the weaker members to 
confirm that results in ineffective problem-solving. The anonymity principle of the 
Delphi design solves this problem (Habibi et al., 2014; Linstone & Turoff, 1975). 
The initial set of questions were carefully crafted. Linstone and Turoff (1975) and 
Skulmoski et al. (2007) pointed to the need for the researcher to decide at the beginning 
of the design if the initial set of questions will be focused or broad and open-ended. 
When the questions are focused, the participants are guided to a certain goal. When broad 
questions are designed, I could collect more data and from a wider range of responses. 
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For this study, I asked a broad set of open-ended questions to allow for a range of 
qualitative responses. Each subsequent round narrowed the results. The filtered results 
may lead to an improvement in controls and processes necessary for response to a 
computer crime caused business interruption. 
Participant Selection Logic 
The Delphi design does not require a statistical sample that attempts to be 
representative of a population but instead is intended as a groupthink mechanism that 
uses qualified experts who hold specific knowledge of the subject being studied (Okoli & 
Pawlowski, 2004). Skulmoski et al. (2007) cautioned that as the panel size increases with 
experts, the more cumbersome the analysis of the data becomes. The Delphi technique 
allows a panel of about 15-18 experts to collaborate to generate themes, disparities, or 
reach consensus (Linstone & Turoff, 1975; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). A requirement for 
the Delphi to be valuable comes from the selection of the qualified experts. 
Approximately 70 experts were invited to participate in this study. The final panel size of 
22 was large enough to determine patterns in the responses without the data becoming 
overwhelming. This sample size was large enough to see patterns in responses but not 
large enough to overwhelm the data analysis process of all responses. Five experts were 
selected to represent disaster recovery first responders, five experts were selected from 
disaster recovery researchers, and five experts were selected from a cybersecurity 
background. The disaster recovery responders in the panel were selected from disaster 
recovery programs of businesses that are large enough to fund a full-time disaster 
recovery program, properly plan, conduct testing, and have experienced an interruption 
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from computer crimes. The disaster recovery researchers must have multiple published, 
peer-reviewed papers on disaster recovery. The DR researchers that authored publications 
need their research to study current trends in disaster recovery. Each participant was 
selected based on interviews, recommendations, or their visibility as a researcher in this 
subject matter. The diversity of knowledge was considered an important selection factor 
along with the field of expertise when the participants were asked to join the research. 
This panel included an adequate number of experts who are interested in identifying a 
successful strategy for disaster recovery. Organizations including Information Systems 
Audit and Control Association (ISACA), Information Security Certification (ISC2), 
Information Systems Security Association (ISSA), Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), and 
the InfraGard were contacted for applicable participants in the United States. Experts 
from the disciplines of emergency management, information technology disaster 
recovery, and cyber resiliency were asked to rate qualitative indicators using the Delphi 
design. 
Potential expert participants received an email invitation to participate (see 
Appendix A). The research topic and description of the study was explained. The email 
described the protection of the expert’s identity. Each expert panelist was asked to agree 
to a consent form (see Appendix A). The anonymity of the panel experts is protected 
because the only expert opinion will be collected. Participant identity was not be revealed 
in the study. The consent form includes an explanation of the study in clear language as 
outlined by the Walden’s Institutional Review Board (12-11-17-0500644). The consent 
form included a description of the importance of the study, the research process, and the 
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Delphi expectations. The form also includes a note that participation in the study is 
voluntary and that the expert participant can leave the study at any time. 
Instrumentation 
 When sufficient information about the topic is available, it is appropriate for the 
researcher to create the first round of questions and streamline the process for the 
panelists (Hsu & Sanford, 2007). Delphi is used to develop a consensus from independent 
judgments on the research topic or identify discourse for follow-up interviews. The 
following questions were used for the study regarding best practices and understanding 
from the disaster recovery literacy: 
1. What factors significantly affect the ability of disaster recovery programs in 
responding to computer crimes caused disasters? 
2. How successful can disaster responders be when following traditional technology 
disaster recovery plans to recover from computer crimes caused business 
interruption? 
3. What steps could be an improvement for resumption from a computer crimes 
disaster? 
4. What interruptions caused by computer crimes cause the response team to recover 
differently than a traditionally planned recovery? 
5. What differences can be found from a business that prepared for interruptions 
caused computer crimes as compared to those that do not? 
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6. What common themes exist where the cause of the technology interruption could 
have been significantly reduced by modification of the information technology 
disaster recovery framework to align with a cybersecurity framework? 
The design includes a note for the disaster recovery and cybersecurity experts with 
questions for the first round of the Delphi study. The participants were provided their 
understanding of forecasting trends and analysis of possible controls that can improve the 
disaster response. A final list was created by a pilot study. 
Pilot Study 
Linstone and Turoff (1975) suggested the researcher pilot the study on any willing 
expert participants, including the sponsor, before finalizing each round. Okoli and 
Pawlowski (2004) wrote that pretesting appeared to be an important reliability attribute 
for the Delphi design but argued that the test-retest reliability is not relevant since it is 
expected that participants will revise their answers to the surveys based on feedback from 
the other participants. Skulmoski et al. (2007) claimed the pilot is important for 
inexperienced researchers who may underestimate the survey and participant response.  
This pilot intended to determine if the instructions are understandable, if the 
questions are clear and concise, can the pilot participants provide suggestions for the 
improvement of the materials provided, and if the data that was collected aligned with the 
intent of the study. The pilot can improve the process by working out any procedural of 
comprehensive problems. The pilot study was conducted with an open-ended list of 
initial questions described in the instrumentation section above. The final revision of the 
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questions for the first round was created during the pretest by the experts in the pilot 
study.  
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
The purpose of this qualitative Delphi study was to understand how information 
technology disaster recovery controls and processes can be modified to improve response 
to a computer crime caused business interruption. The outcome should provide new 
mitigating controls that can improve the response when a technology disaster is 
experienced. The Delphi design and participant recruitment for this study were conducted 
using electronic mail. An advantage of a Delphi design is the ability to conduct the study 
entirely over the Internet (Skulmoski et al., 2007). As the researcher, I received the 
emailed responses during each round and crafted the feedback that was sent back to the 
panel. The Delphi was scheduled to be conducted over three rounds with an expert panel 
of between 15 and 20. For each round, the panelists will be asked to respond within one 
week. After a week of no responses, I contacted the nonparticipants to encourage their 
responses or confirm their exit from that round. As described in the participant selection 
logic, the number of experts asked to participate in the Delphi was designed to allow for 
participants to drop out of the study and still allow the study to provide valuable 
knowledge and consensus. As the Delphi was conducted via email, the data remained in 
the panelist’s original responses in the existing digital format. Feedback, individual 
responses, and further clarifying questions were communicated over email and retained 
as data to be analyzed. Participants were notified that the study had ended after the third 
round of the Delphi has completed and all feedback had been accepted. 
101 
 
Data Analysis Plan 
 Quantitative Delphi responses are tabulated by the mean or median score from 
each round of questions. The median is considered the most valuable when tabulating 
quantitative scores (Dalkey, 1967). Skulmoski, Hartman, and Krahn (2007) wrote 
qualitative Delphi responses start with expert judgment about the research questions and 
will set the direction for the future rounds. Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) claimed the 
Delphi surveys could solicit quantitative, qualitative, or both and the research then 
analyzes the usable responses to investigate the research questions. The qualitative 
judgments serve the purpose of providing empirical data for the next round and 
increasing the understanding of the expert’s factors (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004). Linstone 
and Turoff (1975) wrote that each of these surveys would indicate an index of 
desirability, computed by the expert responses, will favor a consensus. The first set of 
responses from Round 1 was deduplicated, and a recording was made of the expert’s 
judgments. A group of factors was generated into categories to make it easier for the 
experts when the next round was initiated. These feedback factors are not used for 
analysis by the researcher. The feedback was provided to the experts in brief explanations 
to validate the responses. The second round asked the experts to verify the interpreted 
responses and that their judgments are in the proper categories. The panelists could 
provide additional thoughts that may not have been recorded initially. The next two 
rounds narrowed down the factors that reflect the judgments of the experts. The list of 
responses was rated by the panelists on a 6-point Likert-type scale. The responses were 
calculated using a group means to score. The experts were asked to rank the factors. For 
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each factor, the consensus level was set at 80% of expert agreement. The third round 
presented the completed, consolidated list of judgments to the panel and allowed for 
reconsiderations. During the third round, the panelists were asked to reconsider any 
questions where group consensus was not found.  
The qualitative data collected during the three rounds were analyzed using the 
NVivo computer software program. Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2011) and Zamawe (2015) 
claimed the qualitative researcher is the main tool for analysis and computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) software is only a tool for assisting the researcher by 
providing multiple views of the data. The CAQDAS is used so that underlying 
relationships can emerge and can allow the analysis to yield more details than if the 
analysis was conducted manually (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011). Zamawe (2015) wrote 
that NVivo CAQDAS software, created by QRS International, is used to analyze 
qualitative designs such as grounded theory, ethnography, literature reviews, 
phenomenology, and mixed methods. NVivo allowed the data to be examined and 
increased the understanding of the judgments and codes reviewed in the study. NVivo 
was also used to manage the storage and catalog of judgment data. The NVivo features of 
word count and classical content analysis were used to understand underlying themes 
from the judgments provided by the experts (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2011).  
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability are qualitative 
research concepts that describe the level of findings that represent a quality inquiry. To 
address these concepts, I have outlined the elements that are incorporated into this 
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research that met the requirements of a quality study. Each section includes how the 
concepts are followed by the Delphi design or my role as a researcher. 
Credibility 
Credibility is associated with the concept of truthfulness. Linstone and Turoff 
(1975) wrote that the initial Delphi qualitative questions are broad and open-ended. Extra 
care must be made by the researcher to ensure the initial set of qualitative questions set 
the proper path for the research and do not lead the panelists down a predetermined path. 
The researcher may see limitations in the research by not executing Delphi with a proper 
set of initial questions, not populating the panel with the correct expertise, and not 
correctly communicate the requirements of the participants. To address these limitations, 
I worked with the committee to refine the initial round of questions, conduct a pilot round 
to solidify the questions and instructions, diligently seek the proper panel members, and 
carefully craft communications to each participant. I expected that not all the participants 
will complete the multiple rounds of the Delphi design in the proposed time frame. The 
number of participants that were chosen amounted to a number large enough to allow for 
the loss of multiple panelists as well as to obtain data saturation (Day & Bobeva, 2005). 
Day and Bobeva (2005) and Skulmoski et al. (2007) wrote the appropriate number of 
participating experts helps to strengthen the credibility of the study. The Delphi data 
collection procedure supports the development of improvement to the disaster response 
from computer crimes. The participants will have the opportunity during each round to 
contribute to the development of the disaster recovery factors and provide suggestions on 
how to improve the process. 
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Transferability 
Clibbens, Walters, and Baird (2012) claimed the most common means of 
increasing the validity of Delphi study is to test the instrument with a pilot test for the 
first round of questions. The transferability of the items in the instrument was achieved 
by a smaller panel of disaster recovery and cybersecurity expert chosen from my network 
of colleagues that do not take part in the formal study. The pilot panel reviewed the first 
round of content for relevance and clarity and provided feedback for improving the 
questions. The Delphi design can employ further construct transferability when asking 
the panel experts to validate the researcher’s interpretation and factor variables. Linstone 
and Turoff (1975) claimed the validity of the combined group judgment is typically 
measured regarding consensus of the experts. While findings of this Delphi study may 
not apply to all disaster recovery programs, I made every effort to ensure the expert 
judgments and researcher coding from this study aligned with other research found in the 
literature. 
Dependability 
Dependability in qualitative research can be obtained from the role of the 
researcher in data collection, clear communication with the participants, and quality 
checking of the collected data (Patton, 2015). Linstone and Turoff (1975) wrote that 
dependability of the Delphi is demonstrated in group statistical summaries of the 
responses. Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) wrote that the pilot testing is also a dependability 
method for a Delphi study. Both the pilot panel and the formal panel should show the 
same direction in their qualitative data judgments for solving the disaster recovery 
105 
 
scenario. Skulmoski et al. (2007) highlighted that audit trails help to confirm 
trustworthiness of a study’s findings and the methodological process of the Delphi has 
this attribute. I captured all questions, responses, feedback, calculations, and coding for 
each round of the Delphi. A clear decision trail was recorded from the beginning to the 
end of the study. The research was further triangulated by follow-up evaluation 
interviews when outliers were recorded. Day and Bobeva (2005) claimed a Delphi could 
maximize the quality of the outcome and confirm results with an electronic survey and 
evaluation interviews. The Delphi questions were clearly defined with an alignment from 
the review of the literature in Chapter 2 and were incorporated into the first round to 
improve dependability. 
Confirmability 
Conformability requires the researcher to be explicit about the methods executed 
in data gathering, data analysis, participant selection, and the forming of the conclusion 
(Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). In the Delphi design, the researcher is a facilitator 
and not a participant (Day & Bobeva, 2005). This allowed the data collection to come 
directly from the participants and reduce the impact of researcher bias. Linstone and 
Turoff (1975) claimed the Delphi design could lend a greater than objectivity than other 
qualitative inquiries from the methods used in the data collection and revisions by the 
panelists. Donohoe and Needham (2009) wrote the systematic method allows participants 
to express their opinions which ensure rational and reflexive opinions that are not 
influenced by a dominating panelist. Donohoe and Needham wrote that no study is free 
of bias and researchers using the Delphi design must consider critical design decisions in 
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pretesting and the potential for misinterpretation. Linstone and Turoff pointed out that 
since panelists are encouraged to suggest new questions and modify existing ones the 
potential for research bias is low. Statements that comprise the Delphi can reflect cultural 
opinions, and subjective bias from the researchers that formulate them and I will seek to 
remove any bias in the process of the survey creations. To enable confidence in the data, 
a rationale was provided to show how the initial set of questions was initially crafted. 
This rational combined with the audit trail assists with dependability and confirmability.  
Ethical Procedures 
Ethical considerations for qualitative research include the proper treatment of the 
participants, securing, and handling of the collected data. The topic of information 
technology disaster recovery activity resulting from computer crimes does not raise an 
ethical concern for the participants or from the organizations they are employed. The 
panelists were not identified with a business, even to each other, so that there could be no 
negative perceptions of an entity or employer. Disaster responders and technology 
management are not considered a traditional protected class in scientific research. The 
judgments made by the expert panel sought to better respond to a technology interruption 
caused by computer crimes. The judgment data collected from the experts was not a 
confidential data set. The data collected were the opinions of the experts, and all data was 
being stored in an encrypted format while being analyzed. After the data was analyzed 
and summarized, it is electronically destroyed after 5 years. Research by Goodman et al. 
(2012) pointed out the requirements that employees may have to protect the intellectual 
property of their employer. During this study, I ensured confidentiality was maintained 
107 
 
for both participants and their organization to protect any negative effect that could arise 
from participating in this study. 
Summary 
 Disaster recovery planners, incident responders and cybersecurity experts used 
their knowledge and understanding of disaster recovery and computer crimes 
interruptions to identify strategies and mitigating controls to use when developing 
improved plans for responding to disasters. The Delphi design is an effective and 
efficient group think the approach to solving technical problems. The expert panel had 
the experience to provide judgments on improving disaster recovery strategies to combat 
emerging technology threats. The Delphi instrument provided anonymity and an efficient 
technique for the panelists to communicate with the researcher. Chapter 3 includes a 
review of the Delphi design and details on how participants were selected. This 
explanation supports how the panelists will collaborate and provide qualitative data to the 
researcher. The results of the Delphi study are discussed in Chapter 4. The study details, 
expert comments, coding, and scores will be included. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Chapter 4 includes the results and findings from the Delphi panel of experts on 
disaster recovery and cyber security of computer crimes interruptions. The Delphi study 
intended to document the expert opinion on how organizations can improve the disaster 
recovery process when responding to computer crimes. Data were collected using 
questions corresponded over electronic mail or LinkedIn messaging. For the second and 
third round, data were collected using a 6-point and 5-point Likert scale. The group 
median for the research questions was communicated to the panel to allow for feedback, 
additional trends, and expert analysis. With a growing threat of technology disasters that 
can significantly affect organizations, this study might assist in improving processes to 
remediate and recover business operations.  
This Delphi used qualitative seed questions, developed from the literature review, 
to populate the first round. The following Round 1 questions guided the study and were 
used in the pilot: 
1. What factors significantly affect the ability of disaster recovery programs in 
responding to computer crimes caused disasters? 
2. What interruptions caused by computer crimes cause the response team to recover 
differently than a traditionally planned recovery? 
3. In what ways can a disaster response be unsuccessful when following traditional 
technology disaster recovery plans to recover from computer crimes caused 
business interruption? 
109 
 
4. What steps could be an improvement from traditional disaster recovery 
procedures to resume the organization from a computer crimes disaster? 
5. What differences can be found from a business that prepared for interruptions 
caused computer crimes as compared to those that do not? 
6. What should organizations avoid to improve the ability to recover from computer 
crimes? 
7. What common themes exist where the cause of the technology interruption could 
have been significantly reduced by modification of the information technology 
disaster recovery framework to align with a cybersecurity framework? 
8. What type of expertise should be recruited to build a successful disaster recovery 
program that could better respond to computer crimes? 
9. What cybersecurity processes could improve disaster response if any? 
10. What advantages or disadvantages exist in specifically defining cybersecurity risk 
and controls in information technology disaster recovery frameworks? 
The open-ended Round 1 questions focus on multiple disaster recovery themes. 
The first three questions presented in the first round seek to understand attributes that can 
positively or negatively affect the resumption of the organization. The following three 
questions inquired about processes or procedures that improve the response. The 
remaining questions collected judgments on improving an existing DR framework and 
opinion on needed organizational expertise for disaster recovery teams. This chapter 
includes a review of the pilot design, the research setting, demographics, data collection, 
analysis, evidence of trustworthiness, and the study results. 
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Pilot Study 
To assist in the trustworthiness of this research, a pilot study was used. The pilot 
study consisted of three experts who met the eligibility criteria used to select the 
participants for the main study. One expert from each demographic consisting of disaster 
recovery researcher, disaster recovery incident responder, and cybersecurity expert was 
used. The purpose of the pilot was to collect feedback to verify, clarify, and refocus any 
directions or questions for the first round of the Delphi study. The pilot study used the 
predefined study directions and 10 research questions to understand how each pilot 
participants would navigate the returning of the first round’s data. After I analyzed the 
pilot submissions, each expert was given feedback and the opportunity to make changes 
or suggestions to improve the questions and instructions that would be used in the main 
study. The participant’s expertise provided feedback to improve the initial instructions by 
including a definition of information technology disaster recovery and modifying the 
ninth seed question to describe better the intent of the questions focus on cybersecurity. 
Research Setting 
The data collection for the Delphi were electronic instead of observations, focus 
groups, personal interviews, or action research. One advantage of the participants 
submitting electronic data was that the data was not being physically written down or 
transcribed by the researcher. The electronic data collection prohibited me from recording 
conditions that may have biased or influenced the participants while they contributed to 
the study. No other data were collected about the participants other than their initial 
consent to the study and the qualitative data they provided. The Delphi instrument did not 
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inquire about demographics, organizational conditions, or personal preferences that could 
have influenced the analysis of this data. Although there was a vetting process for each 
expert, the expertise of each participant was not recorded in this study. 
Demographics 
The request for expert panelists was successful in confirming 25 of 98 contacted 
for the study. The participant background was represented by: 
 Disaster recovery researchers were recruited into the group. 
 Expertise in the disaster recovery profession was recruited into the group. 
 Expertise from the cybersecurity was recruited into the group. 
The disaster recovery responders in the panel were selected from disaster recovery 
programs of businesses large enough to staff a full-time disaster recovery program, 
properly plan for, conduct testing, fully fund, and have experienced an interruption from 
computer crimes. The disaster recovery researchers had published, peer-reviewed papers 
on disaster recovery. The disaster recovery researchers that authored publications had 
their research study current trends in disaster recovery. Each participant was selected 
based on interviews, recommendations, or their visibility as a researcher in this subject 
matter. The diversity of knowledge was considered an important selection factor along 
with the represented field of expertise. This panel included an adequate number of 
experts who were interested in identifying a successful strategy for disaster recovery. 
Twenty-two experts agreed to join this study. Of the 22, 17 participants completed 
the first two rounds of the study. Eight participants left the study after the second round, 
and nine participants completed the last round. Participants that were late with their 
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submission were contacted after a short timeframe. The participants were encouraged to 
complete the study but allowed to leave if necessary. 
Data Collection 
Recruitment 
While waiting for IRB approval, I crafted a list of potential experts using multiple 
sources. LinkedIn and snowball sampling offered a successful source of experts for 
recruitment of expert participants. I planned to complete recruiting in a 3-week 
timeframe. The weeks provided sufficient time to confirm the requirements with the 
participants and requested phone calls with potential experts that wanted more detailed 
information about necessary expertise. Invitations were sent to roughly 96 individuals 
with a copy of the approved IRB consent form. Two of the prospective participants 
recommended additional experts that could satisfy this study’s edibility requirements. 
Five experts were added to the participants from the snowball sampling. Twenty-two 
experts agreed to participate reaching an optimal target panel size. Additional participants 
were accepted in anticipation of a small number of participants abandoning the study 
before the completion of the third round. The Delphi followed the schedule found in 
Table 1. 
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Table 1 
The Participant Delphi Schedule 
Event Start Date End Date 
Delphi Round 1 12/24/17 1/4/17 
Round 1 analysis 1/4/18 1/6/18 
Delphi Round 2 1/14/18 1/20/18 
Round 2 analysis 1/20/18 1/22/18 
Delphi Round 3 1/23/18 1/29/18 
Round 3 analysis 1/29/18 1/30/18 
 
Delphi Round 1 
After consent was obtained, participants were provided the instructions and 
expectations needed to complete the study in a Microsoft Word format. Each expert was 
recognized for accepting to participate and for contributing to the technology community. 
The changes were made to the Round 1 questionnaire that was identified in the pilot test 
and on December 24, 2017, the first-round was initiated. The 22 participants were given a 
week to provide their responses to the qualitative seed questions that made up Round 1. 
Participants were instructed to record their responses in the document. A spreadsheet was 
used to record each participant’s submissions. Each participant was assigned an 
alphanumeric number to allow for analysis of confidentiality. Statements by the 
participants were collected from the 10 seed questions. The statements were coded, 
deduplicated, and, after considering the conceptual framework, I identified several 
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themed statements for the second Delphi phase. The themed statements were sent back to 
the participants to discover if a consensus could be found in the statements. 
Delphi Round 2 
The codes and themed statements that can impact disaster recovery were shown in 
the participants’ Round 1 submission. The second round provided the participants with 
the statements that stemmed from the first-round submissions. Linstone and Turoff 
(1975) provided a common 6-point Likert scale for Delphi judgments following the first 
round of submissions as explained in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Agreement Scale Used for the Round 2 Judgment 
Scale         Agreement  
6. Strongly agree 
5.  Agree 
4.  Slightly agree 
3.  Slightly disagree 
2.  Disagree 
1.  Strongly disagree 
 
The participants were asked to provide a 6-point Likert scale on the themed 
statements. Each participant could comment on the coding that was created by their 
submissions to facilitate member checking. For submissions ranked at a 2 or less, it was 
encouraged for the participant to provide feedback for a better understanding of the 
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judgment. Participants were encouraged to qualify why they disagreed with the themed 
statement. Appendix D lists the Round 2 questions. In interpreting what a group means, a 
value of 3.5 is considered the natural point and anything above a 4 is an agreement by the 
panel. A mean value of 4.5 to 6 results in a general agreement. An 80% agreement from 
the participants, an interquartile range below 2.5, and a standard deviation below 1.5 are 
commonly used for consensus measurement (Giannariu & Zervas, 2014). The data 
collected from the participants were placed into a spreadsheet and analyzed for percent 
agreement, mean, standard deviation, and the interquartile range. The consensus 
statements were used to build the third round of the Delphi.  
Delphi Round 3 
The third round of the study was used to identify the importance of the consensus 
statements identified in Round 2. The participants were instructed to judge the statements 
on how important that statement would be for the organization to implement with the 
intent of improving recovery from computer crimes. For the third round of the Delphi, an 
importance 5-point Likert scale was used. Table 3 defined the Likert scale used for 
participant agreement. The third round sought to understand what importance the 
participants would place on applying the consensus statement collected in Round 2. The 
instructions with the third-round questions asked for a judgment on the importance of the 
presented statements in influencing the ability of the organization to respond to computer 
crimes. See Appendix E for a copy of the Round 3 questionnaires. 
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Table 3 
Importance Scale Used for Likert Judgment 
Scale         Agreement 
5. Very Important 
4. Important 
3. Moderately Important 
2. Slightly Important 
1. Not Important 
 
Data Analysis 
The thematic analysis in qualitative research is used to pinpoint, examine, and 
record patterns within the data collected (Maxwell, 2005). Thematic analysis was used in 
this study to create the statements used in the second round of the Delphi. The first round 
allowed for the participants to answer open-ended questions about disaster recovery and 
how organizations may better respond to an interruption. Several of the statements 
submitted were duplicates which were removed. I then used thematic analysis to create 
the statements for consensus building among the experts. After studying the participant’s 
open-ended statements, I coded the data into categories. For this coding process, I did not 
bring a set of codes into the study. Multiple reviews were conducted of the statements, 
and the themed statements were placed into rows of a spreadsheet. Commonly used 
words, phrases, and acronyms were groups into themed statements. After each participant 
submitted responses, the themed statements were added to the Round 2 questionnaires or 
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modified to describe the coded themes better. This process was used to analyze down the 
hundreds of statements into 110 statements that were grouped by the 10 seed questions. 
Appendix D contains the themed statement that resulted from this process. 
Linstone and Turoff (2002) claimed the objective of the original Delphi study was 
to obtain the most reliable consensus of a judgment from a panel of experts. Most Delphi 
studies include descriptive statistics put together of the median and frequencies collected 
from a survey of expert judgment. Giannariu and Zervas (2014) claimed that there is not 
a common practice in the Delphi literature to reach consensus. Giannariu and Zervas 
wrote that 51% of participant agreement, a specified distance from the mean, using 
standard deviation measurements, interquartile ranges, and coefficient of variation are all 
found in Delphi literature for computing consensus.  
The Interquartile Range (IRQ) was described by Frankfort-Nachmias and Leon-
Guerrero (2015) as a measure of variation for interval-ratio variables. Frankfort-
Nachmias and Leon-Guerrero defined the IRQ as the difference between the upper and 
lower quartiles by showing what the width of the middle 50% is. The interquartile range 
score was defined as the difference between the highest data point and lowest median 
obtained within a given set of data. Howard (2008) pointed out that the IRQ will point 
out scores that are heavily dependent on extreme scores. The IRQ assists in Delphi 
research by identifying where participant’s judgments are widely different in the 
distribution. 
Linstone and Turoff (2002) and Giannariu and Zervas (2014) described where the 
standard deviation and calculated means are commonly presented for consensus in a 
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Delphi. The standard deviation described by Howell (2008) is the positive square root of 
the variance of the sample collected. The standard deviation is commonly used to 
understand how many of the scores in the sample fall a deviation above or below the 
mean. For reasonably symmetric distributions, it can be stated that two-thirds of the 
sample will fall within one standard deviation of the mean. This measurement allows for 
the researcher to understand how closely together the Delphi participants have scored a 
question. 
For this study, the mean, standard deviation, 80% participant agreement, and 
interquartile score were used in combination to reach a consensus. In interpreting the 
group means, a value of 4 and above is considered an agreement by the panel. Consensus 
for this study was obtained by four measurements used in combination: 
 An 80% agreement from the participants was recorded. 
 An interquartile range below 2.5 was recorded (Giannariu & Zervas, 
2014). 
 A standard deviation below 1.5 was recorded (Giannariu & Zervas, 2014). 
 A mean score of greater than 4.0 
The mean scores of the round one statements falling below 4.00 were eliminated 
from the third round of the Delphi. The analysis of the data also recorded a strong 
consensus measurement among the expert panel judgments which measured an 80% or 
greater of 5 and 6-point Likert scale on any specific statement that reached consensus.  
When a Delphi has a third round, the round is often used to evaluate data that falls 
outside the median or to prioritize statements (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). The third round 
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in this study did not continue to evaluate consensus but allowed each participant to apply 
their opinion of importance in implementing the consensus statements.  
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
The objective of credibility is to describe the concept of truthfulness in the 
research findings. Linstone and Turoff (1975) wrote that Delphi questions must be 
carefully chosen by the researcher to allow the panelists to set the direction of the 
judgments instead of following a predetermined path. To address Delphi credibility 
limitations, I worked with the pilot participants and the committee to refine the seed 
questions, diligently sought the proper expert panel members, and carefully crafted 
communications to each participant.  
Day and Bobeva (2005) and Skulmoski et al. (2007) wrote that obtaining the 
correct number and expertise of participants strengthens the credibility of the study. The 
number of expert participants in the study allowed for the loss of panelists without 
impacting the ability to obtain data saturation (Day & Bobeva, 2005). The data collection 
of this study supported the development of improvements to the disaster response from 
computer crimes. For each round, participants had the opportunity to contribute to the 
development of the disaster recovery factors and provide suggestions on how to improve 
the process. The feedback returned ensured the data that was coded and analyzed by the 
researcher had the expected intent of the participant. Before the second and third rounds 
were initiated, all submitted feedback was collected and confirmed for correctness if 
necessary.  
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Transferability 
The most common means of increasing the transferability of a Delphi is to test the 
instrument with a pilot exercise for the initial round (Clibbens et al., 2012). The 
transferability of the items in the Delphi was achieved by a small panel of disaster 
recovery and cybersecurity expert. The pilot panel reviewed the Delphi first round of 
content for relevance and clarity. Feedback was provided for improving the questions in 
clarity and a better understanding of the intent of the research. Transferability was 
increased by asking the panel experts to validate the researcher’s interpretation and factor 
variables. Linstone and Turoff (1975) wrote the validity of the Delphi judgment can be 
measured by consensus of the experts. Given the small and nonrandom sample of 
participants, this study may not be readily transferable. Additional studies with other 
participants may likely improve transferability. 
Dependability 
Patton (2015) claimed that dependability could be obtained by the researcher in 
proper data collection, providing clear communication with the participants, and attention 
to accuracy in the collection of data. Linstone and Turoff (1975) wrote that dependability 
could be found in a Delphi study by the calculation of group statistical summaries of the 
judgments. Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) wrote that the pilot testing is another mechanism 
to show dependability in a study. Skulmoski et al. (2007) claimed an audit trail could 
confirm dependability of a study’s findings and the methodological process. Day and 
Bobeva (2005) wrote that a Delphi would maximize the quality of the outcome and 
confirm the results of a study with an electronic survey. 
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In this study, the pilot participants and the study participants indicated the same 
themes in their judgments for solving the technology disaster service interruptions, 
providing the correct expertise in personnel, and alignments with technology security 
frameworks. The audit trails retained in the Delphi technique captured all questions, 
responses, feedback, calculations, and coding for each round. A clear decision trail was 
recorded from the beginning to the end of the study. Additionally, the research was 
triangulated by follow-up evaluation questions with two participants. The initial 10 
questions were clearly defined with an alignment from the review of the literature in 
Chapter 2. 
Confirmability 
Miles et al. (2014) wrote that conformability in a qualitative study requires the 
researcher to explicitly define the methods used for data gathering, analysis, selection, 
and conclusion. Linstone and Turoff (1975) claimed the Delphi method has clearly 
defined processes that are easily followed and clearly produces data that can be reviewed 
by additional researchers. The use of the thick description and audit trail allows for the 
conformability in the Delphi. 
Day and Bobeva (2005) summarized that the researcher facilitating a Delphi 
method is not a participant. The Delphi method allows for data collection directly from 
the participants and minimizes researcher bias. The Delphi method will include a greater 
than objectivity to alternative methods because of the ability for revisions by the panelists 
(Linstone & Turoff, 1975). The systematic method allowed the expert participants to 
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express their opinions on their judgments without being influenced by a dominating 
participant.  
It can be a difficult statement to claim a study is free of bias, and a researcher 
using the Delphi should place considerations on design decisions (Donohoe & Needham, 
2009). The ability for the panelists to modify the questions based on their judgments 
lowers the potential for research bias. Linstone and Turoff (1975) wrote that Delphi 
panelists are encouraged to suggest new questions and modify existing ones. Researcher 
statements made in the Delphi were carefully crafted to remove cultural opinions and 
subjective bias. Confidence in the data was found by rationale provided to show how the 
initial set of questions are initially crafted. This rational combined with the audit trail 
assists with dependability and confirmability.  
Study Results 
Round 1 
Four hundred and thirty-one statements were collected from the participants in 
Round 1. The collected statements fell into five significant categories related to 
information technology disaster recovery:  
 factors that come from computer crimes  
 improvement steps 
 planning for computer crimes 
 integrating cybersecurity 
 necessary job skills 
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After collecting and coding the data, considering the conceptual framework, and 
reducing duplicate answers, several statements were developed for Round 2 consensus 
building. The Round 1 coding activity produced 16 themes that were used in the 
construction of the Round 2 statements. Most every participant provided multiple, 
duplicate statements to one or more of the seed questions. 
Table 9 
Round 1 Statements 
Category Round 1 
Statements 
Significant factors 
that come from 
computer crimes 
 
107 
Improving the ITDR 
response 
 
94 
ITDR planning for 
computer crimes 
 
81 
Integrating with 
cybersecurity 
 
105 
Necessary Skillsets 
for responders 
44 
 
 Appendix F includes the removal of duplicate statements made. The statements 
were coded by being placed in a spreadsheet for sorting and a color application. 16 
disaster recovery themes were generated and are listed in Table 4.  
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Table 4 
Round 1 Codes From the Seed Questions. 
Code/Category Frequency 
Lack of understanding or confusion 18 
Management support  6 
Prover versus poor funding 6 
Skills, roles, and training  26 
Lack of scope 5 
Traditional playbook weakness or strength 21 
Testing / Lessons learned 14 
Root cause analysis 9 
Aligning with cybersecurity 16 
Enterprise risk assessment 15 
Poor versus proper planning 26 
Capacity planning 3 
Co-location – data resilience 15 
ITDR team cooperation with cyber 21 
Toolsets 5 
Policy or regulatory requirements 9 
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The data provided by the participants were grouped into 110 statements 
developed from the first round of open-ended questions. The people skills and roles, 
proper planning, and cyber security cooperation categories created the largest number of 
codes. The capacity planning, toolsets, project scoping, funding and management support 
categories held the least amount.  
Round 2 
The Round 1 data collection included 431 statements from the 10 qualitative, 
open-ended questions. The 431 statements were analyzed ad themed into 110 statements 
relating to the seed questions. The themes were broken up into multiple statement relating 
to the questions as described in Table 5. Appendix D contains the complete list of Round 
2 questions sent to the participant panel. Participants could provide additional comments 
on the statements to clarify their answers better. Three participants provided additional 
reasoning and explanations. I did not receive any feedback on the need for a greater 
explanation of the statements or how the statements were generated.  
Table 5 
Themed Statements Created From Round 1 Analysis 
Seed Questions Themed Statements Consensus found 
Question 1 13 11 
Question 2 7 5 
Question 3 12 8 
Question 4 13 11 
Question 5 6 5 
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Question 6 15 12 
Question 7 11 7 
Question 8 12 6 
Question 9 12 8 
Question 10 9 6 
 
Of the 110 statements sent to the participants, the consensus was found on 79 
statements. Table 6 includes the statements that met the consensus requirements outlined 
in this study. Questions 7, 8, 9 and 10 recorded the most amount of statements lacking the 
criteria needed for consensus. The theme of Questions 7, 9, and 10 included cybersecurity 
frameworks that may apply to disaster recovery. Question 8 statements included 
perceived job skills needed for a computer crimes business interruption.  
Table 6 
Participant Consensus From the Round 2 Analysis 
Delphi Statement MEAN SD CON IRQ 
Lack of understanding of the interdependencies in IT 
makes it difficult to anticipate the impact of the 
recovery. 
 
5.40 0.99 0.93 1.00 
The organization must have adequate planning for 
computer crimes. 
 
5.07 1.03 0.93 2.00 
Critical IT services must be available to conduct a 
recovery. 
 
4.60 1.06 0.80 1.00 
A lack of management support and poor funding will 
negatively impact this response. 
 
5.07 1.03 0.93 2.00 
If the organization does not staff skilled resources, 
the response will suffer. 5.33 0.65 0.93 1.00 
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The untested recovery process from computer crimes 
will negatively impact the recovery process. 
 
5.17 1.03 0.87 1.25 
The ability to triage the incident correctly as the 
ITDR team comes on the scene will be an issue when 
the cause is computer crimes 
 
4.71 1.20 0.80 2.00 
IR teams must be trained for such a scenario. 
 5.07 0.73 1.00 0.75 
Delphi Statement MEAN SD CON IRQ 
     
Organizations conducting lessons learned will 
improve their response. 
 
4.93 0.73 1.00 0.75 
Critical data must be protected and available from an 
alternate source to protect from computer crimes 5.25 0.87 0.87 1.00 
There must be a clear list of responsibilities in 
responding to this type incident. 
 
5.17 0.83 0.93 1.25 
Organizations may need to document their computer 
crimes recovery differently for compliance/legal/law 
enforcement reasons. 
 
3.86 1.21 0.80 2.00 
Computer crimes can render critical systems unable 
to support a recovery where traditionally it would. 
 
5.00 1.00 0.93 0.50 
It will be hard to identify compromised versus 
uncompromised systems for recovery. 
 
4.57 0.98 0.87 1.00 
A triage of a computer crimes attack can lead to 
multiple activities of containment outside of the 
recovery process. 
 
4.71 1.11 0.93 1.50 
 Computer crime related recovery is much more 
variable, and it is very difficult to determine the 
variables effectively. 
 
4.45 1.04 0.87 1.00 
If a data backup/alternative is not available, 
traditional recovery will not be successful or 
extremely time-consuming. 
 
4.82 1.08 0.87 1.00 
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has 
not scoped, it will trip upon the response. 4.14 0.90 0.73 1.50 
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When a breach occurs, the organization may lack the 
ability to anticipate and quantify the damage. This 
would hamper the recovery. 
 
5.14 0.90 1.00 1.50 
An organization may not have outside resources 
available to assist with a computer crimes 
interruption. For example, an organization may not 
have an InfoSec resource on retainer. 
 
4.63 1.30 0.87 1.25 
Delphi Statement MEAN SD CON IRQ 
     
The organization has a lack of alignment with IT 
goals and business goals. 
 
4.14 0.69 0.80 0.50 
 A Traditional DR playbook may not eradicate the 
intrusion correctly. 
 
5.09 0.70 1.00 0.50 
The DR team may have a poor understanding of the 
attack which could cause the activation of the wrong 
recovery solution, delaying, or stopping the overall 
business resumption. 
 
5.29 0.76 1.00 1.00 
If organizations do not test for the computer crimes 
scenario, it will fail to recover on time. 4.86 0.90 0.93 1.50 
Computer crimes are more complex and involve 
greater communication and collaboration outside of 
IT and the IT Security team. 
 
5.00 1.07 0.87 1.50 
Keep the soft copy of the DR plan offline from the 
main company environment so that it cannot be 
hacked. 
 
4.86 1.07 0.80 1.00 
Craft procedures where data is lost or corrupted and 
recovery have to be initiated using physical backups. 
 
4.63 1.06 0.80 1.25 
A separate set of procedures for cybercrime that 
takes into consideration the risks of computer crimes 
interruptions. 
 
4.71 0.76 0.87 1.00 
Real-time data synchronization to alternate locations 
would improve recovery from a computer crime 
interruption. 
 
4.29 0.95 0.80 0.50 
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An improvement would come from lessons learned 
and cause analysis sessions. 
 
5.00 0.82 0.93 1.00 
Security architectures must use technology in support 
of business objectives, and accurately model 
dependencies to prioritize resources. 
 
5.14 0.69 0.87 0.50 
 Organizations must focus on people, 
communications, tools, and facilities to improve 
from computer crimes interruptions. 
 
4.71 0.76 1.00 1.00 
Delphi Statement MEAN SD CON IRQ 
     
Preventive and testing measures must be taken 
continuously for computer crimes. 
 
4.71 0.95 1.00 1.50 
Containment and eradication procedures for 
computer crimes will need to be included in 
playbooks. 
 
5.29 0.76 0.93 1.00 
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the ITDR 
program. 
 
4.29 1.50 0.87 2.00 
 I have seen organizations struggle to recover from a 
typical disaster recovery effort and fail completely 
when attempting to recover from a computer crime 
event. 
 
4.71 0.76 0.87 1.00 
The prepared organization will not rely on one 
solution to protect everything. 
 
4.86 0.90 0.93 1.50 
Companies more heavily invested in preparing for 
computer crime-based interruptions have greater 
integration with their Information Security 
counterparts and have a management team that 
understands the risks posed by computer crimes and 
are willing to devote more money and attention to 
prevention and preparation for computer crime 
interruptions. 
 
4.87 1.19 0.87 1.50 
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with 
computer crimes in their ITDR are opening 
themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions 
caused by computer crimes. 
5.13 0.99 0.87 1.00 
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Organizations must provide a robust awareness 
program to ITDR teams to help mitigate computer 
crimes risks. 
 
5.00 0.82 1.00 1.00 
 Organizations cannot treat a computer crimes 
recovery as just a “technical” or “IT” led the 
response to better respond to computer crimes. 
 
5.47 0.83 0.93 1.00 
     
Delphi Statement MEAN SD CON IRQ 
     
Organizations must avoid the knee-jerk reaction to 
throw money at a problem without first grasping 
what that problem is and then smartly coming up 
with the solution.  
 
5.14 0.90 0.93 1.50 
Organizations must avoid open source systems for 
critical business applications to better respond to 
computer crimes. 
 
3.36 1.21 0.40 1.00 
Organizations that do not conduct lessons learned 
and root cause analysis will not improve to better 
respond to computer crimes. 
 
5.29 0.76 1.00 1.00 
Organizations should avoid placing a low value on 
quality management in DR to better respond to 
computer crimes. 
 
4.71 0.95 0.81 1.50 
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack 
redundancy or resiliency attributes to better respond 
to computer crimes. 
 
5.00 0.58 0.93 0.00 
Organizations must avoid thinking they are protected 
from computer crimes. 
 
5.43 0.53 1.00 1.00 
Organizations must avoid neglecting the risk of 
computer crimes interruptions. 
 
5.13 0.99 0.93 1.50 
Organizations must not focus on speed but instead 
focus on the assessment phase to better respond to 
computer crimes. 
 
4.57 0.98 0.80 1.00 
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Organizations must avoid having missing 
cybersecurity policies to better respond to computer 
crimes. 
 
4.43 0.98 0.87 1.00 
Organizations must avoid operating DR functions 
without the proper funding to better respond to 
computer crimes. 
 
4.57 0.98 0.93 1.00 
     
Delphi Statement MEAN SD CON IRQ 
     
Organizations cannot operate ITDR and InfoSec in 
different silos to better respond to computer crimes. 
 
5.53 0.64 1.00 1.00 
A well-developed cybersecurity framework supports 
the ITDR, and the opportunity for a technical 
interruption is reduced. 
 
4.80 0.77 1.00 1.00 
A coordinated process alignment between Disaster 
Recovery and Information Security frameworks is 
vital to reducing the recovery of this type. 
 
5.27 0.59 1.00 1.00 
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle 
processes, so that like steps are executed together, 
and participation is integrated. 
 
5.29 0.76 1.00 1.00 
Developing an ITDR set of practices and different 
playbooks will reduce the response. 
 
4.14 0.90 0.80 1.50 
Resilience efforts should be folded into dependency 
models to reduce the response to this interruption. 
 
4.29 0.76 0.87 1.00 
Advanced preparation will reduce a computer crimes 
response. 
 
5.00 1.15 0.80 1.50 
There is not much alignment between DR and 
InfoSec frameworks, and that is a problem. 
 
4.73 1.10 0.80 1.50 
A deep understanding of interdependencies in the IT 
environment will improve the response to computer 
crimes. 
 
5.27 0.59 1.00 1.00 
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A business-focused understanding of the 
organization will improve the response to computer 
crimes. 
 
5.00 1.15 0.87 1.50 
A risk-based focus on the business will improve the 
response to computer crimes. 
 
5.33 0.72 1.00 1.00 
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking 
will improve the response to computer crimes. 
 
4.57 0.79 0.80 1.00 
Delphi Statement MEAN SD CON IRQ 
     
A basic understanding of the layers of protection, 
prevention, policy management, operations, 
monitoring, and response will improve computer 
crimes recovery efforts. 
 
4.29 0.49 1.00 0.50 
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist to improve 
the response to computer crimes. 
 
4.57 0.79 0.87 0.50 
Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the 
ITDR process 
 
5.20 1.08 0.93 1.00 
InfoSec training for ITDR teams 
 
4.57 0.79 1.00 1.00 
Organizations can integrate the RMO and CSO 
responsibilities into ITDR planning activities. 
 
4.00 1.15 0.87 1.50 
Formal lessons learned and future prevention, which 
may help lessen the severity of future incidents.  
 
4.71 0.76 1.00 1.00 
Establishing a baseline of security configurations is 
another cybersecurity process that extends to ITDR. 
 
4.71 0.76 0.93 1.00 
Asset inventory processes. 
 
4.57 0.53 0.80 1.00 
Penetration testing and disaster recovery testing 
 
5.00 1.00 0.80 0.50 
CAG 20 Critical Security controls would improve the 
recovery. 
 
4.57 0.53 0.87 1.00 
Organizations should include InfoSec risks in ITDR 
frameworks. 
 
5.13 0.92 0.93 1.00 
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If done well, clearly following an ESRM program 
and linking the outcomes of the framework to the DR 
framework offers organizations the ability to see the 
interdependencies between assets and objectives. 
 
5.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 
Without cyber being a part of that plan the plan itself 
will be lacking. 
 
4.86 0.69 0.93 0.50 
     
Delphi Statement MEAN SD CON IRQ 
     
If done properly, cybersecurity risk management will 
identify the DR systems as one of the most business-
critical systems in the organization. 
 
4.33 1.45 0.80 1.00 
Integrating some cybersecurity risks and controls in 
your disaster recovery process may allow it to easier 
identify attacks that would otherwise be considered a 
“system malfunction.” 
 
4.71 0.49 0.93 0.50 
A cybersecurity framework integration could provide 
an advantage in that it provides a 2nd or 3rd layer of 
risk management to the disaster recovery framework. 
 
4.43 1.40 0.80 1.00 
 
Round 3 
In this study, 29 statements of the 110 fell below the combined measurements 
needed to reach consensus and were not used in the third round. Of the 79 statements that 
reached consensus, 71 statements could be used to understand the importance of applying 
that statement to an organization to improve a computer crimes response. The eight 
statements that were filtered out in round three were not statements that could apply to 
improving an disaster recovery response to computer crimes. The filtered statements 
pointed to important knowledge on disaster recovery but did not directly apply to an 
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improvement action an organization could take. Appendix E lists the entire list of Round 
3 questions. 
During Round 3, the participants were given the opportunity to rank the 
importance of the consensus questions identified in round two. Of the 71 consensus 
statements, 32 statements reached a consensus on the importance to the organization. 
Table 7 includes the statements that reach a consensus on the importance to be 
implemented in an organization. 
Table 7 
Round 3 Consensus Statements on Importance 
Round 3 statements MEAN SD CONS IRQ 
 
Lack of understanding of the interdependencies 
in IT makes it difficult to anticipate the impact 
of the recovery. Improve understanding. 
 
4.63 0.7 .88 .025 
A lack of management support and poor funding 
will negatively impact this response. 
 
4.50 0.8 .88 1 
The ability to triage the incident correctly as the 
ITDR team comes on the scene will be an issue 
when the cause is computer crimes. 
 
4.25 0.7 .88 1 
The organization has a lack of alignment with IT 
goals and business goals. 
 
4.25 0.7 .88 .25 
The DR team may have a poor understanding of 
the attack which could cause the activation of 
the wrong recovery solution, delaying, or 
stopping the overall business resumption. 
 
4.63 0.7 .88 .25 
Security architectures must use technology in 
support of business objectives, and accurately 
model dependencies to prioritize resources. 
 
4.25 0.7 .88 1 
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Organizations must focus on people, 
communications, tools, and facilities to improve 
from computer crimes interruptions. 
 
4 0.5 .86 0 
Containment and eradication procedures for 
computer crimes will need to be included in 
playbooks. 
 
4.38 0.7 .88 1 
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the 
ITDR program. 
 
4.5 0.8 .88 1 
Round 3 statements MEAN SD CONS IRQ 
     
The prepared organization will not rely on one 
solution to protect everything. 
 
4.6 0.7 .88 .25 
Companies more heavily invested in preparing 
for computer crime-based interruptions have 
greater integration with their Information 
Security counterparts and have a management 
team that understands the risks posed by 
computer crimes and are willing to devote more 
money and attention to prevention and 
preparation for computer crime interruptions. 
 
4.38 0.5 1 1 
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with 
computer crimes in their ITDR are opening 
themselves up to additional risks, and 
interruptions caused by computer crimes. 
 
4.38 0.5 1 1 
Organizations must avoid plans that do not take 
into consideration the current state of the 
systems to better respond to computer crimes. 
 
4.13 0.6 .88 .25 
Organizations that do not conduct lessons 
learned and root cause analysis will not improve 
to better respond to computer crimes. 
 
4.25 0.7 .88 1 
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack 
redundancy or resiliency attributes to better 
respond to computer crimes. 
 
4.63 0.7 .88 .25 
Organizations must avoid thinking they are 
protected from computer crimes. 4.75 0.7 .88 0 
136 
 
 
Organizations must avoid neglecting the risk of 
computer crimes interruptions. 
 
4.5 .08 .88 1 
A well-developed cybersecurity framework 
supports the ITDR, and the opportunity for a 
technical interruption is reduced. 
 
4.5 0.5 1 1 
     
     
     
Round 3 statements MEAN SD CONS IRQ 
     
A coordinated process alignment between 
Disaster Recovery and Information Security 
frameworks is vital to reducing the recovery of 
this type. 
 
4.75 0.5 1 .25 
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their 
lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed 
together, and participation is integrated. 
 
4.38 0.7 .88 1 
Resilience efforts should be folded into 
dependency models to reduce the response to 
this interruption. 
 
4 0.5 .88 0 
There is not much alignment between DR and 
InfoSec frameworks, and that is a problem. 
Create alignment. 
 
4.5 0.8 .88 1 
A deep understanding of interdependencies in 
the IT environment will improve the response to 
computer crimes. 
 
4.38 0.7 .88 1 
A business-focused understanding of the 
organization will improve the response to 
computer crimes. 
 
4.38 0.7 .88 1 
A risk-based focus on the business will improve 
the response to computer crimes. 
 
4.63 0.5 1 1 
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral 
thinking will improve the response to computer 
crimes. 
4.5 0.5 1 1 
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A basic understanding of the layers of 
protection, prevention, policy management, 
operations, monitoring, and response will 
improve computer crimes recovery efforts. 
 
4.25 0.7 .88 1 
Implement Enterprise Security Risk 
Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process. 
 
4.25 0.7 .88 1 
Deploy InfoSec training for ITDR teams. 
 4.38 0.5 1 1 
Round 3 statements MEAN SD CONS IRQ 
     
Organizations should include InfoSec risks in 
ITDR frameworks. 
 
4.50 0.5 1 1 
If done well, clearly following an ESRM 
program and linking the outcomes of the 
framework to the DR framework offers 
organizations the ability to see the 
interdependencies between assets and objectives. 
 
4.38 0.7 .88 1 
Integrating some cybersecurity risks and controls 
in your disaster recovery process may allow it to 
easier identify attacks that would otherwise be 
considered a “system malfunction.” 
 
4.38 0.5 1 1 
 
 The consensus statements made in this round provided a viewpoint on the 
perceived actions that an organization should consider at high importance. The 32 Round 
3 statements represent only 40% of the round two statements that the participants felt 
were important enough to place a higher priority on implementation of the theme. 
Appendix G provided the analysis of the third-round submissions. In addition to the 
ranking of importance, the participants had the opportunity to provide feedback or 
comments on their submissions. Six participants submitted to the third and final round of 
the study. There were no comments or feedback given in this round by the participants. 
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Summary 
Chapter 4 included the collection and analysis of three rounds of the Delphi study 
to understand the effects of computer crimes in the management of disaster recovery. The 
results of the study recapitulate the data collected from expert participants in the field of 
disaster recovery and cybersecurity. The results of this research communicated the insight 
of the experts and supported the practices that possibly could improve the response to 
computer crimes caused service interruption.  
The qualitative statements and subsequent judgments provided by the first round 
of the Delphi produced 410 qualitative statements. The considerations involving 
planning, modification of disaster recovery playbooks, improving skills of the disaster 
recovery teams, and cooperation with cyber teams were identified as the top four largest 
coding categories as highlighted in Figure 5. Having toolsets, scoping exercises, funding, 
and management support were the least coded categories. The second round presented 
110 themed statements for the participant's judgment. The judgments resulted in 79 
consensus statements. The 79 statements focused on significant factors of computer 
crimes, problems of an unplanned response, improvement steps, planning for computer 
crimes, integrating cybersecurity into disaster recovery processes, and necessary job 
skills needed in the disaster recovery team. 
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Figure 5. Top 4 categories in the round one coding. 
Round 3 was used to solicit the expert opinions on the importance of the 
consensus statements from Round 2. Participants considered the statements for 
organizations to implement to improve the disaster response from computer crimes. Of 
the 79 statements that reached consensus in the second round, 71 were presented to the 
participants in the third round. Of the 71 statements, only 32 or 45% meet the 
requirements for consensus to satisfy the importance for an organization to implement. 
The key findings of this study suggest:  
 Organizations should dedicate effort to have a better understanding of the 
intricacies that technology has on business processes. 
 Planning for computer crimes is crucial for the success of the recovery 
process. 
 Alignment of disaster recovery and cyber security should improve the 
response to siloed activities. 
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 Cybersecurity training of disaster recovery teams will improve the planning 
and response to computer crimes interruptions. 
 Lessons learned for computer crimes interruptions will improve the response 
activity for future events. 
 An enterprise based risk management strategy, considering computer crimes, 
will improve the planning in the disaster recovery program.  
Chapter 5 includes the conclusion of this research, implications, interpretations, 
limitations, and recommendations for this study. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
A large majority of organizations rely on technology for critical processes and 
service interruptions of any type may severely affect their offering. A review of the 
literature indicated a limited knowledge on how to effectively respond to computer 
crimes because of the relative newness of the attack and missing competencies needed by 
the disaster recovery team. The purpose of this qualitative study was to identify 
improvements that could be made to the resumption of an organization that experienced 
an interruption involving computer crime. Woods et al. (2016) described qualitative 
research as the combining of knowledge, experience, and understanding of a topic to 
allow the researcher to build an understanding of a phenomenon. A qualitative inquiry 
was chosen because it was the most appropriate design for gaining an understanding of 
the problem computer crimes interruptions cause to disaster recovery programs. The 
Delphi was selected over other qualitative approaches because of the desire for prediction 
and theory building in disaster recovery. This study allowed for the identification of 
controls, planning, processes, and skillsets that could be used to improve the resumption 
process. The Delphi allowed this study to contribute to the body of knowledge on disaster 
recovery as it pertains to the viewpoints of disaster recovery researchers, practitioners, 
and cybersecurity experts.  
The results of this study included consensus statements by the panel on five 
central topics that described factors affecting recovery efforts from (a)computer crimes, 
(b) processes for improving the disaster recovery response, (c) disaster recovery 
planning, (d) integration with cybersecurity, and (e) desirable job skills. The key findings 
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of this study suggested that (a) organizations should have a better understanding of the 
intricacies that technology has on business processes (b) management support is essential 
for the recovery, (c) planning for computer crimes is crucial, (d) alignment of disaster 
recovery and cyber security should improve the response, (e) skillsets of responders 
should be considered, and (f) a risk-based focus on computer crimes will improve the 
planning in the disaster recovery program.  
In this chapter, I explain inferences and themes that may be drawn from the 
Delphi results. I discuss the possible changes that can be made to a disaster  recovery 
program to improve recovery times from a computer crimes interruption. The remaining 
sections of Chapter 5 are comprised of interpretations of the findings, limitations of the 
study, recommendations, and implications.  
Interpretation of Findings 
The results of this study included consensus statements by the participant panel on 
five central topics that produced 79 consensus statements on the effect of computer 
crimes in disaster recovery. Four hundred and thirty-one statements were collected in the 
first round of the study and themed down into 110 statements. In the second round, 31 of 
the original 110 statements did not reach the consensus formula that consisted of a mean 
of 4.0 or greater, 80% agreement, IRQ of less than 2.5 and SD less than 1.5. Table 8 
contains the statements and consensus found from each round of this Delphi. 
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Table 8 
Overall Delphi findings 
Category Round 1 
Statements 
Round 2 
Statements 
Round 2 
Consensus 
Round 3 
Statements 
Round 3 
Consensus 
Significant factors 
that come from 
computer crimes 
 
107 21 16 10 5 
Improving the ITDR 
response 
 
94 27 
 
19 19 7 
ITDR planning for 
computer crimes 
 
81 22 17 15 8 
Integrating with 
cybersecurity 
 
105 32 21 21 10 
Necessary Skillsets 
for responders 
44 13 6 6 5 
 
The key findings of the study indicated that organization’s disaster recovery 
leadership needed to focus on greater risk assessments of critical technology 
infrastructures outside of the traditional fire, flood, and loss of power. Planning for 
technology interruptions must now consider disruptions from technology vulnerabilities 
that could be leveraged by attackers to bring down organization’s business processes. 
Planners and responder’s skillsets must also be considered. Cybersecurity cross training 
on incident response and identification will improve the response to computer crime. The 
findings also pointed to integrating cybersecurity processes with a disaster recovery 
framework. 
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Delphi Round 1 
The first round of the study provided 10 open-ended, seed questions to the 
participants. The original seed questions were derived from within the literature review. 
Seventeen participants of the 23 that agreed to join the study responded to the 
questionnaire. The initial 10 seed questions resulted in 431 statements corresponding to 
the five main themes in Table 8.  
Significant factors that come from computer crimes. The first two seed 
questions collected factors from the participants that significantly affected the response to 
computer crimes and how the disaster recovery playbook may be impacted. One hundred 
and seven statements were submitted by the panel as factors to consider when responding 
to computer crimes. The panelists recorded the most references to lack of knowledge, 
management support, and responsibilities. The statements were coded and themed for the 
Round 2 judgments. 
Improving the Disaster Recovery response. The third and fourth seed questions 
included judgments on the response aspects of recovery from computer crimes. Ninety-
four statements were submitted by the participants for their viewpoints on responding to 
and improving the response to computer crimes. Determining the root cause of the attack, 
disaster recovery alignment, recovering data, and updating the playbook were the most 
frequently referenced.  
Disaster Recovery planning for computer crimes. The fifth and sixth questions 
collected judgments on the planning aspects that an organization should consider when 
the disaster recovery team is building the playbooks. Eighty-one statements were 
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collected from the participants on disaster recovery planning for computer crimes and the 
way an organization may improve the process. Avoidance of a single solution, specific 
planning for computer crimes, lessons learned, and the need for information security were 
the highest themes analyzed for this category. 
Integrating with cybersecurity. The seventh, ninth, and 10th questions focused 
on the integration of cybersecurity processes with disaster recovery. One hundred and 
five statements were submitted by the participants on the alignment of cybersecurity 
frameworks alignment with disaster recovery, use of cybersecurity processes, and the 
advantages of implementation of cyber security controls. Risk management, lessons 
learned, cybersecurity training, and cybersecurity frameworks recorded the highest count 
of themes in this category. Several participants cited information security frameworks 
that could be aligned with disaster recovery and pointed to the need for alignment of 
cyber with disaster recovery. 
Necessary skillsets for responders. The eighth question focused on any skillsets 
that could assist disaster recovery responders or planners for the recovery of computer 
crimes. Forty-four statements were submitted by the panel for their viewpoints on the job 
skills needing to be recruited for a successful recovery from computer crimes. A risk 
mindset, cyber security expertise, and certifications were the highest coded responses. 
Several experts expressed logical thinking and cyber security knowledge as a requirement 
to be found in the disaster recovery team personnel. A focus on the understanding of 
technology in the business was also highlighted as a skill needed to understand the impact 
of the computer crimes. 
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Delphi Round 2 
The second round of the Delphi presented 110 themed statements analyzed from 
the first round of data collection. The themed questions were broken up by the 10 seed 
questions so that the participants could understand the root of the statement. Of the 110 
statements sent to the participants, the consensus was found on 79 (72%) of the 
statements.  
Significant factors that come from computer crimes. For Questions 1 and 2 
focusing on computer crimes factors, 21 themed statements were presented for judgment. 
Of the 21 statements, 16 (76%) of the statements came to a consensus agreement. The 
panel highlighted the need for understanding interdependencies, adequate planning for 
computer crimes, needed availability of critical infrastructure, management support via 
funding, testing a response for computer crimes, and critical data must be protected from 
tampering.  
Improving the disaster recovery response. Questions 3 and 4, concentrating on 
the response aspects of recovery, provided 27 themed statements. Of the 27 statements, 
19 (70%) of the statements reached a consensus agreement. Of the statements that 
reached a consensus, having a clear scope of the response, quantifying the damage, 
having external resources to assist in the recovery, needing an alignment with business 
goals, revising the disaster recovery playbook for new threats, and testing for computer 
crimes were viewed as steps the organization can take to improve the response.  
Disaster recovery planning for computer crimes. The fifth and sixth questions 
focused on the planning aspects of the recovery and provided 22 statements for judgment. 
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Of the presented statements, 17 (77%) of the statements meet consensus. Specific 
planning for computer crimes, understanding the cyber risk, the need for awareness 
programs, considering the current state of technology in the organization, lesson learned 
activities, adequate funding, and the need for information technology disaster recovery to 
operate in the same business silo as information security were each identified by the 
panel.  
Integrating with cybersecurity. The seventh, ninth, and 10th questions focused 
on the integration of cybersecurity processes with disaster recovery. Thirty-two 
statements were presented to the participants for judgment, and 21 (53%) found 
consensus. Alignment with a cybersecurity framework, resilience controls, the need for 
enterprise risk management, and lessons learned was identified as the major themes. Al 
Hamed and Alenezi (2016) highlighted the importance of a strong connection between 
information security and disaster recovery and the need for organizational improvement 
in business impact analysis. 
Three participants provided additional feedback on the potential cost of 
implementing cybersecurity into disaster recovery processes. The participants felt there 
could be a disadvantage in that adding the cybersecurity components to the existing 
process would require more time, technology, and expertise. This disadvantage could be 
coming from a position of a leader that is already struggling to get funding for a DR 
program and may find it difficult to expand the scope of computer crimes. 
Necessary skillsets for responders. The eighth question focused on skill sets to 
assist disaster recovery responders or planners for the recovery of computer crimes. 
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Thirteen statements were presented to the participants for judgments. Six (46%) of the 
proposed statements found consensus for the skillsets needed to recover from computer 
crimes. Business-focused understanding, risk analysis, prevention, and cybersecurity 
expertise were identified as necessary for the recovery effort. Toigo (1989) and Tucker 
(2014) claimed risk assessment was a commonly misunderstood aspect of disaster 
recovery planning, and without the proper cybersecurity knowledge, the risk assessment 
may not contain the necessary understanding to identify the risks. 
Delphi Round 3 
The Round 3 questionnaire carried consensus statements over from the second 
round of agreements. Five questions from the first category and two questions from the 
third category were filtered from this round because the questions did not apply to the 
application of control or process of an organization. Seventy-five consensus statements 
were presented to the participants for judgment of a 5-point importance Likert scale to the 
organization’s disaster recovery program.  
Significant factors that come from computer crimes. Fourteen statements were 
presented with five reaching the threshold for consensus. The participants highlighted the 
need for management support, a clear understanding of technology interdependencies, 
and the responders understand computer crimes attacks. These findings indicated that 
responders must have a good grasp of the environment and at the same time an 
understanding how computer crimes can affect that environment. This highlighted the 
need for cybersecurity knowledge on the planning and response side of the disaster 
recovery program. Statements not reaching a consensus concentrated on the availability 
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of critical IT services, testing recovery processes, and lessons learned. This research 
seems to indicate lessons learned, and testing is needed in a cyber response, but the 
participants placed a higher priority on implementing cybersecurity knowledge over these 
existing activities that may just need minor upgrading to meet the need.  
Improving the disaster recovery response. Nineteen statements were presented 
for the panel to provide a judgment on the importance of deployment in an organization. 
Seven statements met the criteria for consensus. The panel highlighted the need for the 
technology department to alignment with the business, a need for a clear understanding of 
computer threats, a focus on responder’s knowledge, revising playbooks for new threats, 
and embedding cybersecurity into disaster recovery programs. An analysis of the findings 
resulted in the training of the disaster recovery responders and revision of the DR 
playbook to respond to the emerging threat of computer crimes. The theme statements 
that did not reach consensus focused on data backup techniques, a focus on quantifying 
the damage, third-party resources, traditional disaster recovery playbooks, 
communication, and cause analysis 
Disaster recovery planning for computer crimes. Fifteen statements were 
presented to the panel on planning for computer crimes. Eight statements reached a 
consensus of importance. The participants highlighted the importance of a diversified 
response to computer crimes interruptions, adequate funding, attention to risks, attention 
paid to understanding the current state of systems, and resiliency of technology. The 
concepts that did not reach a threshold of consensus focused on the computer crimes 
problem being an IT problem, quick decision making without understanding the problem, 
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and placing a low value on quality management. This research indicates knowledge of 
cybersecurity will improve the risk management process and deployed controls to resume 
the organization. Resiliency was also scored here with the intent of the participants 
pointing to having data available following a computer crimes attack. Feedback was 
provided by a participant that this might be a difficult problem to solve. Traditional 
redundancy of data with synchronization or a backup medium has not always mitigated 
computer crimes such as ransomware (Bhattacharya & Kumar, 2017). 
Integrating with cybersecurity. Twenty-one statements were sent to the panel 
for ranking that focused on cybersecurity integration with disaster recovery. Of the 21 
statements, 10 (47%) achieved consensus. The participants indicated an information 
security framework should integrate with disaster recovery and cybersecurity teams 
should be aligned, disaster recovery teams should receive infosec training, and enterprise 
risk management being important for organizations to consider. The themes that did not 
reach a consensus of importance threshold included building advanced DR playbooks, 
chief security officer responsibilities in disaster recovery planning, baselining security 
configurations, penetration testing activities, risk management identification of critical 
systems, and risk management. This research indicated the strong need for the integration 
of cybersecurity with disaster recovery.  
Necessary skillsets for responders. Six themed statements were presented for 
ranking the skills that disaster recovery team members should exhibit. Of the six 
statements from the second round, five statements reached a consensus on importance. 
Understanding the technology environment, business-focused understanding of the 
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organization, risk analysis, and basic information security skills was highlighted as 
desirable skills for being better equipped to respond to computer crimes. This finding 
correlates with many sections of this research regarding the training of cybersecurity 
skillsets to disaster recovery planners and responders.  
Limitations of the Study 
This study had potential limitations. Although the Delphi participants were 
provided qualitative questions about information technology disaster recovery, the 
question attributes were limited to computer crimes by the researcher. The disaster 
recovery body of knowledge is far reaching beyond information technology, and this 
research was specifically limited to the disaster recovery of computer crimes caused 
interruption. This research tried to understand how organizations might better respond to 
computer crimes interruptions and if information technology disaster recovery alignment 
with cybersecurity might improve the response. The research study findings did not 
include the motive behind the cyber attackers, describe the type of individuals or groups 
that comprise cyber hackers, or developed a method for preventing the attacks. The study 
did not research the building of an disaster recovery team or how the team should be 
funded.  
The findings from this research may apply to organizations that currently follow 
disaster recovery activities. The study would not apply to organizations that have a 
limited technology footprint or do not find it necessary to have processes to recover 
technology. The study was not focused on any organization, and the finding might have 
different results depending on the purpose of the organization.  
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This research was limited to the disaster recovery and cybersecurity participants 
understanding of information technology disaster recovery and cybersecurity incident 
response. A potential limitation might come from the recruiting of a panel that would fail 
to include the viewpoints of recognized experts. To avoid including participants that 
would not provide valuable data, I held to a strict guideline. Published disaster recovery 
researchers, disaster recovery practitioners, and cybersecurity expertise were confirmed 
from interviews and LinkedIn profiles. The snowball sampling technique provided 
additional experts who were also queried for applicable expertise requirements that had 
been set. The responses to this research may differ from experts that do not agree with the 
need to integrate cybersecurity knowledge into disaster recovery.  
Recommendations 
The following recommendations were derived from this qualitative Delphi study. 
The recommendations are intended to offer an improved understanding of disaster 
recovery teams, social change, and contribute to the information technology disaster 
recovery body of knowledge. This study was not confined to any organizational type or 
geographic locations. The researcher focused on five categories relating to significant 
factors, improving response, planning, integration, and skillsets. Researchers may wish to 
conduct similar Delphi research on different organizations such as corporate 500, 
nonprofits, or government agencies with a similar focus on these major categories.  
A future Delphi on desirable skillsets of disaster recovery responders might yield 
invaluable data on the needs of an increasingly complicated cyber risk. Attacks have 
changed overtime and one section of industry may not see the same attacks as another. 
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Due to different technologies, risks to cyber-attacks, computer crimes, and available 
resources, a Delphi that focuses on one organizational sector, for example, finance, would 
represent a viable option for research on the effects of computer crimes.  
For future studies, researchers might change the eligibility of the study to include 
potential participants from a software development background, cloud service 
architecture, and c-level executives to seek new views on industry-specific experience. 
The results of these future Delphi might provide new insight for comparison with this 
study on new frameworks, responses, integrations or changes to the disaster recovery 
team composition. There are a variety of potential avenues for Delphi studies that might 
provide further insight into disaster recovery as it pertains to cyber threats. 
Five panelists of this study indicated a lack of understanding of technology 
interdependencies and how proper triage of computer crimes may be significant factors in 
a recovery activity. Future qualitative studies could expand on the five panelists 
judgement of disaster recovery responders lacking technical understanding for the 
response. This study would center on successful triage techniques for containment and 
remediation of computer crimes.  
Six panelists highlighted the need for data resiliency. Another area of research 
might seek to understand how vital it is to have data resiliency when an entity 
experiences a computer crimes interruption and if the resiliency deployed is enough to 
overcome the intentional attack. Disaster recovery scholars may wish to understand how 
important it is to have defined disaster response roles when encountering a computer 
crimes interruption. Existing DR plans may not have clear roles when the interruption is 
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not conventional, and the team must leave the planner recovery procedures. 
Understanding how roles with a veteran cyber skillset can improve the disaster recovery 
process would be valuable to the body of knowledge. 
Ninety three percent (93%) of this study’s panel highlighted the need for 
enterprise risk management as it pertains to cyber risks. Guidry et al. (2015) and 
Ferdinand (2015) claimed that the lack of organizational understanding of how a disaster 
recovery program might modify measures to account for computer crimes interruptions. 
Future researchers may find value in qualitative studies looking at how organizations 
need to alter their disaster recovery planning to specifically accommodate technology 
black swans such as the Petya crypto locker or the DyN DDoS attack (Shuler & Smith, 
2017). 
An analysis of the data indicated there would be an advantage with developing 
cybersecurity expertise and when aligning disaster recovery frameworks with 
cybersecurity frameworks. Comments from the experts pointed to the need for greater 
visibility, monitoring, and incident response from cyber-attacks. The study did not 
identify existing or applicable frameworks that would meet this need. Future research 
should center on how to align components of a common cybersecurity framework to add 
value to disaster recovery framework such as the ISO 22301, ISO 17999, NIST 800-34 or 
BS25999 ((Bird, 2015; Brown, 2016). The cybersecurity frameworks 800-184 and CAG 
20 are described as frameworks for improving policies and plans for recovering evolved 
threats (Montesino & Fenz, 2011). Future studies might produce a hybrid control 
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framework that would better position an organization to defend, identify and recover 
from cyber threats. 
An analysis of the data indicated the participants placed importance on 
cybersecurity skills for responders. As expressed by the experts, there might exist a 
considerable gap between traditional disaster recovery skillsets and the cyber skills 
needed for responding to computer crimes. A potential Delphi would seek to understand 
the desirable skillsets of disaster recovery responders that might yield invaluable data on 
the increasingly complicated cyber risk response to computer crimes (McCreight & 
Leece, 2016). Researchers may also conduct qualitative studies for the value of 
penetration testing experience, encryption solutions, and security event monitoring.  
Implications 
The experience of disaster recovery and cybersecurity experts represents a section 
of information which might facilitate a change in the response and recovery from 
technology disasters. Technology disasters are a risk that is increasingly affecting 
organizational survivability. Keeping an organization immediately viable following a 
technology interruption will assist in the survivability or profitability of the organization. 
Prepared organizations are better positioned to keep employees on the payroll and 
remaining in the community instead of invoking evacuation plans and crisis 
communications (Kuo & Means, 2011). By improving the disaster recovery response to 
an event, a community that is relying on vital services from the affected entity will 
experience a reduced interruption as opposed to a prolonged disturbance. Hospitals, 
emergency response, local law enforcement, and transportation are examples of vital 
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services that can leverage an improved information technology disaster recovery response 
to service the local community.  
Recommendations for Information Technology Disaster Recovery Teams 
My research reduces a gap in the understanding of information technology 
disaster recovery by focusing specifically on the consensus of experts in the field of 
cybersecurity and information technology disaster recovery. Organizations across the 
globe are experiencing interruptions due to unexpected computer crimes, and researchers 
are predicting this trend to increase (Page, Kaur, & Waters, 2017; Liu, Li, Shuai, & Wen, 
2017). Traditional disaster recovery has a significant amount of historical data to aid in 
the planning and resuming of a system from fire, flood, and loss of power (Ferdinand, 
2015); however, newer risks to the organization must now be realized from the threat of 
computer crimes. Key decision makers must integrate cybersecurity efforts with disaster 
recovery planning and procedures. Training information technology disaster recovery 
planners and responders in general or specific cybersecurity techniques can improve the 
planning phase and conceptual awareness during a computer crimes interruption. A 
cybersecurity awareness can provide an insight into a risk management activity that may 
not have been considered otherwise (Alexander, 2015; Grigonis, 2002; Iqbal, Widyawan, 
& Mustika, 2016; Lam, 2002; Rittinghouse & Ransome, 2011). Organizations should 
explore ways to integrate more cybersecurity into the disaster recovery lifecycle to 
improve the ability to quickly and efficiently recover from business interruptions. 
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Conclusions 
This qualitative Delphi research study included the viewpoints and knowledge of 
disaster recovery researchers, disaster recovery responders, and cybersecurity experts as a 
tool to understand how to improve the effects of computer crimes on disaster recovery 
programs. Although disaster recovery was originally founded from the principles of 
emergency management in responding to natural disasters (Alexander, 2015), the 
research participants highlighted the need to advance the disaster recovery process to 
include cybersecurity threats. The research pointed to the need for organizations to 
implement cybersecurity knowledge in the disaster recovery process for planning, risk 
management, lessons learned, and awareness improvement of the responders. The 
emerging threats from cyber-attacks pose a serious risk to organizations (Vaidya, 2015) 
and a building of understanding in cybersecurity should improve the disaster recovery 
response from a computer crimes interruption.  
This research also explored the use of a cybersecurity framework integration with 
disaster recovery processes. The monitoring, defensive controls, and incident response 
procedures found in popular cybersecurity frameworks can easily augment existing 
information technology disaster recovery planning and response procedures. The research 
participants highlighted advantages in several sections of this research in combining the 
two concepts where it was applicable. Therefore, based on the results of this study, 
organizations must explore ways to build knowledge in their disaster recovery teams of 
cybersecurity techniques and should improve their disaster recovery programs through an 
integration with a cybersecurity framework. 
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Appendix A: Invitation Letter 
Invitation to participate in a doctoral research project with consent 
 
 
Project Title: The Effects of Computer Crimes on the Management of Disaster Recovery 
 
Researchers:  
Timothy Proffitt, doctoral candidate, Management 
David Gould - Ed.D., Committee Chair, Walden University 
 
Dear Madam/Sir, 
You are invited to participate in a research project being conducted by Walden 
University. This information sheet describes the project. Please read this sheet carefully 
and be confident that you understand its contents before deciding whether to participate.  
 
Who is involved in this research project? Why is it being conducted? 
Timothy Proffitt is conducting this research as a doctoral requirement and Dr. 
David Gould from Walden University will be the committee chair. The Walden 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) has given their written support for this research. The 
purpose of this qualitative study is to understand how information technology disaster 
recovery controls and processes can be modified to improve response to a computer 
crime caused business interruption. 
 
Why have you been approached? 
You have been approached on the basis that you identify yourself as an expert in 
disaster recovery or cybersecurity. You have not been approached randomly, but rather, 
have been identified by one of the researchers or by one of your friends, family or 
acquaintances that might be aware of you being an expert in these fields.  
 
What is the project about? What are the questions being addressed? 
The purpose of this qualitative Delphi study is to understand how information 
technology disaster recovery controls and processes can be modified to improve response 
to a computer crime caused business interruption. A qualitative approach will focus on 
information technology disaster recovery participants to develop a new framework of 
response. A new model will be developed as an understanding of how the information 
technology disaster recovery processes could be influenced by other frameworks tailored 
for cyber security or computer incident response. A Delphi approach was chosen over 
other qualitative research approaches, such as a case study, because the aim of this study 
is to learn what factors affect a certain responses and to problem solve to improve the 
disaster response process. 
 
If I agree to participate, what will I be required to do? 
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Participation will require the full completion of three rounds of a Delphi 
questionnaire that should take between 30 and 45 minutes of your time for each round. 
The initial questionnaires will ask you about factors significantly affecting the ability of 
disaster recovery programs in responding to computer crimes caused disasters. You are 
asked to answer question in your expert opinion with the understanding that the next 
round of questions will build on the previous answers. After each submission, you will be 
provided feedback to be sure that your submission was clearly understood by the 
researcher.  
It is valuable to the study that all three rounds are completed by a participant. The 
last round is important in reaching consensus or identifying new areas that need further 
discussion. 
 
What are the risks or disadvantages associated with participation? 
There are no foreseeable risks for your participation outside your normal day-to-
day activities. Each of the three rounds will ask you judgments on questions around 
information technology disaster recovery. The responses should be expected to take 
between thirty to sixty minutes depending on your responses. The study should not be a 
significant investment of your time.  
 
What are the benefits associated with participation? 
The results of the study will assist in improved disaster recovery planning and 
response to an emerging threat to any organization relying on technology for vital 
business functions. Billions of dollars and a number of organizations each year are lost 
when they are unable to recover from a disaster. Your participation may improve the 
resiliency of organizations around the globe. 
 
What will happen to the information I provide? 
Your completed questionnaire is anonymous and your name will be known only 
to the researcher. No information will be place into the dissertation that can identify you 
personally. Your questionnaire will be kept confidential for 15 years before being 
destroyed. The summarized results may be published in disaster recovery journals, made 
available to various technology groups, conferences, and various other sources. 
 
What are my rights as a participant? 
• You have the right to withdraw your participation at any time. 
• You have the right to have any unprocessed data withdrawn and destroyed. 
• You have the right to have any questions answered at any time. 
 
Is there a payment? 
There will not be any compensation for participating in the study. 
 
Statement of Consent 
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to 
make a decision about my involvement. By, replying to this email with the phrase, “Yes, 
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I consent to this study.” You understand that you are agreeing to the terms described 
above. 
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Appendix B: List of Round 1 Questions 
 
 What factors significantly affect the ability of disaster recovery programs in 
responding to computer crimes caused disasters? 
 What interruptions caused by computer crimes cause the response team to recover 
differently than a traditionally planned recovery? 
 In what ways can a disaster response be unsuccessful when following traditional 
technology disaster recovery plans to recover from computer crimes caused 
business interruption? 
 What steps might be an improvement from traditional disaster recovery 
procedures to resume the organization from a computer crimes disaster? 
 What differences can be found from a business that prepared for interruptions 
caused computer crimes as compared to those that do not? 
 What should organizations avoid to improve the ability to recover from computer 
crimes? 
 What common themes exist where the cause of the technology interruption could 
have been significantly reduced by modification of the information technology 
disaster recovery framework to align with a cyber security framework? 
 What type of expertise should be recruited to build a successful disaster recovery 
program that could better respond to computer crimes? 
 What cyber security processes could improve disaster response, if any? 
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 What advantages or disadvantages exist in specifically defining cyber security 
risk and controls in disaster recovery frameworks? 
197 
 
Appendix C: List of Themes Build from Round 1 
 What factors significantly affect the ability of disaster recovery programs 
 What interruptions caused by computer crimes cause the response team to recover 
differently 
 What ways can a disaster response be unsuccessful when following traditional 
technology disaster recovery 
 What steps could be an improvement 
 What differences can be found from a business that prepared 
 What should organizations avoid to improve 
 Where could the modification of the information technology disaster recovery 
framework to align with a cyber security framework? 
 What type of expertise should be recruited 
 What cyber security processes could improve disaster response 
 What advantages or disadvantages exist in specifically defining cyber security 
risk 
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Appendix D: Consensus Building from Round 2 
Question 1: What factors significantly affect the ability of disaster recovery programs in 
responding to computer crimes caused disasters? 
Lack of understanding of the interdependencies in IT makes it difficult to anticipate the 
impact of the recovery. 
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes. 
Critical IT services must be available to conduct a recovery. 
A lack of management support and poor funding will negatively impact this response. 
If the organization does not staff skilled resources, the response will suffer. 
The untested recovery process from computer crimes will negatively impact the 
recovery process. 
The ability to triage the incident correctly as the ITDR team comes on the scene will be 
an issue when the cause is computer crimes 
IR teams must be trained for such a scenario. 
Organizations conducting lessons learned will improve their response. 
Critical data must be protected and available from an alternate source to protect from 
computer crimes 
There must be a clear list of responsibilities in responding to this type incident. 
The lack of an RTO and RPO will hamper the response for computer crimes. 
Replacement equipment must be available and quickly replaced  
Question 2: What interruptions caused by computer crimes could force an organizations 
disaster response team to recover differently than a traditionally planned recovery 
(playbooks)? 
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for 
compliance/legal/law enforcement reasons. 
A compromise of the IT administrators/ IT systems will force a different response. 
Computer crimes can render critical systems unable to support a recovery where 
traditionally it would. 
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery. 
A triage of a computer crimes attack can lead to multiple activities of containment 
outside of the recovery process. 
Computer crime related recovery is much more variable, and it is very difficult to 
determine the variables effectively. 
A destructive data threat might require a more focused reaction than what a traditional 
play book has.  
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Question 3: In what ways can a disaster response be unsuccessful when following 
traditional technology disaster recovery plans to recover from computer crimes caused 
business interruption? 
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful 
or extremely time-consuming. 
A compromise of the IT administrators system or credentials will force a different 
response capability than recovery from water/power/storms. 
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not scoped, it will trip upon the 
response. 
Attackers can purposely deceive the ITDR team with decoy interruptions to increase the 
success of the attack. 
When a breach occurs, the organization may lack the ability to anticipate and quantify 
the damage. This would hamper the recovery. 
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery. 
A response would be difficult without the possession of endpoints, reliable 
communications, or reliable utilities. 
An organization may not have outside resources available to assist with a computer 
crimes interruption. For example, an organization may not have an InfoSec resource on 
retainer. 
The organization has a lack of alignment with IT goals and business goals. 
A Traditional DR playbook may not eradicate the intrusion correctly. 
The DR team may have a poor understanding of the attack which could cause the 
activation of the wrong recovery solution, delaying, or stopping the overall business 
resumption. 
If organizations do not test for the computer crimes scenario, it will fail to recover on 
time. 
Question 4: What steps could be an improvement from traditional disaster recovery (i.e. 
loss of power, fire, flood) procedures to resume the organization from a computer 
crimes disaster (DoS, hacking, crypto locker, data destruction)? 
Computer crimes are more complex and involve greater communication and 
collaboration outside of IT and the IT Security team. 
Keep the soft copy of the DR plan offline from the main company environment so that it 
cannot be hacked. 
Craft procedures where data is lost or corrupted and recovery have to be initiated using 
physical backups. 
A separate set of procedures for cybercrime that takes into consideration the risks of 
computer crimes interruptions. 
Real-time data synchronization to alternate locations would improve recovery from a 
computer crime interruption. 
An improvement would come from lessons learned and root cause analysis sessions. 
Security architectures must use technology in support of business objectives, and 
accurately model dependencies to prioritize resources. 
200 
 
implement a solution that can detect a change in data to encrypted state or data loss that 
will prevent existing backups from being overwritten. 
Organizations must focus on people, communications, tools, and facilities to improve 
from computer crimes interruptions. 
Preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously for computer crimes. 
Containment and eradication procedures for computer crimes will need to be included in 
playbooks. 
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the ITDR program. 
Leverage a cloud technology for an organization so that they are better secured and 
recoverable.  
Question 5: What differences can be found from an organization that prepares for 
interruptions caused computer crimes as compared to those that do not? 
I have seen organizations struggle to recover from a typical disaster recovery effort and 
fail completely when attempting to recover from a computer crime event. 
The prepared organization will not rely on one solution to protect everything. 
Companies more heavily invested in preparing for computer crime-based interruptions 
have greater integration with their Information Security counterparts and have a 
management team that understands the risks posed by computer crimes and are willing 
to devote more money and attention to prevention and preparation for computer crime 
interruptions. 
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are 
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by computer crimes. 
Organizations may but subject to fines or lawsuits where they may not come from a 
traditional disaster. 
Organizations must provide a robust awareness program to ITDR teams to help mitigate 
computer crimes risks.  
Question 6: What should organizations avoid to improve the ability to recover from 
computer crimes interruptions? 
Organizations cannot treat a computer crimes recovery as just a “technical” or “IT” led 
the response to better respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations must place security controls on mobile phones to better respond to 
computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid the knee-jerk reaction to throw money at a problem without 
first grasping what that problem is and then smartly coming up with the solution.  
Organizations must avoid plans that do not take into consideration the current state of 
the systems to better respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid staff turnover and unclear responsibilities to better respond to 
computer crimes. 
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Organizations must avoid open source systems for critical business applications to 
better respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations that do not conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis will not 
improve to better respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations should avoid placing a low value on quality management in DR to better 
respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack redundancy or resiliency attributes to 
better respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid thinking they are protected from computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid neglecting the risk of computer crimes interruptions. 
Organizations must not focus on speed but instead focus on the assessment phase to 
better respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid having missing cybersecurity policies to better respond to 
computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid operating DR functions without the proper funding to better 
respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations cannot operate ITDR and InfoSec in different silos to better respond to 
computer crimes.  
Question 7: What common themes exist where the cause of the technology interruption 
could have been significantly reduced by modification of the information technology 
disaster recovery framework to align with a cybersecurity framework? 
A well-developed cybersecurity framework supports the ITDR, and the opportunity for 
a technical interruption is reduced. 
Adherence to policies and procedures will reduce the recovery from computer crimes. 
A coordinated process alignment between Disaster Recovery and Information Security 
frameworks is vital to reducing the recovery of this type. 
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are 
executed together, and participation is integrated. 
Developing an ITDR set of practices and different playbooks will reduce the response. 
Resilience efforts should be folded into dependency models to reduce the response to 
this interruption. 
Advanced preparation will reduce a computer crimes response. 
Testing and segmentation with strict access control and secure baseline configurations 
will reduce the response to computer crimes. 
The computer crime prevention program must include the protection from internal 
crimes. 
Organizations must hold pre-event training processes to reduce computer crimes 
responses. 
There is not much alignment between DR and InfoSec frameworks, and that is a 
problem.  
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Question 8: What type of expertise (job skills and/or personal) should be recruited to 
build a successful ITDR program that could better respond to computer crimes 
interruptions? 
Project management will improve the response to computer crimes. 
People management will improve the response to computer crimes. 
A deep understanding of interdependencies in the IT environment will improve the 
response to computer crimes. 
A business-focused understanding of the organization will improve the response to 
computer crimes. 
A risk-based focus on the business will improve the response to computer crimes. 
Do not hire millennials will improve the response to computer crimes. 
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking will improve the response to 
computer crimes. 
A basic understanding of the layers of protection, prevention, policy management, 
operations, monitoring, and response will improve computer crimes recovery efforts. 
Certified professionals with CISSP, CISA, and CISM credentials to reduce the risk of 
computer crimes recovery efforts. 
I don’t think it’s a matter of adding job skills or personnel to the equation but more 
about access to other teams will improve the response to computer crimes. 
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist to improve the response to computer crimes. 
Minor skills are needed such as Ethical Hacking, Encryption Solutions, Highly 
Adaptable and Collaborative skills will improve the response to computer crimes.  
Question 9: What common cybersecurity processes could improve recovery effort that 
would not normally be found in an ITDR program? 
Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process 
Password management is important 
The All-hazards approach should include InfoSec interruptions 
Standards-based Information security management systems life cycle 
InfoSec training for ITDR teams 
Organizations can integrate the RMO and CSO responsibilities into ITDR planning 
activities 
Formal lessons learned and future prevention, which may help lessen the severity of 
future incidents.  
Establishing a baseline of security configurations is another cybersecurity process that 
extends to ITDR. 
Asset inventory processes 
The entire Cybersecurity Framework should be incorporated into the ITDR program 
Penetration testing and disaster recovery testing 
CAG 20 Critical Security controls would improve the recovery 
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Question 10: What advantages or disadvantages exist in specifically defining 
cybersecurity risk and controls in disaster recovery frameworks? 
Organizations should include InfoSec risks in ITDR frameworks 
If done well, clearly following an ESRM program and linking the outcomes of the 
framework to the DR framework offers organizations the ability to see the 
interdependencies between assets and objectives. 
There could be a disadvantage to the organization by increasing the costs of additional 
InfoSec controls into ITDR processes. 
A cybersecurity framework adoption into the ITDR could result in minimal, or zero 
interruptions to its business and could improve both productivity and brand image. 
There does not appear to be any disadvantages to a cybersecurity framework integration 
into ITDR. 
Without cyber being a part of that plan the plan itself will be lacking. 
If done properly, cybersecurity risk management will identify the DR systems as one of 
the most business-critical systems in the organization. 
Integrating some cybersecurity risks and controls in your disaster recovery process may 
allow it to easier identify attacks that would otherwise be considered a “system 
malfunction.” 
A cybersecurity framework integration could provide an advantage in that it provides a 
2nd or 3rd layer of risk management to the disaster recovery framework.  
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Appendix E: List of Round 3 Questions 
Lack of understanding of the interdependencies in IT makes it difficult to anticipate the 
impact of the recovery. Improve understanding. 
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes. 
Critical IT services must be available to conduct a recovery. 
A lack of management support and poor funding will negatively impact this response. 
If the organization does not staff skilled resources, the response will suffer. 
The untested recovery process from computer crimes will negatively impact the 
recovery process. 
The ability to triage the incident correctly as the ITDR team comes on the scene will be 
an issue when the cause is computer crimes 
IR teams must be trained for such a scenario. 
Organizations conducting lessons learned will improve their response. 
Critical data must be protected and available from an alternate source to protect from 
computer crimes. There must be a clear list of responsibilities in responding to this 
type incident. 
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful 
or extremely time-consuming. 
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not scoped, it will trip upon the 
response. 
When a breach occurs, the organization may lack the ability to anticipate and quantify 
the damage. This would hamper the recovery. 
An organization may not have outside resources available to assist with a computer 
crimes interruption. For example, an organization may not have an InfoSec resource on 
retainer. 
The organization has a lack of alignment with IT goals and business goals. 
A Traditional DR playbook may not eradicate the intrusion correctly. 
The DR team may have a poor understanding of the attack which could cause the 
activation of the wrong recovery solution, delaying, or stopping the overall business 
resumption. 
If organizations do not test for the computer crimes scenario, it will fail to recover on 
time. 
Computer crimes are more complex and involve greater communication and 
collaboration outside of IT and the IT Security team. 
Keep the soft copy of the DR plan offline from the main company environment so that 
it cannot be hacked. 
Craft procedures where data is lost or corrupted and recovery have to be initiated using 
physical backups. 
A separate set of procedures for cybercrime that takes into consideration the risks of 
computer crimes interruptions. 
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Real-time data synchronization to alternate locations would improve recovery from a 
computer crime interruption. 
An improvement would come from lessons learned and root cause analysis sessions. 
Security architectures must use technology in support of business objectives, and 
accurately model dependencies to prioritize resources. 
Organizations must focus on people, communications, tools, and facilities to improve 
from computer crimes interruptions. 
Preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously for computer crimes. 
Containment and eradication procedures for computer crimes will need to be included 
in playbooks. 
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the ITDR program. 
The prepared organization will not rely on one solution to protect everything. 
Companies more heavily invested in preparing for computer crime-based interruptions 
have greater integration with their Information Security counterparts and have a 
management team that understands the risks posed by computer crimes and are willing 
to devote more money and attention to prevention and preparation for computer crime 
interruptions. 
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are 
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by computer 
crimes. 
Organizations cannot treat a computer crimes recovery as just a “technical” or “IT” led 
the response to better respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid the knee-jerk reaction to throw money at a problem without 
first grasping what that problem is and then smartly coming up with the solution.  
Organizations must avoid plans that do not take into consideration the current state of 
the systems to better respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations that do not conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis will not 
improve to better respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations should avoid placing a low value on quality management in DR to better 
respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack redundancy or resiliency attributes to 
better respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid thinking they are protected from computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid neglecting the risk of computer crimes interruptions. 
Organizations must not focus on speed but instead focus on the assessment phase to 
better respond to computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid having missing cybersecurity policies to better respond to 
computer crimes. 
Organizations must avoid operating DR functions without the proper funding to better 
respond to computer crimes. 
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Organizations cannot operate ITDR and InfoSec in different silos to better respond to 
computer crimes. 
A well-developed cybersecurity framework supports the ITDR, and the opportunity for 
a technical interruption is reduced. 
A coordinated process alignment between Disaster Recovery and Information Security 
frameworks is vital to reducing the recovery of this type. 
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are 
executed together, and participation is integrated. 
Developing an ITDR set of practices and different playbooks will reduce the response. 
Resilience efforts should be folded into dependency models to reduce the response to 
this interruption. 
Advanced preparation will reduce a computer crimes response. 
There is not much alignment between DR and InfoSec frameworks, and that is a 
problem. Create alignment. 
A deep understanding of interdependencies in the IT environment will improve the 
response to computer crimes. 
A business-focused understanding of the organization will improve the response to 
computer crimes. 
A risk-based focus on the business will improve the response to computer crimes. 
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking will improve the response to 
computer crimes. 
A basic understanding of the layers of protection, prevention, policy management, 
operations, monitoring, and response will improve computer crimes recovery efforts. 
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist to improve the response to computer crimes. 
Implement Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process 
Deploy InfoSec training for ITDR teams 
Organizations can integrate the RMO and CSO responsibilities into ITDR planning 
activities 
Formal lessons learned and future prevention, which may help lessen the severity of 
future incidents.  
Establishing a baseline of security configurations is another cybersecurity process that 
extends to ITDR. 
Implement Asset inventory processes 
Deploy Penetration testing and disaster recovery testing 
Implementing the CAG 20 Critical Security controls would improve the recovery 
effort. 
Organizations should include InfoSec risks in ITDR frameworks 
If done well, clearly following an ESRM program and linking the outcomes of the 
framework to the DR framework offers organizations the ability to see the 
interdependencies between assets and objectives. 
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Without cyber being a part of that plan, the plan itself will be lacking. 
If done properly, cybersecurity risk management will identify the DR systems as one of 
the most business-critical systems in the organization. 
Integrating some cybersecurity risks and controls in your disaster recovery process 
may allow it to easier identify attacks that would otherwise be considered a “system 
malfunction.” 
A cybersecurity framework integration could provide an advantage in that it provides a 
2nd or 3rd layer of risk management to the disaster recovery framework. 
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Appendix F: Removal of duplicate statements 
Question 1: 
 What factors significantly affect the ability of disaster recovery programs in responding 
to computer crimes caused disasters? 
 
Lack of understanding of the interdependencies in IT 
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes 
Critical services must be available to conduct a recovery 
poor funding will negatively impact this response 
executive complacency to the computer crimes threat 
response capability to computer crimes is cost-prohibitive 
 Management support 
The organization does not staff skilled resources 
untested recovery process will negatively impact the recovery process 
ability to triage the incident correctly as the ITDR team comes on the scene 
IR team training for such a scenario 
management support 
conducting lessons learned 
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes 
The organization does not staff skilled resources 
executive complacency to the computer crimes threat 
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes 
Critical data must be protected and available from an alternate source 
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes 
There must be a clear list of responsibilities in responding to an incident 
untested recovery process will negatively impact the recovery process 
Critical data must be protected and available from an alternate source 
The lack of a RTO and RPO will hamper the response 
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes 
With computer crime, it is much more difficult to anticipate the impact. 
poor funding will negatively impact this response 
untested recovery process will negatively impact the recovery process 
There must be a clear list of responsibilities in responding to an incident 
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes 
Replacement Equipment must be quickly replaced 
Critical services must be available to conduct a recovery 
The lack of a RTO and RPO will hamper the response 
Untested recovery process will negatively impact the recovery process 
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes 
executive complacency to the computer crimes threat will negatively impact this response 
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Duplicates removed 
 
Lack of understanding of the interdependencies in IT make it difficult to anticipate the 
impact 
The organization must have adequate planning for computer crimes 
Critical services must be available to conduct a recovery 
A lack of management support and poor funding will negatively impact this response 
executive complacency to the computer crimes threat will negatively impact this response 
If the organization does not staff skilled resources the response will suffer 
Untested recovery process will negatively impact the recovery process 
ability to triage the incident correctly as the ITDR team comes on the scene 
IR team training for such a scenario 
Organizations conducting lessons learned will improve their response 
Critical data must be protected and available from an alternate source 
There must be a clear list of responsibilities in responding to an incident 
The lack of a RTO and RPO will hamper the response 
Replacement Equipment must be quickly replaced 
 
Question 2  
 What interruptions caused by computer crimes could force an organizations disaster 
response team to recover differently than a traditionally planned recovery (playbooks)? 
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for 
compliance/legal reasons 
A compromise of the IT administrators will force a different response 
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it 
would. 
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery 
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it 
would. 
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery 
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it 
would. 
A triage of a computer crimes attack can lead to multiple activities of containment outside 
of the recovery process. 
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it 
would. 
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for 
compliance/legal reasons 
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery 
A triage of a computer crimes attack can lead to multiple activities of containment outside 
of the recovery process. 
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Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it 
would. 
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it 
would. 
 Computer crime related recovery is much more variable and it is very difficult to 
determine the variables effectively. 
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery 
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it 
would. 
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery 
Computer crimes can render systems unable to support a recovery that traditionally it 
would. 
A destructive data threat might require a more focused reaction that what a traditional 
play book has. 
A triage of a computer crimes attack can lead to multiple activities of containment outside 
of the recovery process. 
A compromise of the IT administrators/ IT systems will force a different response than 
traditionally 
 
Duplicates removed 
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for 
compliance/legal reasons 
A compromise of the IT administrators/ IT systems will force a different response 
Computer crimes can render critical systems unable to support a recovery where 
traditionally it would. 
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery 
A triage of a computer crimes attack can lead to multiple activities of containment outside 
of the recovery process. 
 Computer crime related recovery is much more variable and it is very difficult to 
determine the variables effectively. 
A destructive data threat might require a more focused reaction than what a traditional 
play book has. 
 
Question 3 
In what ways can a disaster response be unsuccessful when following traditional 
technology disaster recovery plans to recover from computer crimes caused business 
interruption? 
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for 
compliance/legal reasons 
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful 
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful 
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful 
A compromise of the IT administrators will force a different response 
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If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not scoped, it will trip up the 
response. 
Attackers can purposely deceive the ITDR team with decoy interruptions to increase the 
success of the attack 
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not fully scoped, it will trip up the 
response. 
when a breach occurs the organization may lack the ability to anticipate and quantify the 
damage is impaired. 
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful 
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery 
A response would be difficult without the possession of endpoints, reliable 
communications, or reliable utilities  
An organization may not have outside resources available to assist with a computer 
crimes interruption 
The organization has a lack of alignment with IT goals and business goals. 
 Traditional disaster recovery may not eradicate the intrusion correctly 
The DR team may have a poor understanding of the attack which would could cause the 
activation of the wrong recovery solution, delaying or stopping overall business 
resumption 
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not fully scoped, it will trip up the 
response. 
If organizations do not test for this scenario it will fail to recover on time. 
Organizations may not account for the time need to restore massive amounts of data to 
recover systems. 
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not scoped, it will trip up the 
response. 
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not scoped, it will trip up the 
response. 
 
Duplicates removed 
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for 
compliance/legal reasons 
If a data backup/alternative is not available, traditional recovery will not be successful or 
extremely time consuming 
A compromise of the IT administrators system or credentials will force a different 
response capability 
If an organization finds itself in a response that it has not scoped, it will trip up the 
response. 
Attackers can purposely deceive the ITDR team with decoy interruptions to increase the 
success of the attack 
when a breach occurs the organization may lack the ability to anticipate and quantify the 
damage is impaired. 
It will be hard to identify compromised versus uncompromised systems for recovery 
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A response would be difficult without the possession of endpoints, reliable 
communications, or reliable utilities  
An organization may not have outside resources available to assist with a computer 
crimes interruption 
The organization has a lack of alignment with IT goals and business goals. 
 Traditional disaster recovery may not eradicate the intrusion correctly 
The DR team may have a poor understanding of the attack which would could cause the 
activation of the wrong recovery solution, delaying or stopping overall business 
resumption 
If organizations do not test for this scenario it will fail to recover on time. 
 
Question 4 
What steps could be an improvement from traditional disaster recovery (i.e. loss of 
power, fire, flood) procedures to resume the organization from a computer crimes disaster 
(DoS, hacking, crypto locker, data destruction)? 
computer crime are more complex and involved greater communication and collaboration 
outside of IT and the IT Security team. 
Keep the soft copy of the DR plan offline from the main company environment so that it 
can’t hacked. 
Craft procedures where data is gone or corrupted and recovery has to be initiated using 
physical backups.  
a separate set of procedures for cyber crime that takes into consideration the insidious 
nature of the cyber attacker. 
Real-time data synchronization to alternate locations 
Conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis sessions 
Security architectures must use technology in support of business objectives, and 
accurately model dependencies to prioritize resources. 
Craft procedures where data is gone or corrupted and recovery has to be initiated using 
physical backups.  
implement a solution that can detect a change in data to encrypted state or data loss that 
will prevent existing backups from being overwritten. 
 focus on people, communications, tools, and facilities. 
preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously 
preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously 
Conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis sessions 
Containment and eradication procedures will need to be included in playbooks. 
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the DR program. 
Leverage a cloud technology for an organization so that they are better secured and 
recoverable 
Preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously 
Computer crime are more complex and involved greater communication and 
collaboration outside of IT and the IT Security team. 
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the DR program. 
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Preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously 
 
Duplicates removed 
computer crime are more complex and involved greater communication and collaboration 
outside of IT and the IT Security team. 
Keep the soft copy of the DR plan offline from the main company environment so that it 
can’t hacked. 
Craft procedures where data is gone or corrupted and recovery has to be initiated using 
physical backups.  
A separate set of procedures for cyber crime that takes into consideration the risks of 
computer crimes interruptions. 
Real-time data synchronization to alternate locations 
Conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis sessions 
Security architectures must use technology in support of business objectives, and 
accurately model dependencies  to prioritize resources. 
implement a solution that can detect a change in data to encrypted state or data loss that 
will prevent existing backups from being overwritten. 
 Organizations must focus on people, communications, tools, and facilities. 
preventive and testing measures must be taken continuously 
Containment and eradication procedures will need to be included in playbooks. 
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the DR program. 
Leverage a cloud technology for an organization so that they are better secured and 
recoverable 
Organizations may need to document their computer crimes recovery differently for 
compliance/legal reasons 
 
Question 5: 
What differences can be found from an organization that prepares for interruptions caused 
computer crimes as compared to those that do not? 
 I have seen organizations struggle to recover from a typical disaster recovery effort, and 
fail completely when attempting to recover from a computer crime event. 
Don’t rely on one solution to protect everything. 
companies more heavily invested in preparing for computer crime-based interruptions 
have greater integration with their Information Security counterparts and have a 
management team that understands the risks posed by computer crimes and are willing to 
devote more money and attention to prevention and preparation for computer crime 
interruptions.  
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are 
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks  
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are 
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks  
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are 
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks  
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Organizations may but subject to fines or law suits where they may not from a traditional 
disaster. 
organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are 
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks  
A prepared organization will have a realistic recovery plan that has multiple options for 
recovery scenarios and reduced downtime from computer crimes. 
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are 
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks  
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are 
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks  
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are 
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks  
A prepared organization will have a realistic recovery plan that has multiple options for 
recovery scenarios and reduced downtime from computer crimes. 
Organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are 
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks  
Organizations must provide a robust awareness program to help mitigate computer crimes 
risks 
 
Duplicates removed 
 I have seen organizations struggle to recover from a typical disaster recovery effort, and 
fail completely when attempting to recover from a computer crime event. 
The prepared organization will not rely on one solution to protect everything. 
companies more heavily invested in preparing for computer crime-based interruptions 
have greater integration with their Information Security counterparts and have a 
management team that understands the risks posed by computer crimes and are willing to 
devote more money and attention to prevention and preparation for computer crime 
interruptions.  
organizations that are not prepared to deal with computer crimes in their ITDR are 
opening themselves up to additional risks, and interruptions caused by cyber attacks  
Organizations may but subject to fines or law suits where they may not from a traditional 
disaster. 
A prepared organization will have a realistic recovery plan that has multiple options for 
recovery scenarios and reduced downtime from computer crimes. 
Organizations must provide a robust awareness program to help mitigate computer crimes 
risks 
 
Question 6: 
What should organizations avoid to improve the ability to recover from computer crimes 
interruptions? 
 Organizations cannot treat a computer crimes recovery as just a “technical” or “IT” led 
response.  
Organizations must place security controls on mobile phones  
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avoid the knee-jerk reaction to throw money at a problem without first grasping what that 
problem is and then smartly coming up with the solution.  
Organizations must avoid plans that do not take into consideration the current state of the 
systems 
Organizations must avoid staff turnover and unclear responsibilities 
Organizations must avoid open source systems for critical business applications 
Organizations that do not conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis will not 
improve. 
Organizations should avoid placing a low value on quality management in DR 
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack redundancy or resiliency attributes 
Organizations must avoid thinking they are protected from computer crimes 
Organizations must avoid neglecting the risk of computer crimes interruptions 
Organizations must avoid staff turnover and unclear responsibilities 
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack redundancy or resiliency attributes 
Organizations must not focus on speed but instead focus on the assessment phase 
Organizations must avoid having missing cyber security policies 
Organizations must avoid staff turnover and unclear responsibilities 
Organizations must avoid plans that do not take into consideration the current state of the 
systems 
avoid the knee-jerk reaction to throw money at a problem without first grasping what that 
problem is and then smartly coming up with the solution.  
Organizations must avoid operating DR functions without the proper funding 
Organizations cannot operate ITDR and InfoSec in different silos 
Organizations cannot operate ITDR and InfoSec in different silos 
 
Duplicates removed 
 Organizations cannot treat a computer crimes recovery as just a “technical” or “IT” led 
response.  
Organizations must place security controls on mobile phones  
avoid the knee-jerk reaction to throw money at a problem without first grasping what that 
problem is and then smartly coming up with the solution.  
Organizations must avoid plans that do not take into consideration the current state of the 
systems 
Organizations must avoid staff turnover and unclear responsibilities 
Organizations must avoid open source systems for critical business applications 
Organizations that do not conduct lessons learned and root cause analysis will not 
improve. 
Organizations should avoid placing a low value on quality management in DR 
Organizations must avoid architectures that lack redundancy or resiliency attributes 
Organizations must avoid thinking they are protected from computer crimes 
Organizations must avoid neglecting the risk of computer crimes interruptions 
Organizations must not focus on speed but instead focus on the assessment phase 
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Organizations must avoid having missing cyber security policies 
Organizations must avoid operating DR functions without the proper funding 
Organizations cannot operate ITDR and InfoSec in different silos 
 
Question 7: 
What common themes exist where the cause of the technology interruption could have 
been significantly reduced by modification of the information technology disaster 
recovery framework to align with a cybersecurity framework? 
a well-developed cybersecurity framework supports the ITDR, and the opportunity for a 
technical interruption is reduced.  
Adherence to policies and procedures 
coordinated process alignment between Disaster Recovery and Information Security 
frameworks is vital 
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed 
together and participation is integrated.  
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed 
together and participation is integrated.  
developing an ITDR set of practices and different playbooks 
Resilience efforts should be folded into dependency models. 
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed 
together and participation is integrated.  
Advanced Preparation 
Testing and segmentation with strict access control and secure baseline configurations.  
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed 
together and participation is integrated.  
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed 
together and participation is integrated.  
The computer crime prevention program must include the protection from internal crimes.  
Organizations must hold pre-event training processes 
coordinated process alignment between Disaster Recovery and Information Security 
frameworks is vital 
There is not much alignment between DR and InfoSec frameworks and that is a problem. 
 
Duplicates removed 
a well-developed cybersecurity framework supports the ITDR, and the opportunity for a 
technical interruption is reduced.  
Adherence to policies and procedures 
coordinated process alignment between Disaster Recovery and Information Security 
frameworks is vital 
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their lifecycle processes so that like steps are executed 
together and participation is integrated.  
developing an ITDR set of practices and different playbooks 
Resilience efforts should be folded into dependency models. 
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Advanced Preparation 
Testing and segmentation with strict access control and secure baseline configurations.  
The computer crime prevention program must include the protection from internal crimes.  
Organizations must hold pre-event training processes 
There is not much alignment between DR and InfoSec frameworks and that is a problem. 
 
Question 8: 
What type of expertise (job skills and/or personal) should be recruited to build a 
successful ITDR program that could better respond to computer crimes interruptions? 
project management 
people management 
deep understanding of interdependencies in the IT environment 
business focused understanding of the organization 
Risk Based focus on the business 
Do not hire millennials 
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking 
 basic understanding of the layers of protection, prevention, policy management, 
operations, monitoring, and response  
Certified professionals with CISSP, CISA, and CISM credentials to reduce the risk 
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking 
Analytical, logical, and lateral thinking 
I don’t think it’s a matter of adding job skills or personnel to the equation but more about 
access to other teams 
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking 
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist 
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist 
I don’t think it’s a matter of adding job skills or personnel to the equation but more about 
access to other teams 
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking 
 Minor skills are needed such as Ethical Hacking, Encryption Solutions, Highly 
Adaptable and Collaborative 
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist 
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist 
Certified professionals with CISSP, CISA, and CISM credentials to reduce the risk 
business focused understanding of the organization 
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist 
 basic understanding of the layers of protection, prevention, policy management, 
operations, monitoring, and response  
 
Duplicates removed 
project management 
people management 
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deep understanding of interdependencies in the IT environment 
business focused understanding of the organization 
Risk Based focus on the business 
Do not hire millennials 
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral thinking 
 basic understanding of the layers of protection, prevention, policy management, 
operations, monitoring, and response  
Certified professionals with CISSP, CISA, and CISM credentials to reduce the risk 
Analytical, logical, and lateral thinking 
I don’t think it’s a matter of adding job skills or personnel to the equation but more about 
access to other teams 
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist 
 Minor skills are needed such as Ethical Hacking, Encryption Solutions, Highly 
Adaptable and Collaborative 
 
Question 9: 
What common cybersecurity processes could improve recovery effort that would not 
normally be found in a ITDR program? 
 
Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process would improve the 
planning process 
Password management 
Computer crimes risks should be incorporated into an All-Hazard approach 
Standards based Information security management systems life cycle  
InfoSec training for ITDR teams would improve the program 
Organizations can integrate the RMO and CSO responsibilities into ITDR planning 
activities 
Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process would improve the 
planning process 
formal lessons learned and future prevention, which may help lessen the severity of future 
incidents.  
Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process would improve the 
planning process 
Establishing a baseline of security configurations is another cybersecurity process that 
extends to ITDR. 
Asset inventory processes 
The entire Cybersecurity Framework should be incorporated in the ITDR program. 
Penetration testing and disaster recovery testing 
InfoSec training for ITDR teams would improve the program 
CAG 20 Critical Security controls would improve the recovery 
The entire Cybersecurity Framework should be incorporated in the ITDR program. 
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Duplicates removed 
 
Enterprise Security Risk Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process would improve the 
planning process 
Password management 
Computer crimes risks should be incorporated into an All-Hazard approach 
Standards based Information security management systems life cycle  
InfoSec training for ITDR teams would improve the program 
Organizations can integrate the RMO and CSO responsibilities into ITDR planning 
activities 
formal lessons learned and future prevention, which may help lessen the severity of future 
incidents.  
Establishing a baseline of security configurations is another cybersecurity process that 
extends to ITDR. 
Asset inventory processes 
The entire Cybersecurity Framework should be incorporated in the ITDR program. 
Penetration testing and disaster recovery testing 
CAG 20 Critical Security controls would improve the recovery 
 
Question 10: 
What advantages or disadvantages exist in specifically defining cybersecurity risk and 
controls in disaster recovery frameworks? 
Organizations should include InfoSec risks in ITDR frameworks 
If done well, clearly following an ESRM program and linking the outcomes of the 
framework to the DR framework offers organizations the ability to see the 
interdependencies between assets and objectives. 
There could be a disadvantage by increasing costs to the organization by the addition of 
InfoSec controls into ITDR 
If done well, clearly following an ESRM program and linking the outcomes of the 
framework to the DR framework offers organizations the ability to see the 
interdependencies between assets and objectives. 
There could be a disadvantage by increasing costs to the organization by the addition of 
InfoSec controls into ITDR 
The organization could have minimal or zero interruptions to its business and could 
improve both productivity and brand image 
There does not appear to be any disadvantages 
There could be a disadvantage by increasing costs to the organization by the addition of 
InfoSec controls into ITDR 
There does not appear to be any disadvantages 
 Without cyber being a part of that plan the plan itself will be lacking. 
There could be a disadvantage by increasing costs to the organization by the addition of 
InfoSec controls into ITDR 
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If done properly, cybersecurity risk management will identify the DR systems as one of 
the most business-critical system. 
integrating some cybersecurity risks and controls in your disaster recovery process may 
allow it to easier to identify attacks that would otherwise be considered a “system 
malfunction”. 
A Cybersecurity advantage is that it provides a 2nd or 3rd layer of risk management to 
the disaster recovery framework 
There could be a disadvantage by increasing costs to the organization by the addition of 
InfoSec controls into ITDR 
Organizations should include InfoSec risks in ITDR frameworks 
 
Duplicates removed 
Organizations should include InfoSec risks in ITDR frameworks 
If done well, clearly following an ESRM program and linking the outcomes of the 
framework to the DR framework offers organizations the ability to see the 
interdependencies between assets and objectives. 
There could be a disadvantage by increasing costs to the organization by the addition of 
InfoSec controls into ITDR 
The organization could have minimal or zero interruptions to its business and could 
improve both productivity and brand image 
There does not appear to be any disadvantages 
 Without cyber being a part of that plan the plan itself will be lacking. 
If done properly, cybersecurity risk management will identify the DR systems as one of 
the most business-critical system. 
integrating some cybersecurity risks and controls in your disaster recovery process may 
allow it to easier identify attacks that would otherwise be considered a “system 
malfunction”. 
A Cybersecurity advantage is that it provides a 2nd or 3rd layer of risk management to 
the disaster recovery framework 
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Appendix G: Analysis of the third round of data 
 
Round 3 statements mean STNDV INQ Consensus 
Lack of understanding of the 
interdependencies in IT makes it difficult to 
anticipate the impact of the recovery. 
Improve understanding. 
4.63 0.74 0.25 0.88 
The organization must have adequate 
planning for computer crimes. 
4.13 0.83 1.25 0.75 
Critical IT services must be available to 
conduct a recovery. 
4.00 0.93 2.00 0.63 
A lack of management support and poor 
funding will negatively impact this 
response. 
4.50 0.76 1.00 0.88 
If the organization does not staff skilled 
resources, the response will suffer. 
3.75 0.89 1.25 0.50 
The untested recovery process from 
computer crimes will negatively impact the 
recovery process. 
3.88 0.83 1.25 0.63 
The ability to triage the incident correctly 
as the ITDR team comes on the scene will 
be an issue when the cause is computer 
crimes 
4.25 0.71 1.00 0.88 
IR teams must be trained for such a 
scenario. 
3.88 0.83 1.25 0.63 
Organizations conducting lessons learned 
will improve their response. 
3.75 1.04 1.25 0.63 
Critical data must be protected and 
available from an alternate source to protect 
from computer crimes. There must be a 
clear list of responsibilities in responding to 
this type incident. 
4.25 0.89 1.25 0.75 
If a data backup/alternative is not available, 
traditional recovery will not be successful 
or extremely time-consuming. 
4.38 0.92 1.25 0.75 
If an organization finds itself in a response 
that it has not scoped, it will trip upon the 
response. 
3.25 0.71 1.00 0.38 
When a breach occurs, the organization 
may lack the ability to anticipate and 
4.00 0.76 0.50 0.75 
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quantify the damage. This would hamper 
the recovery. 
An organization may not have outside 
resources available to assist with a 
computer crimes interruption. For example, 
an organization may not have an InfoSec 
resource on retainer. 
3.38 0.92 1.25 0.63 
The organization has a lack of alignment 
with IT goals and business goals. 
4.25 0.71 1.00 0.88 
A Traditional DR playbook may not 
eradicate the intrusion correctly. 
3.63 0.74 1.00 0.43 
The DR team may have a poor 
understanding of the attack which could 
cause the activation of the wrong recovery 
solution, delaying, or stopping the overall 
business resumption. 
4.63 0.74 0.25 0.88 
If organizations do not test for the computer 
crimes scenario, it will fail to recover on 
time. 
3.88 0.83 1.25 0.63 
     
Computer crimes are more complex and 
involve greater communication and 
collaboration outside of IT and the IT 
Security team. 
3.88 0.83 1.25 0.63 
Keep the soft copy of the DR plan offline 
from the main company environment so 
that it cannot be hacked. 
3.50 0.53 1.00 0.50 
Craft procedures where data is lost or 
corrupted and recovery have to be initiated 
using physical backups. 
4.00 0.76 0.50 0.75 
A separate set of procedures for cybercrime 
that takes into consideration the risks of 
computer crimes interruptions. 
3.25 1.16 2.00 0.50 
Real-time data synchronization to alternate 
locations would improve recovery from a 
computer crime interruption. 
3.50 0.93 1.00 0.57 
An improvement would come from lessons 
learned and root cause analysis sessions. 
4.13 0.99 2.00 0.63 
Security architectures must use technology 
in support of business objectives, and 
accurately model dependencies  to 
prioritize resources. 
4.25 0.71 1.00 0.88 
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Organizations must focus on people, 
communications, tools, and facilities to 
improve from computer crimes 
interruptions. 
4.00 0.53 0.00 0.86 
Preventive and testing measures must be 
taken continuously for computer crimes. 
4.13 0.83 1.25 0.75 
Containment and eradication procedures for 
computer crimes will need to be included in 
playbooks. 
4.38 0.74 1.00 0.88 
Embed a Cybersecurity Framework into the 
ITDR program. 
4.50 0.76 1.00 0.88 
     
The prepared organization will not rely on 
one solution to protect everything. 
4.63 0.74 0.25 0.88 
Companies more heavily invested in 
preparing for computer crime-based 
interruptions have greater integration with 
their Information Security counterparts and 
have a management team that understands 
the risks posed by computer crimes and are 
willing to devote more money and attention 
to prevention and preparation for computer 
crime interruptions. 
4.38 0.52 1.00 1.00 
Organizations that are not prepared to deal 
with computer crimes in their ITDR are 
opening themselves up to additional risks, 
and interruptions caused by computer 
crimes. 
4.38 0.52 1.00 1.00 
Organizations cannot treat a computer 
crimes recovery as just a “technical” or 
“IT” led the response to better respond to 
computer crimes. 
4.13 0.83 1.25 0.75 
Organizations must avoid the knee-jerk 
reaction to throw money at a problem 
without first grasping what that problem is 
and then smartly coming up with the 
solution.  
3.88 1.13 2.00 0.63 
Organizations must avoid plans that do not 
take into consideration the current state of 
the systems to better respond to computer 
crimes. 
4.13 0.64 0.25 0.88 
Organizations that do not conduct lessons 
learned and root cause analysis will not 
4.25 0.71 1.00 0.88 
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improve to better respond to computer 
crimes. 
Organizations should avoid placing a low 
value on quality management in DR to 
better respond to computer crimes. 
3.88 0.64 0.25 0.75 
Organizations must avoid architectures that 
lack redundancy or resiliency attributes to 
better respond to computer crimes. 
4.63 0.74 0.25 0.88 
Organizations must avoid thinking they are 
protected from computer crimes. 
4.75 0.71 0.00 0.88 
Organizations must avoid neglecting the 
risk of computer crimes interruptions. 
4.50 0.76 1.00 0.88 
Organizations must not focus on speed but 
instead focus on the assessment phase to 
better respond to computer crimes. 
4.13 0.83 1.25 0.75 
Organizations must avoid having missing 
cybersecurity policies to better respond to 
computer crimes. 
3.75 1.28 2.25 0.63 
Organizations must avoid operating DR 
functions without the proper funding to 
better respond to computer crimes. 
4.00 0.76 0.50 0.75 
Organizations cannot operate ITDR and 
InfoSec in different silos to better respond 
to computer crimes. 
4.25 0.89 1.25 0.75 
     
A well-developed cybersecurity framework 
supports the ITDR, and the opportunity for 
a technical interruption is reduced. 
4.50 0.53 1.00 1.00 
A coordinated process alignment between 
Disaster Recovery and Information 
Security frameworks is vital to reducing the 
recovery of this type. 
4.75 0.46 0.25 1.00 
DR and InfoSec should be aligning their 
lifecycle processes so that like steps are 
executed together, and participation is 
integrated. 
4.38 0.74 1.00 0.88 
Developing an ITDR set of practices and 
different playbooks will reduce the 
response. 
3.38 1.19 1.00 0.63 
Resilience efforts should be folded into 
dependency models to reduce the response 
to this interruption. 
4.00 0.53 0.00 0.88 
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Advanced preparation will reduce a 
computer crimes response. 
4.25 0.89 1.25 0.75 
There is not much alignment between DR 
and InfoSec frameworks, and that is a 
problem. Create alignment. 
4.50 0.76 1.00 0.88 
A deep understanding of interdependencies 
in the IT environment will improve the 
response to computer crimes. 
4.38 0.74 1.00 0.88 
A business-focused understanding of the 
organization will improve the response to 
computer crimes. 
4.38 0.74 1.00 0.88 
A risk-based focus on the business will 
improve the response to computer crimes. 
4.63 0.52 1.00 1.00 
Technical, analytical, logical, and lateral 
thinking will improve the response to 
computer crimes. 
4.50 0.53 1.00 1.00 
A basic understanding of the layers of 
protection, prevention, policy management, 
operations, monitoring, and response will 
improve computer crimes recovery efforts. 
4.25 0.71 1.00 0.88 
Cyber Security expertise needs to exist to 
improve the response to computer crimes. 
4.25 0.89 1.25 0.75 
Implement Enterprise Security Risk 
Management (ESRM) in the ITDR process 
4.25 0.71 1.00 0.88 
Deploy InfoSec training for ITDR teams 4.38 0.52 1.00 1.00 
Organizations can integrate the RMO and 
CSO responsibilities into ITDR planning 
activities 
3.75 0.46 0.25 0.75 
Formal lessons learned and future 
prevention, which may help lessen the 
severity of future incidents.  
3.75 0.71 1.00 0.63 
Establishing a baseline of security 
configurations is another cybersecurity 
process that extends to ITDR. 
3.88 0.83 1.25 0.63 
Implement Asset inventory processes 3.25 0.89 1.25 0.50 
Deploy Penetration testing and disaster 
recovery testing 
3.75 0.71 1.00 0.63 
Implementing the CAG 20 Critical Security 
controls would improve the recovery effort. 
3.88 0.83 1.25 0.63 
Organizations should include InfoSec risks 
in ITDR frameworks 
4.50 0.53 1.00 1.00 
If done well, clearly following an ESRM 
program and linking the outcomes of the 
4.38 0.74 1.00 0.88 
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framework to the DR framework offers 
organizations the ability to see the 
interdependencies between assets and 
objectives. 
Without cyber being a part of that plan, the 
plan itself will be lacking. 
3.88 0.99 0.50 0.71 
If done properly, cybersecurity risk 
management will identify the DR systems 
as one of the most business-critical systems 
in the organization. 
4.00 1.07 1.25 0.75 
Integrating some cybersecurity risks and 
controls in your disaster recovery process 
may allow it to easier identify attacks that 
would otherwise be considered a “system 
malfunction.” 
4.38 0.52 1.00 1.00 
A cybersecurity framework integration 
could provide an advantage in that it 
provides a 2nd or 3rd layer of risk 
management to the disaster recovery 
framework. 
4.00 0.76 0.50 0.75 
 
